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CHAPTER 1   11
Introduction 
  Providing  actively  managed  portfolios  in  publicly  traded  assets,  hedge  funds  and 
mutual funds have exactly the same economic function. In contrast to mutual funds – the 
most popular collective investment vehicles (Babalos, Kostacis, Philipas (2009)) managing a 
considerable part of financial assets worldwide
1 – the overall size of hedge funds is relatively 
small
2. Nevertheless, experiencing tremendous growth over the past two decades (See Figure 
1.1), the active role that  hedge funds play  in financial markets makes them much more 
important than suggested by their size alone (Garbaravicius, Dierick, 2005). In fact, hedge 
funds account for nearly half the trading on the New York and London stock exchanges 
(Stulz, 2007). 
Figure 1.1 
*Estimated Growth of Assets 
Hedge Fund Industry 1990 – 2008 
 
* Source: Hedge Fund Research database 
Hedge funds differ from mutual funds by lack of regulations, by limited transparency 
and disclosure, and by their internal structure (see, e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 1997). Having a 
great  deal  of  flexibility,  hedge  fund  managers  typically  can  invest  in  international  and 
                                                         
1 At year-end 2009 mutual funds assets worldwide counted for about $23 trillion, almost half of which belonged 
to US funds – $11.1 trillion (ICI, 2010, Fact Book, page 22). 
2 According to Hedge Fund Research database, at the year-end 2008 hedge funds worldwide managed about 




























domestic equities and debt, and the entire range of derivatives, take undiversified positions, 
sell  short  and lever  up  the  portfolio  (see,  e.g., Fung  and  Hsieh,  1997,  Liang,  2000). In 
contrast, mutual funds usually do not sell short, do not borrow, and make limited use of 
derivative securities (Koski and Pontiff, 1999). 
In general, hedge  funds can be best defined by their freedom from the Investment 
Company Act’s (1940) rules. The Investment Company Act bounds fund leverage, short 
selling, level of holdings of other investment companies’ shares, as well as level of holdings 
of  a  single  company  shares.  The  hedge  fund  manager  compensation  scheme  is  usually 
composed of a minimum investment, an annual fee (of about 1% - 2%), and an incentive fee 
of annual profits (which range may fluctuate between 5% and 25%). The scheme is typically 
benchmarked against an index or at 0% return each year, and often includes a so called “high 
water mark” – a stipulation appending past underperformance thresholds to the latest one.  
Hedge funds are often structured as limited liability companies or limited partnerships 
primarily targeting for high net worth individuals and institutions.
3 Investment flexibility and 
freedom from regulatory control limiting activity of competing investment companies comes 
at the cost of boundaries on public advertising. Simultaneously, the lack of regulatory control 
implies  difficulties  for  current  and  potential  hedge  fund  investors  in  extracting  reliable 
information on the funds. Moreover, the same regulatory rules prevent the funds opportunity 
to spread information on their activities even if it were in funds’ interest to do so. This may 
be one reason why relatively little is still known about the hedge fund industry.  
Despite  the  fairly  poor  information  about  hedge  funds,  the  industry  attracts 
increasingly growing investors’ interest. Evidence on the hedge funds’ historical risk and 
return characteristics suggests that hedge funds may be a valuable portfolio asset (Brown and 
Goetzmann (2003), Amenc, Faff and Martellini (2002)).   
The first hedge fund, which was founded by Alfred Winslow Jones in 1949, was a 
“market  neutral”  fund  taking  long positions  in  undervalued securities  and  funding these 
positions by taking short positions in overvalued securities. This was the “hedge” aiming to 
leverage the investment in the way allowing to make maximally high bets with limited initial 
                                                         
3 The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 limits a number of participants to at most 500. 
Moreover, according to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act only “qualified investors” defined as 
individuals who have at least $5 Million to invest and institutions with assets of at least $25 Million are allowed 
to participate.   13
investment resources. Following the success of Jones’ fund, many new hedge funds, whose 
managers tried to imitate Jones’ “market neutral” strategy, were founded in the latest ‘60s 
(Lhabitant, 2007, “Handbook of Hedge Funds”). Nowadays hedge funds are anything but a 
homogeneous industry which can be treated as a single asset class (Brown and Goetzmann 
(2003)).  The  hedge  funds  can  be  distinguished  by  wide  range  of  different  investment 
strategies ranging far from the original Jones’ “market neutral” one.
4 Thus, some hedge fund 
managers  create  value  through  unique  trading  skills,  others  through  implementation  of 
superior asset pricing models, and others through advanced knowledge of particular asset 
markets. The diversity of  strategies applied by  different  hedge fund managers,  however, 
complicates benchmarking and evaluation of fund managers’ performance.  
To allow appropriate benchmarking, hedge funds, like many other investment classes, 
are often classified by investment styles revealing the investment strategy that a hedge fund 
follows  (see,  e.g.,  Brown  and  Goetzmann  (2003),  Agarwal,  Daniel  and  Naik  (2004)). 
Thereby, an investment style represents a key element in inferring a fund’s risk exposures 
and  serves  as  a  benchmark  for  performance  evaluation  of  hedge  fund  managers  (see 
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2000).  
According to the results of a survey conducted by Alternative investment Management 
Association in 2003, about half (47%) of the hedge fund industry participants (consultants, 
investors,  and  fund  managers)  use  one  or  more  classifications  as  defined  by  outside 
classification systems, while merely few (3%) argue that there is no way to classify hedge 
funds (Lhabitant, 2007, "Handbook of Hedge Funds"). 
There is no commonly accepted rule to categorize hedge fund strategies. In their works, 
Fung and Hsieh (1997, 1999) claim that the return characteristics are the ones that determine 
the style of hedge fund strategies. In their study from 1997 they determine four broad styles: 
Directional,  Relative  Value,  Security  Selection,  and  Multi-Process  Traders.  The  same 
classification  is  suggested  by  Brown  and  Goetzmann  (2003).  Agarwal  and  Naik  (2000) 
divide hedge funds into two generalized classes: Directional and Non-Directional. There are 
other classifications in the  hedge fund literature. For instance,  Harri and Brorsen (2004) 
classify hedge funds into seven styles: Global, Regional, Market Neutral, Short Sales, Long 
Only, Event Driven, and Macro Strategies as fund styles. Okunev and White (2003) distinct 
                                                         
4 Accordingly, investment strategy determines the investment approaches a fund manager implements and array 
and type of financial instruments he used to operate with.   14
for six different styles – Convertible Arbitrage, Fixed Income Arbitrage, Credit Trading, 
Distress  Securities,  Merger  Arbitrage,  and  Multi-Process  –  Event  Driven.  Many  other 
alternatives exist as well. To identify hedge fund style, we use the TASS style classification, 
which  is  similar  to  the  classification  suggested  by  one  of  the  most  accepted  systems  - 
CS/Tremont.
5 
The importance of the hedge fund investment style is widely documented by existing 
academic literature. Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2000) conduct a so-called generalized style 
analysis
6  to  test  the  risk-return  tradeoffs.  The  authors  report  that  Directional  strategies 
demonstrate  lower  Sharpe  ratios  and  higher  downside  risk  as  compared  to  the  Non-
Directional strategies. Overall, the authors find that the risk exposures are mostly consistent 
with the  investment  objectives
7  of the different  hedge  fund  strategies. Amenc,  Faff  and 
Martellini (2002) show significant diversification benefits by adding hedge funds, diversified 
at style level, to an investors’ portfolio. Brown and Goetzmann (2003) verify a number of 
management  styles.  They  find  that  investment  styles  explain  about  20%  of  the  cross-
sectional variability in hedge fund returns. Based on this finding, the authors conclude that 
appropriate style analysis and style management are crucial in investment decisions of hedge 
fund investors.  
Simultaneously,  recent  research  on  investor  behavior  documents  the  importance  of 
style  information on investment decisions. On the theoretical part, Barberis and Shleifer 
(2003)  introduce  the  style  investing  hypothesis.  According  to  this  hypothesis  investors 
categorize risky assets into styles and subsequently reallocate their money from previously 
successful styles into future winners. Furthermore, within style assets are similarly affected 
from  style  competition  and  therefore  co-move.  There  are  a  number  of  studies  testing 
relevancy of style investing for different financial sectors. For example, Barberis, Shleifer 
and Wurgler (2003) assume that index stocks are considered as a separate category, and find 
                                                         
5 Among most popular classifications appear these of CS/Tremont (27% of users), Hedge Fund Research (27%), 
MSCI (23%), CISDM, and European  and Cogent  Hedge  database ((Lhabitant, 2007, "Handbook  of  Hedge 
Funds"). 
6 Classification into generalized styles implies segregation of hedge fund strategies in two groups: directional 
and  non-directional  strategies.  "The  non-directional  strategies  are  designed  to  exploit  short  term  market 
inefficiencies  while  hedging  out  as  much  of  the  market  exposure  as  possible.  In  contrast,  the  directional 
strategies are designed to benefit from broad market movements. These two categories potentially have very 
different applications: the directional strategies helping one achieve the desired asset allocation while the non-
directional strategies enabling one to profit from security selection. " (quotation Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 
(2000))  
7 Investment objective means the financial goal of investment.   15
that stocks as soon as they are included in the index co-move more than implied by their 
fundamentals. Pomorski (2004) tests the impact of style level information on mutual fund 
flows. The author documents that while at style level money-flows are found to be positively 
affected by past performance of the style, at individual fund level flows are found to be 
negatively  affected  by  style  performance.  These  findings  contradict  the  style  investing 
hypothesis, while they are in line with intra-style return chasing.  
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing papers studies the effect of style 
information on investment decisions of hedge fund investors. At the same time, investigation 
of  the  effect  that  the  investment  style  has  on  hedge  fund  investor  decision  process  is 
especially valuable in light of findings of previous hedge fund literature suggesting that the 
investment style is one of the determinant characteristics of hedge funds. Chapter 2 of this 
thesis  examines the  way  hedge  fund investors  take  into  account  style  information when 
making their investment decisions.   
First, we test for the existence of competition among hedge fund investment styles. In 
line  with  Barberis  and  Shleifer’s  (2003)  theory,  we  find  that  hedge  fund  styles  indeed 
compete for investors' money. Better performing and more popular styles are rewarded with 
higher inflows in the subsequent periods.  
Next, we examine distribution of money flows within styles. In contrast to Barberis and 
Shleifer's theory, we find that within style money flows are not equally distributed. Despite 
that  in  general  style  popularity  attracts  higher  investments  to  the  style,  within  fund 
competition weakens the style effect. Thereby, better performing and more popular funds 
within style experience higher inflows in the subsequent periods.  
Finally, we test whether the hedge funds' version of style chasing justifies itself. Our 
results show that the way hedge fund investors chase investment styles appears to be a smart 
one. In line with the finding of Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers (2007) who show that 
in the hedge fund flows predict future performance of a fund, we find that style chasing 
implemented together with search for the best within style funds is profitable. This result 
implies an ability of hedge fund investors to select funds best-performing in the future.  
A number of papers investigate the fund selection ability for mutual fund investors. 
The investigation of mutual fund investors’ ability to spot the funds that will perform better   16
and move their capital into those funds – known also as the “smart money” effect – was 
initiated by Gruber (1996). Gruber (1996) attempted to find an explanation for the question 
why the industry of actively managed mutual funds
8 has grown so fast despite the widespread 
evidence  that  on  average  active  fund  managers  do  not  add  value.  According  to  Gruber 
(1996),  the  ability  of  mutual  fund  investors  to  identify  better  managers,  and  invest 
accordingly may justify investing in actively managed mutual funds. Expanding on Gruber’s 
(1996)  idea,  Zheng  (1999)  finds  that  funds  with  positive  net  cash  flows  subsequently 
demonstrate better risk-adjusted return than funds experiencing negative net cash flows. In 
addition, Zheng also finds that information on net cash flows into small funds can be used to 
generate risk-adjusted profits. The more recent research of Sapp and Tiwari (2004), however, 
claims that the smart money effect reported by previous studies comes from failure of these 
studies to capture the stock return momentum factor. In contrast to Sapp and Tiwari (2004), 
Keswani and Stolin (2008) report strong evidence of the smart money effect. The authors 
claim that Sapp and Tiwari’s failure to find a significant relationship between money flows 
and subsequent fund returns is attributed to their use of – relatively low frequency – quarterly 
flows.
9 
 Nowadays, the number of actively managed funds has continued to grow. Moreover, 
since the early 1990s, a new class of so-called institutional funds has emerged (James and 
Karceski (2006)). In contrast to retail funds that focus on regular individuals, institutional 
funds primarily target institutional investors such as corporations, non-profit organizations, 
endowments, foundations, municipalities, pension funds, and other large investors, including 
wealthy individuals. As a result, investor profile of those two types of fund differs as well. 
More sophisticated institutional investors allocate their money in institutional funds, while 
retail funds primarily target unsophisticated – individual investors. Given  higher level of 
sophistication of institutional fund investors, they can be expected to demonstrate superior 
fund selection ability – or a stronger “smart money” effect – than retail fund investors. In 
Chapter 3 we reexamine the smart money effect, comparing the fund selection abilities of 
investors of retail funds, representing mostly unsophisticated individual investors, against 
this ability of investors of institutional funds, among whom – though a higher proportion 
                                                         
8 Besides other classifications, mutual funds typically classified into index funds and actively managed funds. 
Index funds invest in companies whose stocks (or bonds) compose major stock (or bond) indexes, such as the 
S&P 500. Thus, the performance of index fund are closely approximates this of the index imitated by the fund. 
In contrast, actively managed funds try to outperform a relevant index through superior stock-picking abilities 
of their managers and implementation of advanced asset-pricing models and methodologies.  
9 In their study, Keswani and Stolin (2008) use flow data estimated on a monthly frequency.   17
represents  sophisticated  investors  –  are  also  disadvantaged  investors  due  to  account 
restriction or tax issues. 
We  explore  this  question  by  examining  the  smart  money  effect  separately  for 
investors of retail and institutional funds.  
In line with the studies of Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), and Keswani and Stolin 
(2008), we find a smart money effect for investors of both retail and institutional mutual 
funds. The effect is robust to different measures of performance and flows, and controlling 
for  stock return  momentum  and investment  style.  Consistent  with the findings  of Zheng 
(1999), we find that the smart money effect comes mainly from small funds. We also observe 
that investors of both types of funds demonstrate better fund selection ability over expansion 
periods than during recession periods.  
Surprisingly, our results suggest that investors of institutional funds, with a higher 
representation of more sophisticated investors, do not demonstrate a better fund selection 
ability.  
In  addition,  the  results  reported  in  Chapter  3  detect  a  few  signs  of  possible 
differences in the way investors of the two types of mutual funds make their investment or 
divestment decisions. The observed dissimilarities in the flows development for retail and 
institutional  mutual  funds  can  be  a  result  of  difference  in  investment  decision  patterns 
characterizing  investors  of  each  fund  type.  Since  the  typical  retail  fund  investor  differs 
noticeably from the typical institutional fund investor in his level of financial sophistication, 
investment  objectives,  and  search  costs  (e.g.,  Alexander,  Jones  and  Nigro  (1998),  Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Palmiter and Taha (2008)), criteria that these two types of 
investors  base  their  investment  decision  on  are  likely  to  vary,  making  investment  flow 
patterns of retail and institutional funds differ too. 
A bench of mutual fund studies examines investment flows. Edelen (1999) shows that 
investment  flows to a large extent determine  fund manager trading activity causing fund 
managers to engage in liquidity motivated trading that they otherwise would have avoided. In 
addition,  mutual  fund  research  documents  that  investment  flows  affect  fund  manager 
incentives with respect to risk. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997) argue that fund manager compensation tied to amount of assets under management 
together with the convex form of the fund flow-performance relationship, creates incentives   18
for  managers  to  shift  fund  risk.  Johnson  (2005)  emphasizes  the  importance  of  flow 
examination due to the potential influence of flows on fund performance.  
Researchers  investigating  the  determinants  of  mutual  fund  flows  established  the 
importance  of  past  performance  (e.  g.,  Chevalier  and  Ellison  (1997),  Gruber  (1996), 
Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1994), Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Ivkovich 
and Weisbenner (2009), and Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos (2009)). Some of these 
studies reveal  that  mutual  funds’  flow  performance relationship  has  a  convex  form.  For 
example,  Sirri  and  Tufano  (1998)  report  that  individual  mutual  fund  investors  allocate 
asymmetrically more assets in funds with high performance in the previous period. In their 
recent  study  Ivkovich  and  Weisbenner  (2009)  document  that  individual  mutual  fund 
investors tend to sell recently losing funds, while reluctant to sell the recent winners. At the 
same time, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) report that the relationship is convex for retail 
mutual  funds,  while  it  is  nearly  linear  for  managers  of  pension  funds.  In  line  with  Del 
Guercio  and  Tkac’s  (2002)  results,  Ferreira,  Keswani,  Miguel  and  Ramos  (2009),  who 
examine variation in the mutual funds’ flow-performance relationship across countries, find 
that the relationship tends to be less convex in countries with a higher level of economy and a 
more  developed  mutual  fund  industry,  explaining  their  findings  by  the  higher  level  of 
financial  sophistication  of  investors,  and  lower  costs  of  participation  in  mutual  funds 
attributing developed countries. 
Some of the literature shows the effect of flows on fund managers’ behavior (e. g., 
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), and Chevalier and Ellison (1995)). Other studies shed 
light on the relationship between search costs and fund flows, and the influence of fund 
marketing and advertisement on flows (e. g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Barber, Odean and 
Zheng (2005), Babalos, Kostakis and Philippas (2009), Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009)). 
For instance, Sirri and Tufano (1998) suggest that search costs have an important impact on 
the investment decisions of individual mutual fund investors. The authors document that high 
performance  seems to be most salient  for funds which exert  higher marketing efforts as 
measured  by  high  fees.  Media  attention,  reducing  investor  search  costs,  is  positively 
associated with fund flows. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2003) find that mutual fund investors 
are influenced by salient, attention-grabbing information. They note that investors are more 
sensitive to salient in-your-face fees, like front-end loads and commissions than operating 
expenses;  they  are  likely  to  buy  funds  that  attract  their  attention  through  exceptional   19
performance,  marketing,  or  advertising.  Moreover,  they  do  not  observe  any  significant 
relationship between annual flows and fund operational expenses. They explain this result by 
a positive relationship between fund advertisement efforts and flows, which cancels out the 
negative effect of the fund expense ratio, embedding advertisement costs. In line with this 
result,  Babalos,  Kostakis  and  Philippas  (2009),  examining  Greek  mutual  funds,  find  no 
relationship between fund expenses and flows. In contrast, Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009) 
find that individual investor divestment decisions are sensitive to the fund expense ratio. 
However, those studies do not usually distinguish between flows of funds targeting 
different types of investors. Meanwhile, the growing proportion of institutional funds – both 
in term of the number of funds and assets under management – makes the recognition and 
understanding  of  those  differences  especially  important.  In  Chapter  4,  we  study 
determinants of mutual funds’ investment flows separately for retail and institutional funds, 
examining  how fund selection criteria  vary across  investors of these two types of funds. 
Examination of flows at the monthly frequency allows us to get a more precise picture of 
fund flows’ dynamics as  compared to analysis  based on  quarterly  or  annually  estimated 
flows.
10 
The  results  documented  in  Chapter  4  indicate  a  number  of  differences  in  the 
investment flow patterns consistent with client attributes. First, we find that customers of 
institutional mutual funds react more to such sophisticated performance measures as risk-
adjusted returns. On the other hand, flows of retail funds have a stronger relationship with 
unadjusted  performance  measures.  This  result  comes  in  line  with  the  previous  research 
examining investment decision process for individual and institutional investors. Del Guercio 
and  Tkac  (2002),  for  example,  find  that  the  typical  institutional  investor  pension  fund 
sponsors,  in  contrast  to  individual  mutual  fund  investors,  rely  more  on  quantitatively 
sophisticated  fund  performance  evaluation  methods,  such  as  fund  Jensen’s  alpha. 
Alternatively,  summarizing  the  findings  of  academic  literature  that  studies  mutual  fund 
individual  investor’s  profile,  Palmiter  and  Taha  (2008)  conclude  that  the  majority  of 
individual investors participating in mutual funds do not take into account the risk and the 
costs associated with their investments in the funds, and chase past returns.  
                                                         
10 Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) investigate mutual fund flows estimated at quarterly frequency; Berk and 
Tonks (2009), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) study mutual fund flows measured at 
annual frequency.   20
We also find that the observed difference in flow-performance relationship increases 
during  recession periods. This  finding  is consistent  with  the  results  of  earlier  studies  of 
Moskowitz (2000) and Kosowski (2006) suggesting that mutual funds perform better during 
recessions than during expansions. Moreover, according to those studies, recession periods 
appear to be the best time to profit from predictability of mutual fund managers’ skills. This 
may explain our results indicating that while investors of both types of mutual funds put 
higher weight to fund alpha during recessions, more sophisticated investors of institutional 
funds exhibit even stronger priority for fund risk-adjusted performance over those periods. 
Furthermore in this chapter, we compare the form of flow-performance relationship 
for  retail  and  institutional  mutual  funds.  Consistently  with  the  empirical  findings  of  the 
previous literature (e. g., Sirri and Tufano (1998), Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009), Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002), Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel and Ramos (2009)), we find that the 
flow-performance relationship has a non-linear form. However, the form of this relationship 
is  not  the  same  for  flows  of  retail  and  institutional  funds.  While  for  retail  funds,  the 
relationship appears to have a convex form, implying that investors of those funds tend to 
allocate disproportionally more into good performers, but do not punish bad performers by 
withdrawing  money.  For  institutional  funds,  however,  the  form  of  flow-performance 
relationship appears to be convex only in the part reflecting disproportional priority of good 
performers to the rest of the funds. Conversely, the form is concave in the part reflecting 
punishment  of  bad  performers.  This  result  implies  that  investors  of  institutional  funds 
withdraw assets from poor performing funds punishing the worst performers the hardest, 
while allocating assets into good performing funds, investing more in the best performers.  
Our  findings  on  differences  in  the  form  of  the  flow-performance  for  retail  and 
institutional funds relationship contribute to the extensive literature on incentives and driver 
factors of fund manager behavior. The convex shape of the flow-performance relationship, 
observed for the funds of retail fund sample, implies that “winners take all”. As a result, fund 
managers, who are typically compensated as a percentage of assets under management, have 
an implicit incentive to raise the risk of their portfolios in order to increase their chances to 
be among the winners, without taking a risk of being punished in case of failure (see, e.g.,  
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997)). At the same time, the 
observed concave-convex form of the flow-performance relationship for institutional funds 
may weaken fund manager incentive to follow the discussed risk-shifting behavior.   21
Existing mutual fund literature reports that individual fund investors may attempt to 
reduce search cost using publically available information such as historical performance of a 
benchmark. For instance, Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009) show that flows of individual 
investors into mutual funds are positively related to fund relative performance with respect to 
its investment objective category (IOC). Similarly, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) document 
the importance of a benchmark for both individual and institutional investors. In line with 
those  findings,  Chapter  4  indicates  that  relative  performance  of  funds,  with  respect  to 
benchmarks, is an important criterion in the fund selection process. Both institutional and 
retail funds, outperforming their IOC, experience higher flows than underperforming funds. 
The benchmark appears to have a stronger influence among investors of retail funds. The 
influence of the magnitude of the excess returns on fund flows is found to be especially 
pronounced at the top of the performance distribution.  
Moreover, we find a significant negative relationship between investment flows and 
tracking error – a measure of diversifiable risk  – for both institutional and retail mutual 
funds.  Thus,  both  types  of  investor  punish  funds  with  a  higher  tracking  error  through 
withdrawing assets from those funds, and the tendency appears to be much more pronounced 
for flows of institutional funds. Furthermore, for institutional funds, the influence of tracking 
error on investment flows is stronger during expansion periods. In contrary, flows of retail 
funds are, though weaker than institutional flows, negatively related to the tracking error 
during bullish periods and positively related to the tracking error during bearish periods.  
Furthermore, Chapter 4 documents evidence suggesting that flows of both types of 
funds  are  significantly  positively  related  to  fund  momentum  exposure.  The  momentum 
phenomenon  implies  that  well  performing  stocks  tend  to  continue  performing  well 
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). Sapp and Tiwari (2004), investigating the “smart money” 
effect for a broad sample of domestic equity funds, conjecture that investors tend to allocate 
their money into ex-post winner funds. As a result, past best-performers disproportionally 
hold ex-post best-performing stocks. Thereby, reallocating their money into past winners, 
investors  unconsciously  benefit  from  momentum  returns  on  winning  stocks.  However, 
analyzing  the  hypothesis  empirically,  the  authors  conclude  that  higher  exposure  to  the 
momentum  factor  does  not  make  a  fund  more  popular,  reporting  a  positive  while 
insignificant relationship between fund momentum exposure and subsequent quarter flows. 
In contrast, Goetzmann and Massa (2002) document that the investors of index mutual funds   22
exhibit momentum behavior. Contributing to this discussion, Wermers (1997) shows that 
momentum  trading  funds  succeed  consistently  to  outperform  their  peers,  therefore 
investment in momentum following funds represent a reasonable strategy.  
Consistent  with  the  literature  documenting  variation  of  investor  behavior  across 
different  market  conditions,  our  results  show  that  momentum-trading  institutional  funds 
attract considerably higher inflows than their retail counterparts during expansions, while 
those  funds  experience  relatively  lower  flows  over  recessions  (see,  e.g.,  Grinblatt  and 
Keloharju (2001), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), and Glode Hollified, Kacperczyk, and 
Kogan (2009)). 
We document that both institutional and retail funds with higher inflows in the past 
continue to experience higher inflows in the subsequent periods (see, e.g., Hendricks, Patel, 
and Zeckhauser (1993), and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)). Moreover, this effect appears to 
be  stronger  for  institutional  funds.  This  result  suggests  that  institutional  fund  investors 
exhibit stronger herding  behavior,  which  is  in line  with  the  results  reported by  previous 
literature (see, e.g., Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992b))
11.  
Finally,  studies  on  the  selection  of  mutual  funds  posit  that  individual  investors  face 
substantial search costs and are less informed than institutional investors (e. g., Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Barber, Odean and Zheng (2003), Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009)). The 
results  reported in  Chapter  4 reveal that the fund expense ratio also appears  to  have  a 
significant influence on flows of both types of funds. In particular, mutual funds with lower 
expense  ratio  experience  higher  inflows.  Retail  fund  investors  demonstrate  stronger 
sensitivity  to  the  fund  expense  ratio,  and  the  difference  is  even  larger  during  recession 
periods.  Probably,  investors  of  institutional  funds  –  being  less  sensitive  to  the  price  of 
services – due to the fact that they do not invest their own money – are ready to pay for 
higher quality or more convenient service.                         
                                                         
11  According to Nofsinger  and  Sias  (1999),  herding  occurs  when  a  group  of  investors  trades  in  the  same 
direction over a period of time. In addition, the authors denote feedback trading is a special case of herding 
involving correlation between herding and lag returns.   23
CHAPTER 2   24
Style Chasing by Hedge Fund Investors 
(This chapter was written in co-authorship with Jenke ter Horst) 
This chapter examines whether investors chase hedge fund investment styles. We find that 
better performing and more popular styles are rewarded with higher inflows in subsequent 
periods.  This  indicates  that  investors  compare  styles  according  to  style  characteristics 
relative to other styles, and subsequently reallocate their funds from less successful to more 
successful hedge fund investment styles of the recent past. Furthermore, we find evidence of 
competition between individual hedge funds of the same style. Funds outperforming their 
styles and funds with above style average inflows experience higher inflows in subsequent 
periods. One of the reasons for competition within same style funds is the investors’ search 
for  the  best  managers.  The  extremely  high  level  of  minimum  investments  limits  the 
diversification opportunities and makes this search particularly important. Finally, we show 
that hedge  funds'  version of style chasing  in combination with  intra-style fund selection 
represents a smart strategy.  
2.1   Introduction 
Hedge funds, like many other investment classes, are often classified by investment 
styles. Long-Short equity hedge, managed futures, event-driven and convertible arbitrage are 
among the most popular hedge fund investment styles of the past decade. The importance of 
style classifications grows with the number of individual assets or funds in an investment 
class. In huge investment classes, like stocks or mutual funds, a portfolio allocation decision 
based on a selection among styles is often preferred to a selection among individual assets. 
Today, the number of registered hedge funds far exceeds 10,000. Therefore, we expect that 
information  regarding  a  hedge  fund’s  investment  style  has  an  important  impact  on  the 
investment  decision.  This  chapter  investigates  whether  hedge  fund  investors  chase  well 
performing hedge fund investment styles and examines the effect of style information on the 
selection of individual funds within a particular style.  
Recent papers investigating investor behavior document evidence on the importance 
of investment styles (see, for example, Brown and Goetzmann, 2003). According to the style 
investing hypothesis (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003) investors categorize risky assets into styles 
and subsequently allocate money to those styles depending on the relative performance of the 
styles. There are a number of studies testing style investing for different financial sectors 
(see, for example, Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2003), Pomorski (2004)). However, for 
our best knowledge, none of the existing papers studies style  investing for hedge funds.   25
Moreover, while some of the current hedge fund literature studies the role of investment style 
documenting  its  particular  importance,  and  some  investigates  factors  driving  investment 
decisions,  there  is  none  that  thoroughly  examines  the  link  between investment  style  and 
investment decisions. We propose to fill this gap by examining the way hedge fund style is 
taken into consideration in the investment decision process. 
Our study contributes to the hedge fund literature in a number of ways. First, the 
study  includes  empirical  tests  that  illustrate  whether  style  investing  takes  place  in  the 
relatively  new  and  dramatically  grown  asset  class  of  hedge  funds.  It  is  interesting  and 
relevant to know whether style investing takes place within this asset class, and, if so, what 
its impact is on the financial market in general or the hedge fund industry specifically. The 
inflow of money to the best performing style may have an important price impact on the 
underlying assets of the investment style. Furthermore, the inflow of money can affect the 
competition between the funds within the style due to an increase in the number of funds 
offered with similar style. Eventually, this could lead to a diminishing performance of the 
style in general. This implies that investors face decreasing returns to scale at style level, in 
line with Berk and Green’s (2004) model at individual fund level. In line with Berk and 
Green’s model, Naik, Ramadorai and Stromqvist (2007) show that capacity constraints at the 
level of investment styles are responsible for declining risk-adjusted returns over the period 
2000-2004. 
Second,  the  chapter  examines  whether  at  individual  fund  level,  aggregate  style 
information is taken into account in the investment decision. A substantial part of the hedge 
fund  literature  investigates  the  determinants  of  individual  hedge  fund  flows.  Past 
performance  as  well  as  fund  characteristics  such  as  the  compensation  scheme  for  the 
manager, fund manager characteristics, and presence of share restrictions, appear to have a 
significant  impact  on  fund  flows  (see,  for  example,  Agarwal,  Daniel  and  Naik,  2004; 
Baquero and Verbeek, 2006; Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers, 2007; and Li, Zhang 
and Zhao,  2007).  However,  none  of  the  previous  studies examine  whether  relative style 
information has an impact on individual fund flows. Given the huge number of hedge funds 
available, we expect that style information is an important factor in the choice for a particular 
hedge fund. In this chapter we will investigate the effect of style characteristics on money 
flows into and out of hedge funds.    26
Finally, the chapter examines whether style chasing is a smart strategy for investors. 
In the case of funds-of-funds, Fung, Hsieh, Naik and Ramadorai (2007) find strong evidence 
of diminishing  returns  to  scale  in  combination  with  inflow  of  new  money  in  the  better 
performing funds. Naik, Ramadorai and Stromqvist (2007) show that capacity constraints 
affect future returns of some hedge fund strategies. Hedge fund investors are considered as a 
more sophisticated investor clientele when compared to mutual fund investors. However, 
hedge fund investors are confronted with liquidity restrictions due to, for instance, lock up 
periods.  An  investment  decision  in  a  hedge  fund  or  hedge  fund  style  cannot  easily  be 
reversed at a short term. This implies that such an investor needs to be more convinced of the 
appropriateness and the timing of the investment decision. Although capacity constraints for 
some strategies may negatively affect future returns at style level, a strategy of style chasing 
in  combination  with  intra-style  fund  selection,  may  nevertheless  be  a  well  performing 
strategy. Therefore it is interesting to examine whether the more sophisticated hedge fund 
investors are behaving effectively when they increasingly invest in the most popular strategy 
of the recent past. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that the better performing and more 
popular  styles  are  rewarded  with  higher  inflows  in  subsequent  periods.  Style  popularity 
positively affects the subsequent money-flows of funds related to popular styles. Secondly, 
we find that the style effect is not equal for funds within a style: better performing and more 
popular funds within a style experience higher inflows in subsequent periods. We explain this 
result by the presence of intra-style competition, a result that is consistent with Getmansky 
(2005). A key  factor encouraging intra-style competition between  funds is the investors’ 
search for the best managers (Li, Zhang and Zhao, 2007; Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2008). 
Apparently,  the  elevated  minimum  investment  required  by  individual  hedge  fund 
substantially limits diversification opportunities (see, for example, Stulz, 2007), and thereby 
magnifies the importance of the search for the right manager. Finally, our results show that 
the way hedge fund investors chase investment styles appears to be a smart one. We find that 
while  style  chasing  alone  does  not  generate  profits,  style  chasing  is  profitable  when 
implemented together with the search for the best funds within a particular style.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe the 
data, and we present some summary statistics from our sample of hedge funds. In Section 2.3   27
we  develop  and  motivate  our  hypotheses,  while  in  Section  2.4  we  formally  test  the 
hypotheses and perform a number of robustness checks. Section 2.5 concludes.  
2.2   Data 
Our  survivorship  free  dataset,  provided  by  TASS,  contains  information  on  2,917 
hedge funds reporting in US dollars over the period 1994-2003. For each individual fund, our 
dataset contains  raw  returns and  total  net  assets under management  (TNA)  on  the  basis 
reported by the fund (monthly, quarterly, or other). Returns are net of all management and 
incentive fees. From our initial sample we exclude 156 closed-end funds that are present in 
our database, since subscriptions to these funds are only possible during the initial issuing 
period. Furthermore, we exclude 487 fund-of-funds (FOFs), which have a different treatment 
of  incentive  fees  and  may  have  different  performance  characteristics.  Another  important 
reason for excluding FOFs from the sample is the difference in investor composition between 
FOF and individual  hedge funds.  While  a majority  of  FOF  clients  are  private  investors, 
clients  of  individual  hedge  funds  are  mostly  so-called  high  net  worth  individuals  and 
institutional investors. Hence, clients of FOFs and those of individual hedge funds may differ 
in their levels of sophistication. Therefore FOFs investors may follow a different decision 
making process than investors allocating their money to individual hedge funds.  
We  use  quarterly  data,  which  allows  us  to  explore  the  short-term  dynamics  of 
investment and redemption behavior. Quarterly data reduces the patterns of serial correlation 
that characterize hedge fund returns when these are analyzed on a monthly basis (Getmansky, 
Lo and Makarov, 2004). We value total net assets (TNAs) per quarter for the most recent 
quarters available. Furthermore, we restrict attention to funds with a minimum of 5 quarters 
of return history and with quarterly cash flows available for at least 5 quarters. While the last 
selection imposes a survival condition, it ensures that a sufficient number of lagged returns 
are available in order to estimate our models. We exclude observations with extreme changes 
in  TNAs.  All  observations  with  changes  higher  than  300  percent  (there  were  83  such 
observations) or lower than -90 percent (there were 44 such observations) are excluded. Our 
final sample contains 2,274 funds and a total of 33,203 fund-period observations. Our sample 
contains 229 funds at the end of the first quarter of 1994, accounting for about 27 billion US 
dollars in net assets, and 1,331 funds at the end of the last quarter of 2003, accounting for   28
195 billion.
12 Hence, the assets under management have grown more than six times over the 
sample period.  
In Table 2.1 we provide some cross-sectional characteristics of individual funds. The 
table reveals that the average level of minimum investment in an individual hedge fund is 
remarkably high: above $750,000. Impressively, the highest level of minimum investment is 
$25 million! The incentive fee can be as high as 50%, while the maximum management fee 
in our sample of funds is 8%. The majority of the hedge funds (approximately 73%) make 
use  of  leverage,  and  55%  of  the  funds  register  that  the  fund  manager invested  personal 
capital.   
[ Please insert Table 2.1 about here] 
According to the results of a 2003 survey conducted by the Alternative Investment 
Management Association, about half (47%) of hedge fund industry participants (consultants, 
investors,  and managers)  use one  or  more of the style classifications  defined  by outside 
classification systems, while only a very few (3%) argue that there is no way to classify 
hedge funds.
13 Nonetheless, there is no commonly accepted rule to categorize hedge funds. 
While the hedge fund industry was originally based on a single long-short strategy, today 
hedge funds use an abundance of different investment strategies. In our study we use the 
TASS style classification which is similar to one of the most widely accepted systems - 
CS/Tremont.
14 For robustness checks we also use the classification suggested by Agarwal, 
Daniel and Naik (2004). They determine four broad styles and we refer to this classification 
as the ADN styles. Alternative classifications exist as well (see, for example, Okunev and 
White (2003), Harri and Brorsen (2004)).  
[ Please insert Table 2.2 about here] 
Table 2.2 presents the two style classifications, while Figure 2.1 displays the trend in 
assets under management for different TASS styles in the industry. The figure shows that the 
total net assets under management for most styles increased considerably over the sample 
                                                         
12  This represents nearly 24% of the total for the entire industry estimated by Hedge Fund Research of about $ 
820 billion of assets under management as of 2003 (See Francois-Serge L'Habitant, 2007, "Handbook of Hedge 
Funds", John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., graph on the page 21, provided to the author by the Hedge Fund Research 
database). 
13 See Francois-Serge L’Habitant, 2007, "Handbook of Hedge Funds", John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.,. 
14  Among  most  popular  classifications  appear  these  of  CS/Tremont  (27%  of users),  Hedge  Fund  Research 
(27%), MSCI (23%), CISDM, and the European and Cogent Hedge databases.   29
period. For instance, the most popular style – Long/Short Equity – had about ten times the 
assets under management at the end of 2003 as it had at the beginning of 1994, and the 
greatest growth is observed in the Equity Market Neutral style which increased its holdings 
over the sample period by a factor of almost 45. At the same time, the difference in the 
growth  rates  of  hedge  fund  styles  indicates  asymmetry  in  distribution  of  funds  among 
different styles.  
[ Please insert Figure 2.1 about here] 
We summarize the development of the TNAs’ distribution among the industry styles 
in Figure 2. As illustrated in the figure, the distribution of TNAs among styles varies over the 
sample period. For example, Global Macro, began with the highest TNA and decreased to 
one of smallest later in the period. Figure 2.2 also demonstrates the cyclical character of the 
distribution of TNAs. For instance, the Managed Futures style has a decreasing share over 
the first half of the sample period, while it improves its share over the second half of the 
period.  
[ Please insert Figure 2.2 about here] 
We determine quarterly net money flows into or out of the investment styles as 
follows: 
                      ,  =
∑    , ,       ,  ∑    , ,   
∑     , ,   
 ,                                              (1)                 
where      , is the growth rate in total net assets under management of style i in quarter t; 
    , ,  is the total net assets under management of fund j related to style i at the end of 
quarter t;   ,  is the return for style i realized during quarter t. Individual fund quarterly net 
money flows are calculated in a similar way. We calculate the style return as follows:  
       ,  =
∑   , , ×    , ,  
∑    , , 
 ,                                                        (2)           
where  t i j R , , is the return of fund j related to style i and realized during quarter t. Table 2.3 
reports descriptive statistics of the style return for each of the hedge fund  styles over the 
sample period.  
[ Please insert Table 2.3 about here]   30
Additionally, figure 2.3 provides an overview of the style returns over the sample 
period. From the figure it can be inferred that there are no persistently winning or losing 
styles in terms of raw returns. For example, in the middle of 1997, the Emerging Market style 
had the highest returns and Dedicated Short Bias the worst, while at the end of 2000 the 
situation reversed: Dedicated Short Bias was among the leaders while the Emerging Market 
style was among the losers. Moreover, Figure 3 indicates that a time prosperous for one style 
might be destructive for other styles. For instance, while at the end of 1999 the Emerging 
Markets style’s return jumped to more than 30%, Long/Short Equity Hedge’s return dropped 
by more than 50%. 
[ Please insert Figure 2.3 about here] 
Table 2.4 provides descriptive statistics for investment style flows over the sample 
period. This table illustrates that the average flows into styles are mostly positive. Moreover, 
none of them exceeds the level of 10%. Interestingly, while this consistent moderate average 
level might seem to indicate stability of the style flows, when examined over time, the flows 
are far more volatile. During our sample period, each style went through both a period of 
dramatic outflow and a period of extremely high inflows. For example, the Equity Market 
Neutral style  had the  highest  level of outflows (-32.66%), losing almost one third of its 
assets, while in a later period it increased its size by more than one third (36.12%).  
[ Please insert Table 2.4 about here] 
2.3   Hypotheses and Methodology 
Our data has illustrated patterns in the market shares of hedge fund investment style 
market share. From the hedge fund literature it is well known that at the individual fund 
level, past performance and fund characteristics appear to have a significant impact on the 
money  flows  to  particular  funds.  Given  the  importance  currently  attributed  to  style 
classification, we expect that information about a hedge fund’s style affects the money flow 
to a particular style. In a second stage, investors decide which fund within a particular style 
to choose.  
Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok (2002) study the role 
of investment styles in the mutual fund industry. The authors find that style classifications   31
are  useful  in  both  performance  evaluation  and  return  covariation  explanation.  Dividing 
mutual  funds  into  styles,  Massa  (2003)  shows  that  within  family  fund-switching  affects 
managerial incentives in such a way that they may no longer intend to maximize performance 
alone.  Cooper,  Gulen,  and  Rau  (2004)  document  that  mutual  funds  related  to  poorly 
performing styles tend to change their names. These funds thereby attempt to rid themselves 
of the poor performance image, and to create a winning image, by using a name that invokes 
the currently popular styles. The authors also reveal that such name changes do not always 
correlate with actual change of fund strategy. Nevertheless, the name change indeed affects 
subsequent investors' decisions as shown by increased inflows to the fund.  
A number of hedge fund papers investigate the style-performance relation. Agarwal, 
Daniel and Naik (2000) conduct a so-called generalized style analysis to examine the risk-
return tradeoffs.
15 The authors report that directional strategies demonstrate lower Sharpe 
ratios  and  higher  downside  risk  as  compared  to  non-directional  strategies.  Overall,  the 
authors find that the risk exposures are mostly consistent with the investment objectives of 
the different hedge fund strategies. Amenc, Faff and Martellini (2003) show evidence on 
significant diversification benefits achieved by adding hedge funds, diversified at style level, 
to an investors’ portfolio. Brown and Goetzmann (2003) find that investment styles explain 
about 20% of the cross sectional variability in hedge fund returns. Based on this finding, the 
authors  conclude  that  appropriate  style  analysis  and  style  management  are  important 
elements in the investment decisions of hedge fund investors.  
In this chapter we first want to examine the relevancy of style information in the 
hedge fund industry. We test for the existence of competition among hedge fund investment 
styles.  We  expect  that  hedge  fund  investors  employ  style  information  when  making 
investment decisions. In the hedge fund industry investment style information seems to be 
particularly important. Style information is one of the few accessible indicators for a hedge 
funds’ strategy, while the strategy itself is a determining characteristic of the fund’s activity. 
Therefore, it is very likely that sophisticated investors, who are prevalent in the hedge fund 
industry, search for better performance using style information. 
                                                         
15 Classification into generalized styles implies segregation of hedge fund strategies in two groups: directional 
and  non-directional  strategies.  "The  non-directional  strategies  are  designed  to  exploit  short  term  market 
inefficiencies  while  hedging  out  as  much  of  the  market  exposure  as  possible.  In  contrast,  the  directional 
strategies are designed to benefit from broad market movements. These two categories potentially have very 
different applications: the directional strategies helping one achieve the desired asset allocation while the non-
directional strategies enabling one to profit from security selection." (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2000)).    32
Style  investing  suggests  that  relative  rather  than  absolute  style  characteristics 
determine  the  outcome  of  the  competition  for  investors’  money  (Barberis  and  Shleifer 
(2003)). It implies that when making investment decisions, investors determine whether the 
return  on  a  certain  style  index  is  higher  or  lower  than  that  of  other  investment  styles. 
Alternatively, given the high concentration of sophisticated investors present in the hedge 
fund industry, it is also possible that investors determine their preference for a specific style 
on a ranking of risk-adjusted returns, or alpha. We use the Fama-French three factor model 
(Fama and French, 1993) as well as the Fung and Hsieh seven factor model (Fung and Hsieh, 
2004) to calculate alphas. We calculate alpha for both style and individual fund levels. Since 
alpha measurement requires a sufficiently large minimal number of data history, all funds 
with data  history shorter than 3 years were  excluded from the sample. To complete our 
analysis, each individual fund has to have at least 5 alpha observations. Hence we had to 
exclude from our sample observations all individual funds with less than 15 observations of 
raw returns. Therefore, for the analysis based on risk-adjusted returns or alphas our sample 
reduced to 9,898 fund observations for 883 funds.  
In order to test for the existence of style competition in the hedge fund industry, we 
use relative style flows and relative style performance, where performance can be measured 
as a raw or risk-adjusted style return. Our first hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis 1:  The  relative performance  and  relative  flows  of  an  investment style 
positively affect the money flows of the style. 
To  measure  relative  style  performance  and  relative  style  flows  we  use  simple 
rankings. For each quarter we rank styles in such a way that the best performer takes the 
highest rank, and the worst – the lowest. Similarly, style flows are ranked from the highest 
net flows to the lowest. The number of positions in the ranking is equal to the number of 
styles. The regression model testing Hypothesis 1 is:                     
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where        ,  represents flows of style i at quarter t.          ,    is the rank of the 
flows of style i at quarter t-n.       ,    is the rank of the performance of style i at quarter t-  33
n.
 16       ,  is the risk of style i calculated as the standard deviation of the style’s quarterly 
return measured over the previous four quarters.       ,  is a control variable for size of the 
style and calculated as the natural logarithm of the total net assets under management for 
style i at quarter t.
17 
In line with Hypothesis 1, we expect that higher style flows will be accompanied by 
higher  historical  style  ranks  for  both  flows  and  performance.  To  capture  the  effect  of 
different lockup periods, we include four lags for ranks of style flow changes, and a similar 
number of lags of style performance. We also control for style risk and style size, taking into 
account  that  the  possible  negative  size-flows  relation  documented  by  previous  studies 
(Agarwal, Daniel and Naik, 2004) exists at style level as well. We expect that the relative 
past performance of an investment style creates initial interest in that style, while subsequent 
investments  attract  even  greater  investments  (money  follows  money).  "Money  follows 
money" seems to be especially powerful in the hedge fund industry. Style flows reflect the 
beliefs of investors in the future potential of a specific style. In the case of the hedge fund 
industry, investors' beliefs are especially meaningful, since this industry is characterized by a 
relatively high concentration of sophisticated investors. This is in line with the finding of 
Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers (2007) who show that in the hedge fund industry, a 
fund’s flows predict its future performance. 
At  the  individual  fund  level,  hedge  fund  literature  suggests  a  variety  of  factors 
determining investment decisions. Past performance as well as fund characteristics such as 
the  manager  compensation  scheme,  fund  manager  characteristics,  and  presence  of  share 
restrictions- appear to have a significant impact on fund flows (see, for example, Agarwal, 
Daniel and Naik, 2004; Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross, 2003; Baquero and Verbeek, 2006; 
Ding,  Getmansky,  Liang  and  Wermers,  2007;  Li,  Zhang  and  Zhao,  2007). Most  studies 
examining  the  flow-performance  relation  report  a  positive  relationship  between  past 
performance and money flows into and out of the hedge funds (see, for example, Agarwal, 
Daniel  and  Naik  (2004),  Baquero  and  Verbeek,  (2006)).  Using  annual  time  intervals, 
Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2004) show that the superior performance of an individual hedge 
fund in a  given  year  lead  to  higher  money-flows  into  this  fund  in the succeeding  year. 
                                                         
16 To exclude multicollinearity problem, we first compute correlations for all of the variables included in the 
analysis. We confirm that the estimated correlations are low enough to allow performance of the discussed 
analysis. 
17 We perform a robustness test controlling for time effect. We confirm that our results stay qualitatively the 
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Moreover,  this  relation  is  found  to  be  convex.  Further,  the  authors  demonstrate  that 
persistence of good past performance can be associated with even higher money-inflows. The 
authors also find that the future performance of larger individual hedge funds with greater 
inflows  tends  to be  worse.  Fung,  Hsieh, Naik and Ramadoria  (2007)  examine  the  flow-
performance  relation  in the context  of fund of funds (FOFs). They document  that  alpha 
producing  FOFs  have  substantially  higher  and  steadier  money  inflows  than  their  less 
successful rivals. Based on this finding, they conclude that capital inflows influence funds' 
ability to generate alpha in the future. Most recently, Ding, Getmansky, Liang and Wermers 
(2007)  show  that  share  restrictions  have  an  important  effect  on  the  shape  of  the  flow-
performance relation. In the absence of share restrictions, a convex relation is found, while in 
case of share restrictions, the relation appears to be concave. The authors also demonstrate 
that while in the hedge fund industry fund flows predict future hedge fund performance, this 
effect is weaker in funds with share restrictions. However, none of the studies cited above 
examine the  influence of style information on hedge fund money  flows. Given the huge 
number of hedge funds available, we expect that style information is an important factor in 
an investor’s choice of a particular hedge fund.  
In this chapter we will investigate the effect of style characteristics on money flows 
into  and  out  of  individual  hedge  funds.  For  this  purpose,  we  define  funds  with  flows 
exceeding  average  style  flows  as  popular  and  funds  outperforming  their  style  as  better 
performing. Note that performance will be measured as a raw or risk-adjusted return. Our 
second hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The intra-style relative flows and relative performance of hedge funds 
positively affect the inflows into the individual funds.  
We specify the following regression equation:  
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where       , ,  are the flows of fund j related to style i at quarter t.          , ,    is a 
dummy variable for measuring a fund’s popularity within its style, that takes a value one if 
the fund has above average style flows in the corresponding quarter t-n.       , ,    is a 
dummy variable for measuring a fund’s success within its style that takes a value of one if 
the fund has above average style performance in the corresponding quarter t-n.       , ,    
are the lagged flows of fund j related to style i.    , ,    is the raw or risk-adjusted return of 
fund j related to style i at quarter t-n, and   ,  is a vector of characteristics of fund j related to 
style i such as risk of the fund, size of the fund, and other characteristics considered as 
constant over the sample period.
18          , ,    is the rank of the flows of style i at 
quarter t-n, while        , ,    reflects the rank of the performance (measured as raw return 
or risk-adjusted return) of style i at quarter t-n. In keeping with our second hypothesis, we 
expect coefficients for the more popular and for the better performing funds, within their 
styles, to be significant and positive. Significant coefficients for both these variables would 
indicate that there is no direct competition among hedge funds of different styles, but rather 
competition  between  them  via  styles.  More  specifically,  significant  coefficients  of  these 
variables  would imply that two funds related to different styles and having  all the same 
characteristics except that one of them is among the leaders in its style while another is 
among the losers in its style will have significantly different flows in subsequent periods.  
A third and related question of interest is whether the strategy of chasing the best 
performing  and  most  popular  investment  style,  and  subsequently  investing  in  the  best 
performing  funds  within  that particular  style  is  a  smart  strategy  for investors.  Berk  and 
Green’s (2004) model of active portfolio management predicts diminishing returns to scale. 
The inflow of money into the best performing funds affects the performance negatively due 
to a limited number of profitable investment opportunities. Naik, Ramadorai and Stromqvist 
(2007) show that capacity constraints in some hedge fund strategies explain the decline in the 
alphas  of  those  strategies.  In  contrast  to  mutual  fund  managers,  individual  hedge  fund 
managers have the option of closing a fund to new investors. In this way they can circumvent 
the challenge of having to invest significant additional money funds, potentially affecting the 
fund performance negatively. However, in line with Naik, Ramadorai and Stromqvist (2007), 
we  expect  that  the  inflow  of  new  money  to  a  particular  successful  style  affects  the 
                                                         
18  We  perform  a  robustness  test  controlling  for  time  and  style  effects.  We  confirm  that  our  results  stay 
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competition between funds within that style by leading to an increase in the number of funds 
offered with that same style. This would lead to a diminishing performance of the style in 
general as shown by Naik, Ramadorai and Stromqvist (2007). However, this outcome does 
not necessarily imply that the strategy of investing in the best performing and most popular 
investment style at a certain moment in combination with intra-style fund selection is not a 
profitable strategy. Our third hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3: A style chasing strategy in combination with intra-style fund selection 
is profitable for investors.  
To examine whether style chasing implemented together with the search for the best 
funds with the particular styles is indeed profitable, we construct the following regression 
equation: 
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where    , ,  is the raw return or risk-adjusted return for fund j related to style i at quarter t. 
         , ,    is a dummy variable for within style popularity of a fund that takes a value 
of one if the fund has above average style flows in quarter t-n.       , ,    is a dummy 
variable for within style winning funds that takes value one if the fund has above average 
style performance in quarter t-n. We control for individual fund characteristics such as past 
flows  and past  performance,  risk  and  size.
19       , ,     represents  the  flows  of  fund j 
related to style i in quarter t-n.    , ,    is the raw return or risk-adjusted return for fund j 
related to style i in quarter t-n.  We also control for relative style characteristics.   ,  is a 
vector of fund characteristics such as  risk and size, while          , ,    is the rank of the 
flows of style i in quarter t-n and       , ,    is the rank of performance of style i in quarter 
                                                         
19  We  perform  a  robustness  test  controlling  for  time  and  style  effects.  We  confirm  that  our  results  stay 
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t-n. To evaluate hypothesis 3, we test whether better performing and more popular intra-style 
funds tend to produce higher performance in subsequent quarters.  
2.4   Style Chasing 
Our first question is whether relative style performance and relative style popularity 
affect the money flows to a specific hedge fund investment style. Column (1) of Table 2.5 
presents the estimation results of equation (3) when performance is measured by raw style 
returns, while Columns (2) and (3) show the results when performance is measured by risk-
adjusted returns based on the corresponding models. In the case of raw style returns, the 
results  reveal  that  the  coefficients  of  the  first  three  lags  of  relative  style  flows  and  the 
coefficient  of  the  first  lag  of  relative  style  performance  are  significant  and  positive. 
Moreover, these coefficients are economically significant. For instance, an increase in the 
style  flow  ranking  of  merely  one point  contributes  0.8% to  the  next  period  style  flows. 
Furthermore, an increase in the style performance ranking of one point increase next period 
style flows by more than 0.3%. These results suggest that, in keeping with Hypothesis 1, 
popular and better performing styles are rewarded with higher inflows in subsequent periods. 
In addition, the results show that the impact of style popularity, as measured by ranking past 
style flows, persists for a longer term than the effect of past style performance. While style 
popularity  boosts  style  flows  for  the  next  three  quarters,  the  effect  of  relative  style 
performance holds for just a single quarter, and thus is considerably weaker. It appears that 
the risk associated with a particular hedge fund investment style has a dampening effect on 
the money flows to that style. When we measure performance as a risk-adjusted style return, 
we find similar results for past style popularity. However, the impact of lagged relative style 
performance is no longer significant. Apparently, even sophisticated hedge fund investors 
consider raw returns as more relevant than risk-adjusted returns in their allocation decision to 
particular hedge fund investment styles.  
[ Please insert Table 2.5 about here] 
To  compare  the  explanatory  power  of  relative  style  flows  and  relative  style 
performance,  we  run  separate  regressions  for  each  of  these  variables
20.  The  explanatory 
power of the regression with relative style  flows  is almost 18 percent, while that of the 
regression with relative style performance is only around 5 percent. This difference shows 
                                                         
20 The results of these analyses will be provided upon request.   38
that  style  popularity  has  a  stronger  effect  on  future  style  flows  than  relative  style 
performance. These results of our style level analyses show that the better performing and 
more popular  styles  are  rewarded  with  higher  inflows  in  the  subsequent  periods.  These 
findings support the claim that there is style chasing in the hedge fund industry. Apparently, 
investors divide hedge funds  into styles according to the fund's investment strategy, and 
increasingly invest in the better performing and popular styles. These results are consistent 
with the style investing theory of Barberis and Shleifer (2003).  
However, the above analysis does not exclude the situation where investors do not 
classify  funds  into  styles,  but  rather  compare  funds  according  to  their  individual 
characteristics. In such a situation, if all the best funds composed the best styles and the worst 
funds composed the worst styles, and then style “competition” would be just an unintended 
outcome of fund competition.  
If  this  would  be  the  case,  we  would  observe  low  correlation  between  relative 
performance of fund computed with respect to performance of the rest of funds combining 
the industry and relative performance of fund estimated with respect to performance of other 
funds  in the  style to  which  a particular fund is  related.  Correspondingly,  the  correlation 
between fund popularity measured with respect to this of all hedge funds and the popularity 
calculated with respect to popularity of funds related to the same style as that particular fund 
would be low as well. However, statistics summarized in Table 2.6 reveals that the discussed 
correlations  are  rather  high,  weakening,  thereby,  the  direct  fund  competition  argument. 
Further, we investigate the style chasing effect at the individual fund level, and show that 
there is no direct competition among individual funds, but only competition through styles. 
[ Please insert Table 2.6 about here] 
At the individual fund level, hedge fund literature suggests that a variety of factors 
determine investment decisions. The above analysis shows that style information, measured 
by performance and popularity, is an important driving factor for the inflow of money at style 
level. Given the vast universe of hedge funds, we expect that style information is also an 
important factor in the choice of a particular hedge fund.  
Table 2.7 summarizes the results of the estimation of Equation 4 in which we test 
whether the  intra-style relative flows and relative performance of  hedge funds positively 
affect the inflows into the individual funds. Column (1) shows the results when performance   39
is measured by raw returns, while Columns (2) and (3) show the results for risk adjusted 
returns calculated based on the three-factor Fama-French and the seven-factor Hsieh-Fung 
models respectively.  
[ Please insert Table 2.7 about here] 
In the table we consider three sets of variables, intra-style, fund specific and general. 
The results in Specification A demonstrate that the intra-style coefficients for all four lags of 
both – intra-style popularity and intra-style winner as measured by raw returns– are highly 
significant and positive. This suggests that, in  line with Hypothesis 2, more popular and 
better performing funds within a style attract significantly higher money flows than the less 
popular and poorly performing ones. Intra-style popularity appears to have stronger impact 
on future flows than performance: flows toa popular fund are expected to be approximately 
7% higher in the subsequent quarter than flows to an unpopular one, while flows to a well-
performing fund will be granted with an additional 3.5% compared to a poorly performing 
one. In addition, the results show that the effect of intra-style popularity and performance 
diminishes over time. For both variables, coefficients of the first lags are more than three 
times higher than these of the forth. The estimates for the fund specific  variables are  in 
accord  with  results  found  in  existing  hedge  fund  literature.  Lagged  fund  returns  have  a 
positive impact on the inflows to the funds, while larger and riskier funds receive less money 
than  otherwise  similar  funds.  The  estimates  for  the  general  variables  show  that  style 
popularity has an additional positive impact on the money flows towards a fund. Although 
the coefficients of the first three lags of relative style popularity are significant and positive, 
they have comparatively weak economic impact on fund flows. However, should the fund 
style’s popularity move up one position in rank, the fund could expect a 0.55% additional 
inflows.  On  the  other  hand,  none  of  the  coefficients  of  relative  style  performance  are 
statistically significant. For risk-adjusted returns we find similar results. As we found in the 
analysis  at  the  style  level,  performance  measured  by  risk-adjusted  returns  has  marginal 
impact on individual fund flows. The significant coefficients for intra-style popularity and 
performance are in keeping with our assertion as to the absence of direct competition among 
hedge funds, and thereby confirm the presence of inter-style competition. Furthermore, the 
results show that the effect of style competition deteriorates at the intra-style level.  
So far the results of this section confirm the existence of style competition in the 
hedge  fund  industry.  Many  hedge  fund  investors  believe  current  style  popularity  and   40
performance ratings  are predictive of  future winning styles, and they are  switching their 
investments from past losers to past winners. Furthermore, investor’ money is not distributed 
equally among funds within a given hedge fund style. The investors’ quest for the best funds 
leads to intra-style competition for investors’ money, and results in higher inflows to the 
popular and better performing funds within a style.  
Once more we will examine whether the strategy of chasing the best performing and 
most  popular  investment  style,  and  subsequently  investing  in  the  best  performing  funds 
within that particular style, is a smart one for hedge fund investors. Since the minimum 
investment  required  by  individual  hedge  funds  is  extremely  high,  diversification 
opportunities for investors are limited (Stulz, 2007). This accentuates the importance of the 
search for the best manager, or alternatively, for the best qualified managers, within a given 
style.  Thus,  the  search  for  the  best  funds  within  a  given  style  creates  competition  for 
investors’ money among funds of the same style.  
As noted above,  Berk  and Green’s (2004)  model of active  portfolio  management 
predicts  diminishing  returns  to  scale.  According  to  the  model,  increased  asset  flow  to 
successful funds leads to decreased performance by those funds due to the limited number of 
profitable  investment  opportunities.  Hedge  fund  managers,  however,  can  prevent  the 
negative effect of money inflows by closing a  fund to new investors. At the same time, 
increased asset flow to a successful style leads to an increase in the number of funds within 
that style. . In order to analyze the factors affecting the number of funds within a specific 
style, we have to distinguish between two opposing processes: the introduction of new funds 
versus the liquidation of existing ones. Here, it is important to note that hedge funds report 
mostly on a voluntary basis. Moreover, the majority of newly created funds tend not to report 
at the beginning of their activity, but rather to wait until they can document respectable rates 
of return. Even so, most hedge funds will continue reporting even up until a liquidation. We 
expect that  style popularity has a positive effect on the  survivorship of  individual funds 
within the style, and thus that higher style popularity should be associated with a decrease in 
the number of liquidated funds within the style.  
To test the above suggestions, we performed the following regression analyses: 
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where    .     ,  in Equation (6) represents the number of funds related to style i and 
reporting for the first time at quarter t so that the regression analysis illustrates the influence 
of style popularity on the number of new funds within a style. An analogous regression 
analysis – expressed by Equation (7) – is used to illustrate the influence of style popularity on 
the number of liquidated funds within a style. Respectively,    .      ,  in Equation (7) 
represents the number of funds related to style i, and reporting for the last time in the quarter 
t -1, in the regression testing the effect on the number of liquidated funds.          ,    is 
the rank of the flows of style i at quarter t-n.       ,  is the risk of style i calculated as the 
standard deviation of the style’s quarterly return measured over the previous four quarters. 
      ,  is a control variable for size of the style and measured as the natural logarithm of the 
total net assets under management for style i at quarter t. 
In Table 2.8 we present results of the analysis testing the influence of style popularity 
on the number of new and liquidated funds within a style (Panels A and B of Table 2.8 
respectively). In keeping with our predictions, the effect of style competition for investors’ 
money on the number of newly founded funds is not detected. At the same time, the results 
reveal a negative relation between past style popularity and the number of liquidated funds 
within the style, implying that higher style popularity predicts a lower number of liquidated 
funds within the style in the subsequent period. This result is in keeping with previous studies 
examining factors affecting survival probabilities (see, for example, Baquero, Ter Horst and 
Verbeek, 2005).  
[ Please insert Table 2.8 about here] 
Table 2.9 reports the results of Equation (5). The results of the regression analysis 
show that the coefficient of the second, third and fourth lags of the best intra-style performers 
are significant and positive. These findings indicate that funds outperforming their style tend 
to perform better in the subsequent periods. The effect of the relative performance of the past 
half a  year appears to be the strongest. Thus, a fund that outperforms its style could be 
expected  to have a  return over the next  half  year that  is 1.13%  higher  than  a  fund  that 
underperforms its style. It should be noted that the past half year relative performance has the   42
strongest impact on fund flows as well. This result testifies to the effectiveness of hedge fund 
investors' form of style chasing.   
Furthermore, the regression results show that the coefficient of the first lag of intra-
style popularity is highly significant and positive. This suggests that intra-style popular funds 
show significantly better performance in the next quarter. This result contradicts to Berk and 
Green’s model that predicts diminishing returns to scale. Thus, controlling for fund and style 
characteristics, it appears that fund’s popularity within its style will lead it to outperform an 
unpopular fund  within  the  same  style by  0.59%.  The  effect  of  longer  lags  of  intra-style 
popularity is less clear. Their coefficients are twice lower than the first lag coefficient, and 
one of them is negative. However, as previous results show, investors take intra-style fund 
popularity  into  consideration  mostly  over  a  half  year  horizon  (see  Table  2.7).  Thus,  in 
keeping with our prediction, in the hedge fund industry, style chasing implemented together 
with the search for the best funds within a particular style appears to be a successful strategy. 
[ Please insert Table 2.9 about here] 
We  explain  these  results  by  arguing  that  while  in  the  hedge  fund  industry  the 
investing style is one of main determinants of performance, fund specific characteristics such 
as managerial abilities are crucial as well. Hedge fund style can help to identify groups of 
funds  with  potentially  successful  investment  strategies.  At  the  same  time,  individual 
characteristics  of  funds  help  to  identify  funds  that  are  able  to  apply  the  strategy  most 
effectively. It  has to be mentioned that  style characteristics serve as a benchmark  in the 
evaluation of individual fund quality.  
As is mentioned in Section 3.3 of this chapter, statistics on the hedge fund industry 
shows that the majority of its participants use style classifications. Nonetheless, there is no 
commonly accepted categorization of hedge funds strategies. In our study, we use the style 
classification provided by TASS to perform the main analysis. Since this style classification 
is not the only one common in the hedge fund sector, we go through all the steps of our 
analysis a second time, this time applying the style classification suggested by Agarwal, 
Daniel and Naik (2004). The authors use an extensive database which includes data provided 
by different vendors, each of whom uses his favorite style classification. To define a common 
classification for their dataset the authors follow the approach of the studies of Fung and 
Hsieh  (1997) and of  Brown and Goetzmann (2003),  which  demonstrate that  hedge  fund   43
returns include distinct style factors. The authors thereby reclassify all funds in their database 
into four categories (see Table 2.2). This broad classification may serve as a useful common 
denominator for the style classifications used by the main information services providers.    
Appendix 2.1 reports the results of the analysis based on the ADN style classification. 
As illustrated by the appendix, these results are in keeping with those arrived at using the 
TASS classification, the style related coefficients at both the style and the individual fund 
levels are slightly higher than the corresponding coefficients of the analyses based on the 
TASS classification. Most importantly, these results provide strong support for the findings 
of our main analysis: the considerable effect of style on investment decisions in the hedge 
fund industry.   
2.5   Conclusion 
In  our  study  we  examine  whether  hedge  fund  investors  chase  investment  styles, 
focusing on the style effect in investment decisions. We find that indeed hedge fund styles 
compete for investors' money. More specifically, our results indicate  that investors tend to 
actively pursue better performing styles and reallocate their capital from formerly successful 
styles  to  future  winners.  These  findings are in  accord with  the  style investing theory of 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003). We suggest that hedge funds investors are looking for the best 
investment strategy using style parameters such as the relative flows of the styles and the 
relative performance of the styles. As a result, better performing and more popular styles are 
rewarded with higher inflows in the subsequent periods.  
Furthermore,  we  find  that  investment  flows  into  a  given  style  are  not  equally 
distributed  among  the  funds  so  styled.  While  a  popular  style  attracts  higher  overall 
investments, intra-style competition weakens this style effect. Better performing and more 
popular funds within a given style experience higher inflows in the subsequent periods. We 
explain this result by positing existence of intra-style competition, stimulated by investor 
pursuit of the best funds. Additionally, style analysis, as a key element in inferring the risk 
exposures  of  fund  managers,  helps  in  classifying  fund  managers  and  determining  an 
appropriate  benchmark for their  performance  evaluation  (see  Agarwal, Daniel  and Naik, 
2000).    44
Finally, we test whether the hedge funds' version of style chasing justifies itself. Our 
results show that the way hedge fund investors chase investment styles appears as a smart 
one. We find that style chasing implemented together with search for the best funds within 
the given styles is profitable.    45
2.6   Tables, Figures, and Appendix (Chapter 2)   46
Table 2.1 
 Descriptive Statistics of Cross-sectional Characteristics of Individual Hedge Funds 
This table presents summary statistics on some of the cross-sectional characteristics of our sample for the period between the 
1
st quarter of year 1994 and the 4
th quarter of year 2003. Live Funds is a dummy variable with value one for funds reported 
as lived at the end of the sample period. Minimum Investment is the monetary value in millions of US $ that an investor is 
requested to allocate to invest in a fund. Management Fee is a percentage of the fund's net assets under management that is 
paid annually to the managers for administering a fund. Incentive Fee is the percentage of profits above a hurdle rate that is 
given as reward to the managers. High Water Mark is a dummy variable with value one for funds having this type of policy. 
Leveraged is a dummy taking the value one if the fund makes active and substantial use of borrowing according to TASS 
definitions. Personal Capital is a dummy variable indicating that the manager invests his or her own wealth in the fund. 
Open to Public is a dummy variable with value one for funds open to public investments. Domicile Country US is a dummy 
variable with value one for funds whom domicile country is US. 
Fund Characteristics  Mean  St. Dev  Min.  Max. 
         
Live Funds  0.65  0.48  0  1 
Minimum Investment (mill.$)   0.76  0.14  0.001  25.00 
Management Fee (%)  1.42  0.87  0  8 
Incentive Fee (%)  18.70  5.28  0  50 
High Water Mark  0.41  0.49  0  1 
Leveraged  0.73  0.44  0  1 
Personal Capital  0.55  0.50  0  1 
Open to Public  0.13  0.33  0  1 
Domicile Country US  0.49  0.50  0  1 
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Table 2.2 
Hedge Fund Style Classifications: TASS versus ADN
21 
This table presents the style classifications used in this chapter. Panel A lists the classification provided by TASS and used 
in the main analysis. Panel B lists the style classification suggested by Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (ADN) in their paper from 
2004. We use ADN classification in the robustness analysis.  
   Panel A    Panel B 
TASS Style Classification 
 





Equity Market Neutral   
Fixed Income Arbitrage   
     
Dedicated Short Bias   
Directional Traders 
Emerging Markets   
Global Macro   
Managed Futures   
     
Long/Short Equity Hedge    Security Selection 
     
Event Driven    Multi-Process 
Multi-Strategic     
     
                                                         
21 Style classification according to Agarwal, Daniel and Naik 2004.   48
Table 2.3 
Descriptive Statistics of Style Return  
This table presents descriptive statistics of investment flows to the corresponding TASS styles for the period between the 1
st 
quarter of 1994 and the 4
th quarter of 2003. The style return (Ri,t) for  style i over quarter t is measured as   ,  = ∑(  , ,  ×
    , , )/∑    , , (In this equation, the term TNAj,i,t represent the total net assets for the fund j - related to style i - at the 
end of quarter t , and Rerj,i,t represents the return of fund j related to style i and realized during quarter t). The statistics is 
presented in percents. 





percentile  St. Dev  Max.  Min. 
Convertible Arbitrage  2.60  3.10  1.78  4.20  2.49  6.49  -5.94 
Dedicated Short Bias  1.41  -0.19  -6.46  8.23  9.46  22.18  -14.21 
Emerging Markets  4.47  5.34  -4.74  11.04  11.96  33.56  -24.00 
Equity Market Neutral  2.50  2.56  1.58  3.39  1.14  4.52  -0.18 
Event Driven  2.80  3.26  2.15  4.45  2.49  6.81  -5.80 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  2.15  2.60  1.28  3.37  2.00  5.41  -4.09 
Global Macro  3.55  3.15  0.06  8.00  7.03  17.97  -14.10 
Long/Short Equity Hedge  1.85  3.50  -1.30  6.95  10.38  16.35  -53.86 
Managed Futures  2.94  2.09  -1.47  5.71  5.83  17.73  -5.51 
Multi-Strategic  3.09  2.37  -0.83  5.13  7.26  31.07  -7.45 
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Table 2.4 
 Style Investment Flows over the Sample Period 
This table presents descriptive statistics of investment flows to the corresponding TASS styles for the period between the 1
st 
quarter of 1994 and the 4
th quarter of 2003. The investment flows (Flowi,t) for  style i over quarter t is measured as 
     ,  = (∑    , ,  −(1 +     , ) × ∑    , ,   )/(∑    , ,   )  (In  this  equation,  the  terms  TNAj,i,t-1  and  TNAj,i,t 
represent the total net assets for the fund j - related to style i - at the end of quarter t-1 and t respectively, Reri,t represents 
the style’s return realized during quarter t). The statistics is presented in percents.  





percentile  St. Dev  Max.  Min. 
Convertible Arbitrage  7.17  4.79  -0.33  12.08  19.04  110.74  -17.47 
Dedicated Short Bias  5.43  6.74  -3.79  10.28  13.98  61.06  -19.57 
Emerging Markets  3.05  1.66  -2.54  7.10  10.43  43.15  -17.70 
Equity Market Neutral  8.50  6.16  2.24  13.74  11.78  36.12  -32.66 
Event Driven  4.03  3.41  1.54  7.20  5.20  17.03  -8.86 
Fixed Income Arbitrage  5.20  5.23  1.07  11.31  8.21  20.64  -14.89 
Global Macro  -0.93  -2.43  -6.38  4.33  12.64  29.00  -44.57 
Long/Short Equity Hedge  4.53  2.85  0.59  4.63  12.75  78.30  -10.39 
Managed Futures  3.30  3.17  -1.78  8.61  7.46  21.44  -12.71 
Multi-Strategic  0.79  1.91  -2.19  4.35  6.54  14.46  -19.84 
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Table 2.5 
 Style flows and style competition 
This table reports coefficients of a pooled OLS regression of all styles together. The dependent variable is the style flows. The independent 
variables are rank of style flows - for each quarter we rank style flows in such a way that the style with highest flows has the highest rank, and 
the one with the lowest flow has  the lowest rank, where the range of ranks is equal to the number of styles, and we include four lags of this 
variable; rank of style return: in Column (1), at each time point, we rank style return in such a way that the style with the highest raw return 
takes the highest rank, with the lowest – the lowest; in Column (2)/(3), at for each quarter we rank the alpha of style return, calculated based on 
the three-factor Fama-French model (Column (2)) or on the seven-factor Fung-Hsieh model (Column (3)), in such a way that the style with the 
highest alpha has the highest rank, and that with the lowest has the lowest rank, where range of ranks is equal to the number of styles, and we 
include four lags of this variable; style risk – the standard deviation of a style’s return for the four previous quarters; style size – the natural 
logarithm of the  total net assets under management of a style at the end of quarter t. The standard errors are clustered by styles. * Significant at 
10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 






Hsieh-Fung 7-Factors Alpha 
Based Model 
  Estimate    St. Err.  Estimate    St. Err.  Estimate    St. Err. 
Intercept  3.55    12.748  -28.90  *  17.105  -31.25  *  16.006 
Style Flows Rank (1
st lag)  0.81  ***  0.254  1.14  ***  0.336  1.22  ***  0.328 
Style Flows Rank (2
nd lag)  0.50  **  0.201  0.41  *  0.234  0.42  *  0.225 
Style Flows Rank (3
rd lag)  0.63  ***  0.195  0.39  *  0.208  0.33  *  0.200 
Style Flows Rank (4
th lag)  0.03    0.219  0.09    0.299  0.10    0.271 
Style Performance Rank (1
st lag)  0.32  **  0.158  0.26    0.293  -0.13    0.289 
Style Performance Rank (2
nd lag)  0.26    0.162  -0.01    0.436  0.21    0.512 
Style Performance Rank (3
rd lag)  -0.08    0.171  -0.19    0.323  -0.97  *  0.506 
Style Performance Rank (4
th lag)  0.06    0.199  0.06    0.324  0.60    0.422 
Style Risk  -0.31  ***  0.081  -0.24  ***  0.088  -0.19  **  0.090 
Style Size  -0.53    0.524  0.93    0.673  1.11  *  0.664 
                   
R sq. adjusted  0.18      0.17      0.20     
Number of observations  400      250      250     
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Table 2.6 
 Correlation Matrix 
The table contains correlation matrix for the following variables: fund’s intra-style popularity dummy (Popular Within Style) getting value 1 if at 
corresponding  time  point  fund  flows  exceed  flows  of fund’s  style;  well  performing-fund  dummy  (Winner  Within  Style) getting  value  1  if  at 
corresponding time point a fund raw return is higher than this of fund’s style; fund flow percentile estimated with respect to flows of the rest of funds 
in the sample. In particular, the range of the percentiles varies from the lowest 10
th to the highest 10
th percentile. The return percentile is computed 
the similar way to this used for flows percentile. The reported statistics is calculated based on the relevant variables of all funds in our final sample. 
  Winner Within Style  Popular Within Style  Fund Return Percentile  Fund Flows Percentile 
         
Winner Within Style  1.00       
Popular Within Style  0.05  1.00     
Fund Return Percentile  0.68  0.04  1.00   
Fund Flows Percentile  0.06  0.72  0.08  1.00 
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Table 2.7 
 Fund Flows and within Style Competition of Funds 
The table reports coefficients of a pooled OLS regression of all funds together. The dependent variable is fund flows. The independent variables 
are popular intra-style - dummy getting value 1 if at corresponding time point fund flows exceed flows of its style, we include four lags of this 
dummy; winner intra-style – in Column (1)/(2)/(3) dummy has value 1 if at the corresponding time point, the fund raw return/Fama-French return 
alpha/Fung-Hsieh return alpha is higher than the raw return/Fama-French return alpha/ Fung-Hsieh return alpha of its style, we include four lags of 
this dummy; four lags of fund flows; in Column (1)/(2)/(3) four lags of fund raw return/Fama-French return alpha/Fung-Hsieh return alpha; fund 
size – the natural logarithm of the total net asset value of the fund at the end of quarter t; risk of fund - standard deviation of fund return for four 
previous quarters; live fund - dummy getting value 1 if the fund appear to be live at the last quarter of our dataset; minimum investment is in 
millions of US$ dollar; management fees are in percents; incentive feesare  in percents; high water mark policy - dummy getting value 1 if this 
policy is used by fund; leveraged fund - dummy with value 1 if fund is leveraged; personal capital - dummy with value 1 if personal capital is a 
part of fund capital; open to public dummy getting value 1 if fund is open to public investments; domicile country US - dummy getting value 1 if 
domicile country of  fund is US; rank of style flows: at each time point we rank styles in such a way that the style with highest flows has the 
highest rank, and the one with the lowest flows has the lowest rank, where range of ranks is equal to the number of styles, and we include four lags 
of this variable; in Column (1)/(2)/(3) rank of style raw return/Fama-French return alpha/Fung-Hsieh return alpha: at each time point we rank 
styles in such a way that  style with the highest raw return/Fama-French return alpha/Fung-Hsieh return alpha takes the highest rank, and that with 
the lowest takes the lowest rank, where range of ranks is equal to the number of styles, and we include four lags of this variable. The standard 
errors are clustered by funds. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
    (1)      (2)      (3)   
  Raw Returns  Fama-French Alpha  Hsieh-Fung 7-Factors 
  Estimate    St. Err.  Estimate    St. Err.  Estimate    St. Err. 
Intercept  13.56  ***  1.876  1.02    2.988  0.96    2.879 
Popular Within Style (1
st lag) (dummy)  6.69  ***  0.306  5.27  ***  0.515  5.40  ***  0.514 
Popular Within Style (2
nd lag) (dummy)  4.55  ***  0.307  4.14  ***  0.483  4.21  ***  0.481 
Popular Within Style (3
rd lag) (dummy)  2.31  ***  0.305  2.47  ***  0.475  2.51  ***  0.480 
Popular Within Style (4
th lag) (dummy)  2.18  ***  0.300  1.69  ***  0.471  1.80  ***  0.474 
Winner Within Style (1
st lag) (dummy)  3.49  ***  0.343  1.42  *  0.756  0.31    0.578 
Winner Within Style (2
nd lag) (dummy)  3.13  ***  0.357  0.03    0.836  0.81    0.718 
Winner Within Style (3
rd lag) (dummy)  1.60  ***  0.324  0.33    0.730  -0.15    0.650 
Winner Within Style (4
th lag) (dummy)  1.08  ***  0.327  -0.80    0.652  -1.29  **  0.564 
Fund Flows (1
st lag)  0.00  ***  0.000  0.01    0.006  0.01    0.006 
Fund Flows (2
nd lag)  0.00  ***  0.000  0.00    0.001  0.00    0.002 
Fund Flows (3
rd lag)  0.00  **  0.000  0.00  *  0.001  0.01  *  0.001 
Fund Flows (4
th lag)  0.00    0.000  -0.01    0.004  -0.01    0.004 
Fund Performance (1
st lag)  0.18  ***  0.019  0.45  ***  0.110  -0.02  *  0.009 
Fund Performance (2
nd lag)  0.12  ***  0.018  -0.17    0.127  -0.00    0.011 
Fund Performance (3
rd lag)  0.10  ***  0.015  -0.36  ***  0.108  -0.01    0.010 
Fund Performance (4
th lag)  0.09  ***  0.014  0.12    0.093  0.02  **  0.011 
Fund Size  -1.74  ***  0.095  -0.82  ***  0.150  -0.78  ***  0.145 
Fund Risk  -0.26  ***  0.021  -0.09  ***  0.027  -0.08  ***  0.028 
Live Funds (dummy)  3.26  ***  0.304  3.64  ***  0.525  3.73  ***  0.524 
Minimum Investment  0.00  ***  0.084  0.00    0.000  0.00    0.000 
Management Fee  -0.63  ***  0.160  -0.04    0.221  0.01    0.223 
Incentive Fee  -0.01    0.023  -0.01    0.034  -0.01    0.034 
High Water Mark (dummy)  2.34  ***  0.309  1.61  ***  0.521  1.62  ***  0.521 
Leveraged (dummy)  0.29    0.292  0.73  *  0.422  0.75  *  0.426 
Personal Capital (dummy)  0.16    0.284  -0.91  **  0.448  -0.93  **  0.451 
Open to Public (dummy)  0.14    0.428  -0.38    0.565  -0.44    0.561 
Dom. Country US (dummy)  -1.52  ***  0.288  -0.46    0.462  -0.42    0.457 
Style Flows Rank (1
st lag)  0.55  ***  0.048  0.45  ***  0.087  0.46  ***  0.084 
Style Flows Rank (2
nd lag)  0.41  ***  0.046  0.44  ***  0.093  0.44  ***  0.092 
Style Flows Rank (3
rd lag)  0.10  *  0.046  0.10    0.098  0.12    0.099 
Style Flows Rank (4
th lag)  0.019    0.046  0.14    0.097  0.11    0.094 
Style Performance Rank (1
st lag)  0.08    0.058  -0.12    0.115  -0.01    0.081 
Style Performance Rank (2
nd lag)  0.07    0.061  -0.05    0.117  0.01    0.099 
Style Performance Rank (3
rd lag)  -0.03    0.060  0.38  ***  0.114  0.15    0.108 
Style Performance Rank (4
th lag)  0.02    0.057  -0.25  **  0.108  -0.28  ***  0.087 
R sq. adjusted  0.11      0.06      0.06     
Number of observations  33,203      9,898      9,898       53
Table 2.8 
The Effect of Style Popularity on Number of New/Liquidated Funds within Style  
 
Panel A: 
The table reports the coefficients of a pooled OLS regression of all styles together; the dependent variable is the number of new 
funds within style; the  independent variables are rank of style flows:for each quarter, we rank style flows in such a way that the 
style with highest flows has the highest rank, and the one with the lowest flows has the lowest rank, where the range of ranks is 
equal to the number of styles, and we include four lags of this variable; style risk – the standard deviation of a style’s return for 
the four previous quarters; style size –the natural logarithm of the total net assets under management of a style at the end of 












The table reports the coefficients of a pooled OLS regression of all styles together; the dependent variable is the number of 
liquidated funds within style; the  independent variables are rank of style flows:for each quarter, we rank style flows in such a 
way that the style with highest flows has the highest rank, and the one with the lowest flows has the lowest rank, where the range 
of ranks is equal to the number of styles, and we include four lags of this variable; style risk – the standard deviation of a style’s 
return for the four previous quarters; style size –the natural logarithm of the total net assets under management of a style at the 
end of quarter t. The standard errors are clustered by styles. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant 






  Estimate    St. Err. 
Intercept  -73.195  ***  8.605 
Style Flows Rank (1
st lag)  -0.004    0.129 
Style Flows Rank (2
nd lag)  0.175    0.124 
Style Flows Rank (3
rd lag)  0.116    0.115 
Style Flows Rank (4
th lag)  0.016    0.123 
Style Risk  0.343  ***  0.110 
Style Size   3.393  ***  0.369 
       
R sq. adjusted  0.305     
Number of observations  400     
  Estimate    St. Err. 
Intercept  -35.856  ***  5.467 
Style Flows Rank (1
st lag)  -0.165  **  0.081 
Style Flows Rank (2
nd lag)  -0.064    0.086 
Style Flows Rank (3
rd lag)  -0.056    0.079 
Style Flows Rank (4
th lag)  0.020    0.081 
Style Risk  0.136  ***  0.049 
Style Size   1.773  ***  0.252 
       
R sq. adjusted  0.238     
Number of observations  400       54
  Table 2.9 
 Fund Performance and Hedge Fund Version of Style Chasing  
The table reports the coefficients of a pooled OLS regression of all funds together; the dependent variable is fund return; the independent variables 
are popular within style –a  dummy getting value 1 if at corresponding time point fund flows exceed flows of its style, we include four lags of this 
dummy; intra-style winner - dummy getting value 1 if for that quarter a fund over-performs its style, we include four lags of this dummy; four lags of 
fund flows; four lags of fund return; fund size – the natural logarithm of the total net asset value of a fund at the end of quarter t; risk of fund – the 
standard deviation of the fund return for the four previous quarters; rank of style flows: for that quarter, we rank styles in such a way that the style 
with the highest flows has the highest rank, and the one with the lowest flows has the lowest rank, where the range of ranks is equal to the number of 
styles, and we include four lags of this variable; rank of style return: for that quarter,we rank styles in such a way that  the best performer has the 
highest rank,and the worst performer has the lowest, where therange of ranks is equal to the number of styles, and we include four lags of this 
variable. The standard errors are clustered by funds. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level.  
 
  Estimate    St. Err. 
Intercept  5.72  ***  0.818 
Popular Within Style (1
st lag) (dummy)  0.59  ***  0.149 
Popular Within Style (2
nd lag) (dummy)  0.03    0.150 
Popular Within Style (3
rd lag) (dummy)  -0.31  **  0.156 
Popular Within Style (4
th lag) (dummy)  0.32  **  0.143 
Winner Within Style (1
st lag) (dummy)  -0.15    0.197 
Winner Within Style (2
nd lag) (dummy)  1.13  ***  0.247 
Winner Within Style (3
rd lag) (dummy)  0.42  **  0.192 
Winner Within Style (4
th lag) (dummy)  0.91  ***  0.200 
Fund Flows (1
st lag)  -0.00  **  0.000 
Fund Flows (2
nd lag)  0.00    0.000 
Fund Flows (3
rd lag)  -0.00    0.000 
Fund Flows (4
th lag)  -0.00    0.000 
Fund Performance (1
st lag)  0.09  ***  0.017 
Fund Performance (2
nd lag)  -0.02    0.021 
Fund Performance (3
rd lag)  0.01    0.015 
Fund Performance (4
th lag)  -0.06  ***  0.015 
Fund Size  -0.21  ***  0.044 
Fund Risk  -0.01    0.022 
Style Flows Rank (1
st lag)  0.20  ***  0.029 
Style Flows Rank (2
nd lag)  0.04    0.029 
Style Flows Rank (3
rd lag)  -0.01    0.032 
Style Flows Rank (4
th lag)  -0.26  ***  0.029 
Style Performance Rank (1
st lag)  -0.14  ***  0.030 
Style Performance Rank (2
nd lag)  0.13  ***  0.034 
Style Performance Rank (3
rd lag)  0.09  ***  0.027 
Style Performance Rank (4
th lag)  -0.15  ***  0.029 
       
R sq. adjusted  0.02     
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Figure 2.1 
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Figure 2.3 
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Appendix 2.1 
Robustness - ADN 2004 style classification 
Panel A: Style flows and style competition 
The table reports the coefficients of a pooled OLS regression of all styles together; the dependent variable is style flows; the 
independent variables are rank of style flowsfor each quarter, we rank style flows in such a way that the style with highest flows 
has the highest rank, and the one with the lowest flows has the lowest rank, where the range of ranks is equal to the number of 
styles, and we include four lags of this variable; rank of style return: for that quarter, we rank style return in such a way that the 
best performer has the highest rank, and the worst performer has the lowest rank, where the range of ranks is equal to the number 
of styles, and we include four lags of this variable; style risk – the standard deviation of the style return for the four previous 
quarters; style size – the natural logarithm of the total net assets under management of a style at the end of quarter t. The standard 
errors are clustered by styles. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
  Estimate    St. Err. 
Intercept  -26.44    20.980 
Style Flows Rank (1
st lag)  1.29  ***  0.475 
Style Flows Rank (2
nd lag)  1.46  ***  0.528 
Style Flows Rank (3
rd lag)  0.59    0.458 
Style Flows Rank (4
th lag)  -0.34    0.836 
Style Performance Rank (1
st lag)  0.20    0.359 
Style Performance Rank (2
nd lag)  0.65  *  0.370 
Style Performance Rank (3
rd lag)  0.00    0.360 
Style Performance Rank (4
th lag)  0.37    0.388 
Style Risk   -0.29  ***  0.084 
Style Size  0.79    0.827 
       
R sq. adjusted  0.18     
Number of observations  200     
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Panel B: Fund flows and within style competition of funds  
The table reports the coefficients of a pooled OLS regression of all funds together; the dependent variable is fund flows; the 
independent variables are popular intra-style - dummy getting value 1 if at corresponding time point fund flows exceed flows of 
its style, we include four lags of this dummy; winner within style - dummy getting value 1 if for that quarter, a fund over-
performs its style, we include four lags of this dummy; four lags of fund flows; four lags of fund return; fund size – the natural 
logarithm of the total net asset value of the fund at the end of quarter t; risk of fund – the standard deviation of fund return for 
four previous quarters; live fund - dummy getting value 1 if the fund appear to be live at the last quarter of our dataset; minimum 
investment is in millions of US$ dollar; management fees are in percents; incentive fees are in percents; high water mark policy - 
dummy getting value 1 if this policy is used by fund; leveraged fund - dummy with value 1 if fund is leveraged; personal capital - 
dummy with value 1 if personal capital is a part of fund capital; open to public dummy getting value 1 if fund is open to public 
investments; domicile country US - dummy getting value 1 if domicile country of  fund is US; rank of style flows: at each time 
point we rank styles in such a way that the style with highest flows has the highest rank, and the one with the lowest flows has the 
lowest rank, where range of ranks is equal to the number of styles, and we include four lags of this variable; rank of style return: 
at each time point we rank styles in such a way that  the best performer takes the highest rank, and that with the worst takes the 
lowest, where range of ranks is equal to the number of styles, and we include four lags of this variable. The standard errors are 
clustered by funds. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
  Estimate    St. Err. 
Intercept  15.16  ***  1.933 
Popular Within Style (1
st lag) (dummy)  6.95  ***  0.333 
Popular Within Style (2
nd lag) (dummy)  5.20  ***  0.324 
Popular Within Style (3
rd lag) (dummy)  2.43  ***  0.329 
Popular Within Style (4
th lag) (dummy)  2.16  ***  0.321 
Winner Within Style (1
st lag) (dummy)  3.74  ***  0.360 
Winner Within Style (2
nd lag) (dummy)  3.08  ***  0.374 
Winner Within Style (3
rd lag) (dummy)  1.27  ***  0.344 
Winner Within Style (4
th lag) (dummy)  0.88  ***  0.343 
Live Funds (dummy)  3.40  ***  0.303 
Minimum Investment  0.00  ***  0.084 
Management Fee  -0.22  **  0.168 
Incentive Fee  -0.02    0.023 
High Water Mark (dummy)  2.00  ***  0.314 
Leveraged (dummy)  0.58  **  0.291 
Personal Capital (dummy)  0.11    0.285 
Open to Public (dummy)  0.16    0.429 
Dom. Country US (dummy)  -1.58  ***  0.290 
Fund Size  -1.84  ***  0.098 
Fund Risk  -0.26  ***  0.021 
Fund Flows (1
st lag)  0.00  ***  0.000 
Fund Flows (2
nd lag)  0.00  ***  0.000 
Fund Flows (3
rd lag)  0.00  ***  0.000 
Fund Flows (4
th lag)  0.00    0.000 
Fund Performance (1
st lag)  0.18  ***  0.018 
Fund Performance (2
nd lag)  0.12  ***  0.018 
Fund Performance (3
rd lag)  0.11  ***  0.015 
Fund Performance (4
th lag)  0.09  ***  0.014 
Style Flows Rank (1
st lag)  0.32  **  0.135 
Style Flows Rank (2
nd lag)  0.60  ***  0.149 
Style Flows Rank (3
rd lag)  0.62  ***  0.127 
Style Flows Rank (4
th lag)  -0.19    0.135 
Style Performance Rank (1
st lag)  0.13    0.103 
Style Performance Rank (2
nd lag)  0.30  ***  0.105 
Style Performance Rank (3
rd lag)  0.28  **  0.111 
Style Performance Rank (4
th lag)  0.34  ***  0.118 
       
R sq. adjusted  0.11     
Number of observations  33,203     
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The “Smart Money” Effect: 
Retail versus Institutional Mutual Funds 
Do sophisticated investors exhibit a stronger “smart money” effect than unsophisticated ones? In this 
chapter, we examine whether fund selection ability of institutional mutual fund investors is better 
than that of retail mutual fund investors. In line with the studies of Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), and 
Keswani and Stolin (2008), we find a smart money effect for investors of both institutional and retail 
mutual funds. Surprisingly, our results suggest that, the presumably more sophisticated investors of 
institutional funds, do not demonstrate a better fund selection ability. 
3.1   Introduction 
More than a decade ago, Martin Gruber (1996) in his paper “Another Puzzle: The Growth in 
actively Managed Mutual Funds” attempted to find a reasonable explanation for the question why 
the industry of actively managed mutual funds has grown so fast. The main finding of Gruber was 
that investors in actively managed mutual funds have fund selection ability allowing them to detect 
future  best-performing  funds.  Gruber  defines  conditions  required  for  the  “smart  money” 
phenomenon to exist. These conditions are superior fund manager abilities and superior ability of 
sophisticated  investors  to  detect  talented  managers.  Addressing  the  question  why  there  are  still 
consistently poorly performing funds, Gruber notes that these funds remain due to the presence of 
“disadvantaged”  investors.  According  to  the  author,  the  disadvantaged  investor  group  includes 
unsophisticated individuals, restricted accounts of institutional investors such as pension funds, and 
tax  disadvantaged  investors  whose  capital  gain  taxes  make  divestment  of  money  from  a  fund 
inefficient.  Gruber’s study initiated the whole stream of literature investigating whether mutual fund 
investors are smart ex ante moving to the funds that will perform better – the “smart money” effect 
(see, for example, Zheng (1999), Sapp and Tiwari (2004), Keswani and Stolin (2008)).     
Nowadays, the number of actively managed funds has continued to grow. Moreover, since 
the  early  1990s,  a  new  class  of  so-called  institutional  funds  has  emerged  (James  and  Karceski 
(2006)). Instead of focusing on traditional mutual funds’ investors – regular individuals, those funds 
serve exclusively institutional investors such as corporations, non-profit organizations, endowments, 
foundations, municipalities, pension funds, and other large investors, including wealthy individuals. 
Thereby, mutual funds were virtually divided into retail and institutional according to their clientele 
focus. Thus, following Gruber’s terminology, clienteles of retail funds, which focus primarily on 61  
 
individual  investors,  can  be  classified  as  an  unsophisticated  type  of  disadvantaged  investor 
(Alexander, Jones and Nigro (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Palmiter and Taha (2008)), while 
clienteles of institutional funds either fall into the category of sophisticated investors or into the 
group of disadvantaged investors of account restriction or tax issue type.  
In the context of the “smart money” effect in mutual fund industry, investor composition 
determines the growth rate of actively managed funds. Following Gruber’s line of reasoning, retail 
and institutional funds, which have different – in terms of Gruber’s (1996) investor classification 
into “sophisticated” and “disadvantaged” types – investor compositions, should grow at a different 
pace. In fact, the number of institutional funds has increased disproportionally faster (James and 
Karceski (2006)). Thus, the question to ask is whether Gruber’s smart money effect can also explain 
the difference in the growth rate of retail and institutional funds, and in particular whether investors 
of these two types of funds indeed demonstrate dissimilar fund selection abilities. 
In this chapter we reexamine the smart money effect comparing the fund selection abilities of 
investors  of  retail  funds,  (representing  mostly  unsophisticated  individual  investors)  against  this 
ability of  investors of institutional  funds, among whom – though a  higher proportion represents 
sophisticated investors – are also disadvantaged investors, due to account restriction or tax issues.   
We explore this question by examining the smart money effect separately for investors of 
retail and institutional funds. We use the complete universe of diversified U.S. equity mutual funds 
for  the  period  January  1999  to  May  2009  in  the  CRSP  Survivor-Bias  Free  U.S.  Mutual  Fund 
Database. We use CRSP’s classification of institutional and retail funds to identify fund types. Note 
that  this  classification  may  not  be  a  precise  identifier  of  investor  type.  For  instance,  the  final 
investment decision of 401k plans’ participants is taken by an individual investor, while their capital 
flows may combine flows of either an institutional or a retail fund. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the classification of funds into retail and institutional implies differences in investor 
composition  of  the  two  types  of  fund.  In  particular,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  retail  fund 
investors apparently are regular individuals. At the same time, institutional investors, if participating 
in mutual funds, can be expected to invest in institutional funds. Furthermore, presumably more 
sophisticated institutional investors influence flows of institutional funds, while flows of retail funds 
are determined by investment decisions of unsophisticated – individual investors. 62  
 
Following Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), Sapp and Tiwari (2004), and Keswani and Stolin 
(2008), at the beginning of each month and for each type of fund, we construct two portfolios of 
new-money. The first portfolio consists of all funds with a positive net cash flow realized during the 
previous month. The second portfolio comprises all funds with a negative net cash flow realized over 
the same month. Next, we estimate the performance of each of the portfolios in the subsequent 
month using both the Fama-French’s (1993) model and the  Carhart’s (1997) model including  a 
momentum factor.  
To test for fund selection ability on the part of investors of each fund type, we examine the 
difference between the alphas of the positive and negative cash flow portfolios of the corresponding 
fund sample. Thus, to compare money smartness of investors of retail and institutional funds, we 
compare the estimated differences. 
In line with the studies of Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), and Keswani and Stolin (2008), we 
find a smart money effect for investors of both institutional and retail mutual funds. The effect is 
robust to different measures of performance and flows, and controlling for stock return momentum 
and investment style. Consistent with the findings of Zheng (1999), we find that the smart money 
effect  comes  mainly  from  small  funds.  We  also  observe  that  investors  of  both  types  of  funds 
demonstrate better fund selection ability over expansion periods than during recession periods.  
Surprisingly,  our  results  suggest  that  investors  of  institutional  funds,  with  a  higher 
representation of more sophisticated investors, do not demonstrate a better fund selection ability. 
Probably, performance persistence, widely documented by existing mutual fund literature (Sharp 
(1966),  Grinblatt  and  Titman  (1989a,  1992),  Hendricks,  Patel  and  Zeckhauser  (1993),  Gruber 
(1996),  Elton,  Gruber  and  Blake  (1996),  Bollen  and  Busse  (2002),  Wermers  (2003),  Kosowski, 
Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006)), represents one of the main observable attributes of the 
superior ability of the fund manager, while past return information is accessible and widely used by 
both types of investors (Alexander, Jones and Nigro (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Palmiter 
and Taha (2008)). If so, a higher level of financial sophistication does not necessarily lead to better 
fund  selection  ability.  Alternatively,  performance  persistence,  providing  some  extent  of  return 
predictability,  together  with  accessibility  of  past  return  records  and  financial  advisers’  services, 
allows unsophisticated investors to demonstrate fund selection ability as well.  63  
 
Concurrently, our results indicate dissimilarities in the cash flow development for retail and 
institutional funds. The observed dissimilarities can be a result of difference in investment decision 
patterns  characterizing  investors  of  each  fund  type  (Nofsinger  and  Sias  (1999),  Grinblatt  and 
Keloharju (2001), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Froot and Teo (2004), Sias (2004), Gallo, Phengpis 
and Swanson (2008)), and deserve further investigation.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of 
relevant  literature.  Section  3.3 discusses  the  mutual  fund  data  sample  and  the  methods  used  to 
measure cash flows and the performance of new money portfolios. Section 3.4 provides evidence on 
the performance of the new-money portfolios for both types of funds and discusses the differences in 
the observed effect for retail and institutional funds. Section 3.5 studies determinants of cash flows 
into both types of funds. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2   Overview of related literature  
3.2.1   The “Smart Money” hypothesis 
The smart money hypothesis postulates that investors are “smart” enough to move to funds 
that will outperform in the future, that is, that investors have fund selection ability. As noted above, 
the investigation of the smart money effect in the context of mutual funds was initiated by Gruber 
(1996).  He  aimed  at  understanding  the  continued  growth  of  the  actively  managed  mutual  fund 
industry despite the widespread evidence that on average active fund managers do not add value. To 
test whether investors in fact have selection ability, he examines whether investors’ money tends to 
flow to the funds that subsequently outperform. Working with a subset of U.S. equity funds, he finds 
evidence that money appears to be smart. One potential explanation for this smart money effect is 
that  investors  have  an  ability  to  identify  better managers,  and  invest  accordingly.  According  to 
Gruber  (1996),  this  argument  provides  a  justification  for  investing  in  actively  managed  mutual 
funds.  
Zheng (1999) develops the analyses of Gruber (1996), using the universe of all U.S. domestic 
equity funds that existed between 1970 and 1993. She reports that funds with positive net cash flows 
subsequently  demonstrate  better  risk-adjusted  return  than  funds  experiencing  negative  net  cash 
flows. In addition, Zheng finds that information on net cash flows into small funds can be used to 
generate risk-adjusted profits.  64  
 
The more recent research of Sapp and Tiwari (2004), however, claims that the smart money 
effect reported by previous studies comes from failure of these studies to capture the stock return 
momentum factor. Their line of reasoning can be illustrated as follows. Well performing stocks tend 
to  continue  performing  well  (Jegadeesh  and  Titman  (1993)).  Simultaneously,  investors  tend  to 
allocate  their  money  into  ex-post  best-performing  funds.  Furthermore,  past  best-performers 
inevitably disproportionally hold ex-post best-performing stocks. Thus, relocating their money into 
past winners, investors inadvertently benefit from momentum returns on winning stocks. To test this 
argument, Sapp and Tiwari estimate abnormal return on portfolios formed based on net cash flow 
with and without the stock return momentum factor. They find that accounting for the momentum 
factor eliminates outperformance of positive cash flow funds. At the same time, the authors show 
that investors do not rationally pursue to benefit from stock return momentum, and higher exposure 
to the momentum factor does not make a fund become more popular. Contributing to this discussion, 
Wermers (2003) investigates holdings of fund portfolios and shows that fund managers who have 
recently done well tend to invest a considerable portion of new money into the recently winning 
stocks in an attempt to continue to perform well.  
Keswani  and  Stolin  (2008)  revisit  the  smart  money  debate using  a  British  data  set. The 
authors report strong evidence of the smart money effect for both individuals and institutions in the 
U.K. They note that while the performance difference between positive and negative net cash flow 
funds  is  lower  in  its  magnitude,  it  is  highly  significant  statistically.  The  authors  also  briefly 
reexamine the effect for U.S. data, and find that when using monthly flows, there is a smart money 
effect in the U.S. as well, even after controlling for the momentum factor. The U.S. smart money 
effect is comparable in magnitude to the one they find in the U.K. The authors claim that Sapp and 
Tiwari’s failure to find a significant relationship between money flows and subsequent fund returns 
in the U.S. is attributed to their use of quarterly flows.
22  
Our study contributes to this stream of literature testing the existence of the “smart money” 
effect separately for investors of retail and institutional mutual funds. This gives us the opportunity 
to compare the fund selection  abilities for investors of two types of funds, whose investors are 
presumably different in their level of financial sophistication. In contrast to Keswani and Stolin 
(2004),  who  treat  flows  of  individual  and  institutional  investors  separately,  we  estimate  the 
                                                              
22 In their study, Keswani and Stolin (2008) use flow data estimated on a monthly frequency. 65  
 
differences  in  the  fund  selection  abilities  for  the  investors  of  retail  and  institutional  funds 
statistically. 
We use monthly data for all U.S. domestic equity mutual funds that existed over the last 
decade. Thus, our study tests the “smart money” effect for the most recent period, which was not 
covered by  the  previous  smart  money  literature.  Monthly  flow  data  allows  us  to  conduct  more 
accurate analysis compared to the one performed by Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), and Sapp and 
Tiwari (2004), who use quarterly flow data. While Keswani and Stolin (2008) also conduct the 
analysis of smart money effect on a monthly level, they concentrate primarily on British data.    
3.2.2   Institutional versus Individual Mutual Fund Investors 
Studies of mutual funds typically distinguish between individual and institutional investors. 
For example, studies of fund selection often assume that, individual or so-called “retail” investors, 
face substantial search costs and are less informed than institutional investors. Other studies argue 
that institutional investors base their investment decisions on more sophisticated selection criteria 
than individual investors do (Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), James and Karceski (2006), Birnbaum, 
Kallberg, Koutsoftas and Schwartz (2008)). Nevertheless, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
conjecture that investment decisions by some institutional investors are affected by several layers of 
agency  conflicts.  Particularly,  the  authors  argue  that  sponsors  of  pension  funds,  trustees  and 
corporate treasurers may entrust outside managers with money management in an attempt to avoid 
responsibility in the case of poor performance. This can result in the manager selection process being 
mainly based on past performance, similar to the way retail investors tend to select mutual funds.
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Birnbaum, Kallberg, Koutsoftas and Schwartz (2008) discuss how the institutions and retail 
investors  react  to  past  performance,  and  whether  their  reactions  differ  considerably  during  the 
bearish or bullish market conditions. The authors document that the reaction of institutions to past 
performance  differs  from  the  reaction  of  retail  investors.  In  particular,  the  authors  find  that 
institutions  react  less  aggressively  to  both  good  and  bad  performance.  Birnbaum  et  al.  (2008) 
emphasize weak negative reaction to underperformance of both – retail and institutional investors. 
                                                              
23  According  to  Lakonishok  et  al.  (1992),  the  corporate  insider  responsible  for  money  allocation  can  easily  switch 
between money managers, relocating the money from a poorly performing manager to a manager who has done well in 
the past. This way the money manager selection process is based mainly on past performance. 
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The authors conclude that investors’ reluctance  to withdraw their money during bearish periods 
allows mutual funds to experience relatively low outflows, even during adverse market conditions. 
Summarizing the academic literature that examines the profiles of mutual fund investors, 
Palmiter  and  Taha  (2008)  report  that  individual  mutual  fund  investors  are  mostly  financially 
unsophisticated: they do not take into consideration costs associated with the investment, and tend to 
chase  past  returns.  Simultaneously,  the  authors  point  out  that  clienteles  using  the  assistance  of 
financial advisers, don’t do any better. This conclusion contradicts the findings of Jones, Lesseig and 
Smythe  (2005),  who  show  that  financial  advisers  pay  great  attention  to  characteristics  such  as 
relative fund performance, fund investment style, fund risk, and manager reputation and tenure, i.e., 
those characteristics that individual investors do not usually take into consideration or are unable to 
access.  
In their study from 2002, Del Guercio and Tkac argue that due to differences in agency 
relationships  and  level  of  financial  sophistication:  pension  fund  sponsors  –  considered  more 
sophisticated – use different selection criteria in picking their portfolio managers than mutual fund 
investors,  the  majority  of  which  are  relatively  unsophisticated  individual  investors.  In  fact,  the 
authors document that the criteria to select portfolio managers are significantly different for pension 
funds  and  retail  mutual  funds.  Pension  funds  are  found  to use  such  quantitatively  sophisticated 
measures as tracking error and risk-adjusted returns, such as Jensen’s alpha. In contrast, retail mutual 
fund investors pay greater attention to raw returns. The authors also document significant differences 
in the flow-performance relationship attributing both types of investors. Thus, the authors confirm 
that,  the  presumably  more  sophisticated  pension  fund  investors  also  employ  more  sophisticated 
measures in selecting a portfolio manager than unsophisticated retail investors do.  
At the same time, mutual funds’ literature documents evidence on persistence in fund returns, 
(see, for example, Sharp (1966), Grinblatt and Titman (1989a, 1992), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson 
and Ross (1992), Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1994), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown 
and Goetzmann (1995), Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996), Carchart (1997), Bollen and Busse (2002), 
Wermers  (2003),  Kosowski,  Timmermann,  Wermers  and  White  (2006)).  Sharp  (1966)  finds 
persistence for both low and high-ranked mutual funds. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) 
introduce the concept of “hot hands” meaning the tendency of the best performing funds to continue 
to outperform in the subsequent periods. Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) show that past return can 67  
 
serve as a good predictor of future return for the long run as well as the short run. Carhart’s (1997) 
reports persistence in fund performance only over short term horizons of up to one year. Carhart 
argues  that,  momentum  effect  is  mostly  responsible  for  the  disappearance  of  performance 
persistence on the longer horizon, noting that only the worst-performing funds stay bad in the long 
run. Wermers (2004), documents strong persistence of mutual fund returns over multi-year periods. 
To summarize: empirical findings investigating performance persistence, do not reject a possibility 
that, past raw returns and returns estimated on risk-adjusted basis, can predict future return. Thus, 
“unsophisticated” investors, in their naïve chase for past returns, do not necessarily follow the wrong 
fund selection strategy. 
Therefore, while the existing academic literature provides empirical evidence on differences 
in fund selection criteria, implemented by sophisticated versus unsophisticated investors, (see for 
example Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Birnbaum, Kallberg, Koutsoftas and Schwartz (2008)), it is 
not clear whether a higher level of financial sophistication essentially implies better fund selection 
ability.  
Alternatively,  there  is  no  consensus  in  the  mutual  fund  literature  regarding  exceptional 
abilities of fund managers to generate high returns. Jensen (1967) contends that there is very little 
evidence of fund managers with genuine timing and picking abilities. In their recent study, Duan, Hu 
and McLean (2008) find that mutual fund managers exhibit stock-picking ability only in stocks with 
high idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the authors document that, in general stock picking ability of 
mutual fund managers has diminished considerably over the last decade, being negatively affected 
by  the  expansion  of  mutual  fund  industry  itself  and  intensive  growth  of  competing  hedge  fund 
industry.  Cuthbertson,  Nitzsche  and  O'Sullivan  (2008)  show  that  only  a  few  of  the  top  best-
performing U.K. mutual funds demonstrate stock picking ability which is not just due to good luck. 
Simultaneously, the worst-performers are not found to be unlucky, but rather ‘badly skilled’. For 
U.S. data, Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006) reveal that merely a minority of 
mutual fund managers have stock-picking ability. Furthermore, Swinkels and Rzezniczak (2009) 
state that fund managers possess insignificantly positive selectivity skills and they do not appear to 
possess  equity  and  bond  timing  skills.  Studying  hybrid  mutual  funds,  Comer,  Larrymore  and 
Rodriguez (2009) suggest that these funds consistently underperform their style benchmarks. This 
means that managers of those funds exhibit neither timing nor selectivity ability. 68  
 
To  summarize,  the  question  that  remains  is  whether  advanced  financial  sophistication  is 
indeed closely associated with superior fund selection ability. In this chapter, we investigate this 
question empirically, comparing fund selection ability of individual versus institutional mutual fund 
investors, when the latter are commonly considered to be more sophisticated. 
So far, we have discussed differences between individual and institutional investors. Now, 
let’s take a look at characteristics of funds serving these two types of investors.      
3.2.3   Institutional versus Retail Mutual Funds 
In  US  mutual  fund  industry,  funds  purely  focused  on  institutional  investors  represent  a 
relatively recent trend which started in the early 1990s (James and Karceski (2006)). The formation 
of institutional funds  has resulted in a division  of mutual funds into individual and institutional 
oriented. Thus,  funds  serving  individual  clienteles  are  recognized  as  being  “retail”  funds,  while 
funds targeting institutional investors are seen as “institutional” funds. There is no formal definition 
of the retail or the institutional fund. The main criteria usually considered to classify funds into retail 
and institutional, are minimum investment requirements declared by the fund and the distribution 
channel  of  fund  shares.  Morningstar,  for  example,  classifies  as  being  an  institutional  fund  with 
minimum initial investment requirements of at least $100,000 (James and Karceski (2006)). In this 
study, we use fund classification provided by CRSP, which adopts Lipper fund type categorization. 
Lipper  classifies  institutional  funds  as  having  a  minimum  investment  requirement  of  at  least 
$100,000 and fund’s shares having to be distributed to or through an institution.
24 In addition, funds 
that designate themselves as being institutional are usually recognized as such.
25 
Although  the  same  companies  that  have  a  part  in  running  retail  mutual  funds  (banks, 
insurance  companies,  brokers,  and  fund  advisory  companies)  operate  institutional  mutual  funds, 
these funds have several distinguishing characteristics. Besides considerably higher minimum initial 
investments, institutional funds usually offer lower costs to investors compared to retail funds. So, 
only an insignificant minority of institutional funds have front or deferred loads, redemption fees or 
12b-1 marketing expenses. 
                                                              
24 We received this information during a phone conversation with one of the Lipper officers responsible for this field. 
25 Both Morningstar and Lipper consider a fund to be  institutional if it is designated as such (for Morningstar this 
information is based on the study of James and Karceski (2006), and for Lipper, based on our e-mail dialogue with one 
of  the Lipper officers responsible for this field)).   69  
 
The size of the institutional segment of the mutual fund market has grown dramatically in 
recent  years, both in terms of the number of funds and assets under management. For example, 
James and Karceski (2006) report that at the beginning of their sample period – year 1986 – the 
number of open-end bond and equity institutional funds was 22, while at the end of the sample 
period – the end of  year 1998 – there were 873 funds. Thus, the number of institutional  funds 
increased 40-fold during the sample period. In contrast, the number of retail funds increased from 
786 to 5,076 (an increase of around 650%) during the same period. At the same time, the amount of 
assets managed by institutional funds grew from 3.2 billion at the beginning of the sample period – 
year 1986 – to over $302 billion by the end of the sample period – year 1998.  
Numbers reported by the Investment Company Institute (ICI) confirm the observed tendency. 
ICI estimates that institutions held more than 1.7 trillion dollars in equity, bond, money market and 
hybrid open-end mutual funds at year-end 2008 (out of a total of $9.6 trillion in these funds). That is 
compared with 0.7 trillion dollar held by institutional investors in mutual funds at year-end 2000, 
which represented merely 10% of the total assets of the mutual fund industry in the year 2000 (7.3 
trillion dollar).
26  
Our sample also depicts considerable growth of proportion of institutional funds. Thus, at the 
beginning of our sample period – January 1999 - institutional funds represented around 20% of all 
funds managing merely 12% of assets, while at the end of the period – May 2009 – almost 40% of 
all funds in our sample were institutional funds accounting for 22% of assets under management.  
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the evolution of both groups of funds in our sample over the period 
between January 1999 and May 2009. The number of institutional funds grew at a faster pace than 
the number of retail funds, with the number of institutional funds increasing 322 percent (from 884 
to 2844 funds), and the number of retail funds increasing 53 percent (from 3042 to 4656 funds). 
Assets under management held by institutional funds increased almost three-fold (from 247 billion 
to 671 billion), while assets under management of retail  funds remained nearly the  same (1883 
billion to 1840 billion). 
 [Please insert Figures 3.1 and 3.2 about here] 
Some of the institutional funds in our sample have retail counterparts. Since the Investment 
Company Act requires different classes of shares of the same fund to have the same return before 
                                                              
26 See, ICI “Fact Book 2009”.  70  
 
distribution  expenses,  the  institutional  and  retail  shares  of  such  funds,  while  holding  the  same 
portfolio, are claims on separate asset pools or trusts. This structure is imposed by the differences in 
services that each type of fund requires from the fund manager. For instance, management fees may 
be lower for the institutional investor shares than for the retail, since institutional sponsors may 
provide  bookkeeping  services  and  transact  with  the  fund  through  an  omnibus  account.  The 
institutional and the retail peers file separate prospectuses. 
Comparing performance of retail and institutional funds, James and Karceski (2006) find 
that, despite significantly lower management expenses, the average return on institutional funds is no 
better  than  the  average  return  on  retail  funds. Even  on  a  risk-adjusted basis,  institutional  funds 
performance is similar to retail funds. In addition, the authors report that institutional funds with low 
initial investment requirements and funds with retail peers perform worse than other institutional 
funds both before and after adjusting for risk and expenses.  
Baker, Haslem and Smith (2009) investigate the relationship between the performance and 
characteristics of domestic, actively managed institutional equity mutual funds. Their results show 
that large funds tend to perform better, which suggests the presence of significant economies of 
scale. The authors also document evidence on the positive relationship between cash holdings and 
performance.  
3.3   Data and Methodology 
3.3.1  Sample Description 
We collect data from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database. Our sample 
comprises all open-end domestic equity mutual funds that existed at any time during the period 
January 1999 to May 2009 and for which values of monthly total net asset are reported by CRSP. 
Further, we exclude specialized funds, sector funds, balanced funds and international funds, since 
risk factors of these funds may differ from risk factors driving the performance of other equity 
mutual funds. We treat fund-entity as is denoted by CRSP. More specifically, each fund represents 
either a share class (thereby representing only a part of the fund assets) or a fund representing an 
entire  portfolio.  Thus,  the  final  sample  contains  11,710  fund-entities  comprising  818,530  fund-
months.  71  
 
The CRSP mutual fund sample is fairly close to the opportunity set of equity mutual funds 
faced by institutional and retail investors in practice. Thus, the results based on this sample should 
provide a realistic evaluation of fund selection ability for both types of the investors. 
We categorize funds as institutional if CRSP designates them as such. Starting in 1999, the 
CRSP database includes a variable that identifies whether a fund represents institutional or retail 
type. We use this year as a starting point in our investigation. As mentioned in the previous section, 
explicit division of funds into institutional and retail, represents relatively recent trends that started 
in the early 1990s.  
CRSP derives the institutional/retail identifier from Lipper, and assigns funds as institutional 
if they fall into Lipper’s “Institutional” or “Bank Institutional” categories. More specifically, Bank 
Institutional funds are considered to be funds that are primarily offered to clients, agencies and 
fiduciaries  of  bank  trust  departments,  commercial  banks,  thrifts,  trust  companies,  or  similar 
institutions. The bank, bank affiliate or subsidiary acting as advisor, or, in some cases, sub-advisor 
for  the  funds,  and  the  funds  are  typically  marketed  as  a  bank  product.  Institutional  funds  are 
considered if they are primarily targeted at organizations and institutions, including pension funds, 
401k plans, profit sharing plans, endowments, or accounts held by institutions in a fiduciary, agency 
or custodial capacity. 
Note that this classification may not be a precise identifier of investor type. For instance, the 
final investment decision of 401k plans’ participants is taken by an individual investor, while their 
capital flows may combine flows of either an institutional or a retail fund. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the classification of funds into retail and institutional implies differences 
in investor composition of the two types of fund. In particular, the overwhelming majority of retail 
fund  investors  apparently  are  regular  individuals.  At  the  same  time,  institutional  investors,  if 
participating  in  mutual  funds,  can  be  expected  to  invest  in  institutional  funds.  Furthermore, 
presumably more sophisticated institutional investors influence flows of institutional funds, while 
flows  of  retail  funds  are  determined  by  investment  decisions  of  unsophisticated  –  individual 
investors. 
Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics for the mutual funds of both samples. Therefore, 
Panels B and C provide corresponding statistics for the retail fund and the institutional fund samples 72  
 
respectively. For purposes of comparison, we also report corresponding statistics for the sample of 
all funds (Panel A). 
As reported in Table 3.1, on average, retail funds are slightly bigger than institutional funds. 
Thus, the average retail fund in our sample had $505 million under management compared with 
$247 million managed by the average  institutional fund. Presumably, the observed difference in 
average size is the result of the size difference between the largest retail and institutional funds. 
More specifically, the largest institutional fund in our sample is roughly two times smaller than the 
largest retail fund, managing $48 billion and $97 billion respectively. At the same time, the median 
fund size is almost the same: $29 million for retail funds compared to $27 million for institutional 
funds.  
In  addition,  Table  3.1  shows  that  the  average  expense  ratio  is  considerably  lower  for 
institutional funds than for the retail funds. In particular, the average expense ratio for institutional 
funds (1.02% per year) is 60 basis points lower than the average expense ratio for the retail fund 
(1.62% per year).  Although an expense ratio and maximum front-end load fee are considerably 
higher for retail funds, we also observe that the turnover ratio is similar for both samples.
27  
The average monthly new cash flow, described in this section below, into funds is positive 
for retail funds as well as for institutional funds. However, the average monthly net cash flow for 
institutional funds is nearly four times higher than for retail funds ($1.73 million and $0.44 million 
correspondingly). If we normalize the net cash flow by fund TNA of the prior month, the average 
normalized monthly cash flow is much more similar for both types of funds.
 28  
[Please insert Table 3.1 about here] 
The  institutional  funds  in  our  sample  seem  to  perform  slightly  better.  Lower  brokerage 
commissions  and  expenses,  characterizing  institutional  funds,  are  possible  sources  of  return 
difference. Moreover, some of the institutional funds in our sample have retail counterparts. Such 
retail “peers” are equity funds with the same advisor and fund name as the institutional funds, but 
with different share classes. In these cases, institutional and retail “peers” hold exactly the same 
equity portfolio and have identical fractional cash balances. Thus, the only source of differences in 
their returns can be the differences in paid brokerage commissions and expenses. 
                                                              
27 Expense ratio for retail funds is 1.62%, and 1.02% for institutional funds. Maximum front-end load fee is 3.40% for 
retail funds, and 1.50% for institutional funds. 
28 Average Monthly Normalized Cash Flow for retail fund is 1.82%, and 2.13% for institutional fund.  73  
 
Before commencing our work with our flow data at the fund-month level, we eliminate fund-
months without records for fund total net asset value. This leaves us with 817,423 fund-months, 
from which 576,975 are retail fund-months and 240,448 institutional fund-months. In addition, we 
exclude fund-observations with 1st and 99
th flow percentile, so that highly unusual flows do not 
drive our results. More specifically, exceptionally noisy flow data can be an attribute to very young 
funds or funds about to be closed down. 
3.3.2  Measurement of Cash Flows and Performance 
Following the existing “smart money” literature (see for example Zheng (1999), Sapp and 
Tiwari (2004)), we examine investors’ fund selection ability by estimating the performance of new-
money portfolios, which are constructed based on a signal of the fund’s realized net cash flow. At 
the beginning of each month and for each type of fund, we construct two portfolios of new-money. 
The first portfolio consists of all funds with a positive net cash flow, realized during the previous 
month. The second portfolio comprises all funds with a negative net cash flow, realized over the 
same month. Since both portfolio types are formed based on the signals of a new cash flow, we refer 
to those portfolios as new money portfolios. We measure the net cash flow to fund j during month t 
as follows:  
     ,  =     ,  −     ,    1 +   ,  .                                         (1) 
Here      ,  denotes the dollar monthly net cash flow for fund j during month t.     ,  refers 
to the total net assets at the end of month t,   ,  is the fund’s return for month t. The estimate of net 
cash flow expressed in equation (1) implies that existing fund investors reinvest their dividend. In 
addition, the estimate assumes that all the new money is invested at the end of month.  Further, we 
employ two portfolio-weighted approaches to calculate monthly performance for each type of new-
money  portfolios.  The  first  one  calculates  equally-weighted  new-money  portfolios’  returns.  The 
second  calculates  cash  flow-weighted  returns  using  fund  net  cash  flows,  realized  during  the 
corresponding month, as weight.   
We summarize the descriptive statistics for the new-money portfolios in Table 3.2. Thus, we 
report the statistics for equally-weighted and cash flow-weighted new money portfolios for each type 
of funds. For the purpose of comparison, we also show the returns on a TNA-weighted and an 74  
 
equally-weighted portfolio of all the funds in our sample. Thus, Panels A, B and C of the table report 
corresponding statistics for the samples of all funds, retail funds, and institutional funds respectively.  
The  table  reports  the  mean,  the  median,  the  25
th  and  75
th  percentile,  and  the  standard 
deviation of monthly returns in excess of risk free rate, which in this case is a return on the one-
month T-bill. In addition, the table shows the statistics for the excess return on the market portfolio, 
revealing that its average for our sample period was -0.10%. As one can note, the average returns on 
the  positive  cash  flow portfolios  are  higher  than  the  average  returns  on  the  negative  cash  flow 
portfolios. More specifically, the average excess return on the positive cash flow portfolio of retail 
funds (-0.08%) is 18 basis points higher than the average excess return on the negative cash flow 
portfolio of retail funds (-0.26%). Simultaneously, the average excess return on the positive cash 
flow portfolio of institutional funds is -0.10%, which is 11 basis points higher than the average 
excess return on the negative cash flow portfolio of institutional funds (-0.21%). Moreover, the level 
of excess return of the corresponding portfolios is fairly similar for both types of funds.  
[Please insert Table 3.2 about here] 
In line with previous “smart money” studies (see for example Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), 
Sapp and Tiwari (2004), and Keswani and Stolin (2008)), we compute the risk-adjusted return of the 
portfolios using two approaches. First, following the “portfolio regression approach”, we estimate 
time-series regression  for the returns of each of the new-money portfolios. Next, we implement 
“fund  regression  approach”.  Fund  regression  approach  estimates  Fama-French’s  three-factor  and 
Carhart’s four-factor time-series regressions for each of the funds in our sample, and then computes 
the cross-sectional risk-adjusted return for each of the portfolios, month by month. 
For the portfolio regression approach, for each month, we first measure the return of each of 
the  portfolios  as  a  weighted  average  of  returns  of  the  funds  composing  the  portfolio.  Then,  to 
estimate the portfolio alpha, we regress monthly portfolio returns on factors of the corresponding 
model, specifying the following regressions:  
  ,  =   
  +   ,        +   ,      +   ,      +    ,                                        (2) 
  ,  =   
  +   ,        +   ,      +   ,      +   ,      +    .                  (3) 
Here,    ,  is the monthly return on a portfolio of funds in excess of the one month T-bill 
return;        is the excess return on a value-weighted market portfolio in month t;      is the 75  
 
return on the mimicking portfolio for the common size factor in stock returns in the month t;      
is  the  return  on  the  mimicking  portfolio  for  the  common book-to-market  equity  factor  in  stock 
returns in the month t;       is the return on the mimicking portfolio for the one-year momentum in 
stock return factor in the month t;    are risk-adjusted returns or alphas from the corresponding 
factor model, and   are factor loadings of the corresponding factors.  
For the fund regression approach, we first estimate alphas for each of the funds. Then, for 
each month, we calculate portfolio alpha as a weighted average of alphas of funds comprising the 
portfolio. Finally, we measure portfolio alpha averaging monthly portfolio alphas estimated in the 
previous stage. Thus, the regression  equation for fund alphas, and the measure for the monthly 
estimated portfolio alpha can be expressed as the follows:  
    =   
  +   ,        +   ,      +   ,      +    ,                                           (4) 
    =   
  +   ,        +   ,      +   ,      +   ,      +    ,                      (5) 
    = ∑(    ×    )/∑   ,                                                                                         (6) 
where     is the return , in month t, on a portfolio j in excess of the risk free rate, which is the return 
on the one month T-bill,     is the excess return of the portfolio of mutual funds on factors of the 
corresponding model in month t,      is the excess return of individual mutual funds on factors of the 
corresponding model in month t, and     is the portfolio weight of the individual fund j in month t. 
In  his  work  in  1997,  Carhart  demonstrates  the  superiority  of  the  four-factor  model  – 
including the stock return momentum factor – to both the CAPM and Fama-French’s three-factor 
model, in explaining cross-sectional variation in mutual fund returns. Implementing Carhart’s four-
factor  model,  Sapp  and  Tiwari  (2004)  show  that  inclusion  of  the  momentum  factor  in  the 
performance measurement eliminates the “smart money” effect. While in their more recent paper, 
Keswani and Stolin (2008), revisit the effect with U.K. data and subsequently with U.S. data on a 
monthly level, and report a robust “smart money” effect for the samples of both of the regions.  
To test for fund selection ability on the part of investors of each fund type, we examine the 
difference between the alphas of the positive and negative cash flow portfolios of the corresponding 
fund sample. Thus, to compare “money smartness” of investors of retail and institutional funds, we 
compare the estimated differences. 76  
 
Both  –  the  portfolio  regression  approach  and  the  fund  regression  approach  –  have  their 
advantages and drawbacks. The portfolio regression approach is free of a look-ahead bias, which 
occurs when the fund is required to survive for a longer period of time in order to be included in the 
examination. That is since the approach requires mutual fund to have return information only one 
month after the portfolio formation. However, this approach does not account for time-variation in 
the portfolio compositions and their risk characteristics (see Zheng (1999), Fama and French (1996), 
Ferson and Harvey (1997)). 
In contrast, the  fund regression approach does suffer from a look-ahead bias, due to the 
existence of some new funds that do not have enough tracking history for the regression analysis. 
Requiring a minimum of 36 months of return data, to perform the time-series OLS estimation for 
each fund, we exclude some of the new funds and defunct funds included in the portfolio regression 
approach.  The  look-ahead  bias  may  affect  the  precision  of  the  new  money  performance 
measurement.  At  the  same  time,  the  fund  regression  approach  captures  the  portfolio  variations 
through time.  
3.4   Performance of New Money Portfolios:   
        Individual versus Institutional Investors 
3.4.1  Portfolio Regression Approach 
We start the analysis by reexamining investors’ ability to gain superior returns based on 
their investment decisions. We conduct separate analysis for retail institutional fund samples. We 
report the results for the equally-weighted new money portfolios as reported in Panel A of Table 3.3. 
The first three rows of Panel A present the results of the analysis based on four-factor models for all 
funds, retail funds, and institutional funds respectively. The next three rows report corresponding 
results using the three-factor model.  
[Please insert Table 3.3 about here] 
For the three-factor model not accounting for momentum, the positive cash flow portfolios 
of both retail and institutional funds have statistically insignificant and negative alphas of -6.1 and -
2.1 basis points per month respectively. Four-factor alphas are slightly lower for retail as well as for 
institutional  funds  (-7.1  and  -2.8  basis  points  respectively).  Thus,  they  are  also  negative  and 77  
 
insignificant. At the same time, the average dollar invested in retail and institutional mutual funds, 
over the sample period, generated the insignificant four-factor alphas of -10.1 and -5.8 basis points 
respectively. Four-factor alphas of the negative cash flow portfolios are -13.1 basis points for retail 
funds and -9.2 basis points for institutional funds. Both of the estimates are statistically insignificant.  
The reported difference in alphas represents returns generated by a trading strategy that is 
long in the positive cash flow portfolio, and short in the negative cash flow portfolio, estimates the 
fund selection ability of corresponding type of investors. The second column from the right presents 
the differences. The difference between the positive cash flow and negative cash portfolio alphas, for 
retail and institutional funds, are almost the same. For both models, the differences are positive and 
significant. Four-factor alpha difference for retail and institutional funds is equal to 6 and 6.4 basis 
points per month respectively, or to 72 and 76.8 annually. Therefore, the effect appears to be similar 
for both retail and institutional investors. 
Furthermore, the results based on the three-factor model as well as those based on the four-
factor  model,  show  that  alphas  of  positive  cash  flow  portfolios  of  both  types  of  investors  are 
significantly higher than alphas of negative and average cash flow portfolios. This result indicates 
the existence of the smart money effect for investors of both types of funds. Notably, both models 
indicate that the alphas of institutional funds for all types of portfolios are about 4 basis points higher 
than those of retail portfolios. 
The estimates for four-factor and three-factor alphas, reported in Panel A of Table 3.3, are 
lower than respective alpha estimates reported by  Sapp and Tiwari (2004). For instance, in our 
sample, the four-factor alpha of all funds has a value of -6.2 basis points, which is merely 6 basis 
points  lower  than  the  four-factor  alpha  estimate  reported  by  Sapp  and  Tiwari  (2004). 
Correspondingly, the three-factor alpha of the positive cash flow portfolio of all funds in our sample 
equals -5.3, which is roughly 12 basis points lower than this reported by Zheng (1999) and Sapp and 
Tiwari (2004). One of the possible explanations for such disparity in alphas is a difference in the 
sample periods. Our sample period does not overlap the one used by Zheng, and has only two years 
in common with the sample period used by Sapp and Tiwari. 
Panel  A  of  Table  3.4  reports  statistical  estimates  for  the  differences  between  alphas  of 
positive, negative and average, equally-weighted cash flow portfolios, for different types of funds. 
For instance, the leftmost column from the top to the bottom respectively, shows the difference in 78  
 
alphas of positive portfolios for retail versus all, institutional versus all, institutional versus retail 
funds. For all types of portfolios, the alpha of institutional fund portfolios is significantly higher than 
that of retail fund portfolios.  
[Please insert Table 3.4 about here] 
We test the statistical significance of the difference  in the observed smart money  effect 
between investors of retail and institutional funds, and summarize the results in Panel A of Table 
3.5. We note that there is no significant difference in the detected fund selection ability for the 
investors of retail and institutional funds.  
[Please insert Table 3.5 about here] 
To summarize, our results for equally-weighted new money portfolios confirm the existence 
of the smart money effect findings of Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), and Keswani and Stolin (2008). 
In addition, these results support the findings of Keswani and Stolin arguing that implementation of 
monthly data allows detection of the smart money effect even controlling for the momentum factor. 
Furthermore, both types of investors display the “smart money” effect. Remarkably, the effect does 
not differ for investors of both retail and institutional funds.  
Further, we take a look at the performance of cash flow-weighted new money portfolios.  
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports the results. Compared to the equal-weighting method, a cash flow-
weighting scheme has the advantage of putting greater accent on funds having the larger absolute 
cash flows.  
As can be seen, the alphas of positive, negative, and average portfolios for both types of 
funds, are negative, while for the positive portfolios, the alphas are not significantly different from 
zero. Moreover, the alphas are negative for both models excluding and including the momentum 
factor. Yet, the three-factor as well as four-factor alphas of positive cash flow portfolios of both 
types of funds are higher than alphas of corresponding negative and average cash flow portfolios. 
This result contradicts the findings of Sapp and Tiwari (2004), who report that the four-factor alpha 
of the average cash flow portfolio is higher than the corresponding alpha of the positive portfolio. It 
is possible that the difference in the result resides in the difference in the sample periods and data 
frequency. As documented by Keswani and Stolin (2008), even controlling for momentum, use of 
monthly flow data allows detection of the smart money effect, which is not observed with quarterly 
flow data, used in the Sapp and Tiwari (2004) study.  79  
 
Our results show that the four-factor alpha of positive cash flow portfolio is not significantly 
different from zero and equal to -3.8 basis points per month for retail funds and -5.3 basis points per 
month for institutional funds. This is higher than the corresponding four-factor alphas of average 
portfolios, which are -8 basis points for retail funds and -10.3 basis points for institutional funds, and 
of negative portfolios, which equal -12.5 and -14.6 basis points for retail and institutional funds 
respectively. Thus, the results support the existence of fund selection ability for investors of both 
individual  and  institutional  funds.  Notably,  in  contrast  to  the  results  for  the  equally-weighted 
portfolios, the cash flow-weighted alphas of institutional funds are, though not significantly, lower 
than the corresponding alphas of retail funds (see Panel B of Table 3.4). This result might indicate a 
difference in the effect of fund size on net cash flows between retail and institutional funds, given 
that the cash flow-weighted measure gives much greater weight to the performance of the largest 
funds, which, in our sample, are associated with the highest in- and outflows.  
Next, we examine the statistical significance of the observed smart money effect. For this 
purpose,  we  estimate  the  difference  in  alphas  between  the  positive  and  the  negative  cash  flow 
portfolios for each type of funds. A strategy of going short in the negative cash flow portfolio and 
long in the positive cash flow portfolio, generates a four-factor alpha of 8.7 basis points per month 
for retail funds and 9.3 basis points for institutional funds. While both of the alphas are economically 
significant, the institutional fund alpha is also statistically significant. At the same time, this strategy 
yields a three-factor alpha of 12.3 basis points per month for retail funds and 11.2 basis points per 
month for institutional funds.  
Testing statistically the difference in the fund selection ability of investors of retail and 
institutional funds, we find that, compared to investors of retail funds, investors of institutional funds 
do  not  demonstrate  significantly  better  fund  selection  ability  (see  Panel  B  of  Table  3.5). 
Interestingly,  the  results  of  both  equally-weighted  and  cash  flow-weighted  portfolio  approaches, 
show  that  the  smart  money  effect  estimated,  based  on  the  four-factor  model  is,  though 
insignificantly, stronger for the investors of institutional funds. Simultaneously, the effect is stronger 
for the investors of retail funds, if it is estimated using the three-factor model. This result indicates 
possible differences in the effect of momentum on flows of retail and institutional funds. Existence 
of such dissimilarity would be in line with the literature arguing that momentum follow behavioral 
varies for different types of investors (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, (1993), Nofsinger 80  
 
and Sias (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Froot and Teo (2004), Sias (2004), Gallo, Phengpis 
and Swanson (2008)).    
To  summarize,  the  results  for  the  cash  flow-weighted  portfolios  corroborate  with  the 
equally-weighted portfolios findings, showing fund selection ability for the investors of both types of 
funds even controlling for stock return momentum, while revealing that investors of institutional 
funds do not exhibit superior fund selection ability.  
3.4.2  Fund Regression Approach 
Similarly to previous smart money studies (see  Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), Sapp and 
Tiwari (2004), Keswani and Stolin (2008), we also apply fund-regression approach to investigate the 
new cash flow performance.  
Table  3.6  reports  the  portfolio  three-  and  four-factor  alphas  from  the  fund  regression 
approach for each type of investors as well as for all funds together. As we see, alphas obtained 
based  on  three-factor  and  four-factor  models  are  economically  and  statistically  significant,  and 
negative, for both equally-weighted and cash flow-weighted approaches. This result holds for all 
types  of  portfolios  and  fund  type  combinations.  For  instance,  the  four-factor  alpha  of  positive 
equally-weighted  portfolio  equals  -27.9  basis  points  for  retail  funds  and  -28.6  basis  points  for 
institutional funds. The corresponding alphas, which were estimated based on cash flow-weighted 
approach, equal -11.8 and -21.7 basis points per month for retail and institutional funds respectively. 
The  results  indicating  underperformance  of  actively  managed  mutual  funds,  with  respect  to  the 
benchmark, are not too surprising, and are in line with a number of studies documenting relatively 
poor performance of the funds (see for example Jensen (1968), Gruber (1996), Fama and French 
(2008)).  Yet, positive portfolio three- and four-factor alphas, for both equally-weighted and cash 
flow-weighted types of portfolios, are higher than the corresponding alphas of negative and average 
portfolios. Moreover, in all of the cases the difference between alphas of positive and negative, and 
positive  and  average  portfolios  is  strongly  economically  and  statistically  significant.  So,  for 
example, the four-factor alpha of the positive cash flow-weighted flow portfolio is higher than that 
of the negative flow portfolio, at 27.7 basis points for retail funds and at 15.6 basis points higher for 
institutional  funds,  and  the  reported  differences  are  significant  at  1%  level.  Thus,  these  results 81  
 
confirm the results of previously described portfolio regression approach reporting fund selection 
ability for investors of both types of funds.  
 [Please insert Table 3.6 about here] 
Next,  we  take  a  closer  look  at  the  differences  in  portfolio  alphas  between  retail  and 
institutional funds. Table 3.7 summarizes the discussed differences. We note that results based on 
equally-weighted portfolio technique are much more favorable to institutional investors than the 
results of cash flow-weighted approach. More specifically, while the four-factor alpha of the positive 
equally-weighted institutional portfolio is only 0.6 basis points lower than that of the corresponding 
retail portfolio, and the difference is statistically insignificant, the respective three-factor institutional 
portfolio alpha is 9.8 basis points lower than the retail portfolio one, and this difference is highly 
significant. As in the case of portfolio regression analysis illustrating the same tendency, this finding 
indicates possible difference in the effect of fund size on flows of retail and institutional funds. In 
addition, consistent with the portfolio regression approach results, four-factor model based results 
for both equally-weighted and cash flow-weighted approaches are, though slightly, more supportive 
for institutional fund investors than the results of the three-factor model. So, the four-factor alpha of 
negative  cash-flow  weighted  portfolio  of  institutional  funds  is  significantly  higher  than  the 
corresponding alpha of retail funds’ portfolio at 2.3 basis points per month, while the three-factor 
alpha of negative cash flow-weighted institutional portfolio is 1.9 basis points higher than this alpha 
of  retail  funds’  portfolio,  and  the  difference  is  not  significant  statistically.  We  suppose  that 
previously mentioned differences in the effect of momentum on flows of the two types of funds can 
be one of possible explanations.  
[Please insert Table 3.7 about here] 
Finally, we estimate the difference in fund selection ability between investors of retail and 
institutional funds. To estimate this difference, we use the technique similar to the one employed in 
the portfolio regression analysis. We report the results of the analysis in Table 3.8. In contrast to the 
results  of  portfolio  regression  approach,  the  results  indicate  that  investors  of  institutional  funds 
representing  the  more  sophisticated  investors display  weaker  fund  selection  ability  compared  to 
investors of retail investors. In particular, a hypothetical strategy of going short in the negative cash 
flow-weighted portfolio of retail funds and long in the positive cash flow-weighted portfolio of retail 
funds, generates four-factor alpha of 12.1 basis points per month higher compared to the equivalent 82  
 
strategy  applied  to  institutional  funds’  portfolios.  So,  to  reiterate,  implementation  of  the  fund 
regression approach implies much stronger survivorship conditions than these sufficient for portfolio 
regression approach. Thus, as previously discussed in this chapter, fund regression approach suffers 
from the look-ahead bias. Presumably, the stronger the effect of such fund characteristics as fund age 
and fund size, the stronger the look-ahead bias. At the same time, as we noted before, size effect 
might  be  different  for  retail  and  institutional  funds.  More  specifically,  both  relative  portfolio 
performance of institutional funds and relative fund selection ability of institutional investors, with 
respect to those of retail funds and retail investors respectively, are weaker if calculated based on the 
approach,  putting  greater  weight  on  the  largest  funds.  Furthermore,  the  look-ahead  bias  can  be 
expected to have a stronger effect on the estimates of institutional funds, negatively affecting the 
estimates.   
 [Please insert Table 3.8 about here] 
Therefore, the results for the fund regression approach support our findings for the portfolio 
regression  approach  and  show  that  investors  of  both  retail  and  institutional  funds  exhibit  fund 
selection ability. While keeping in mind the possible effect of look-ahead bias attributing the fund 
regression approach, and described above, we conclude that investors of institutional funds do not 
exhibit superior fund selection ability, while investors of retail funds demonstrate a comparable, or 
even stronger, smart money effect.  
3.4.3  Small versus Large Funds 
Zheng (1999) reports that the smart money effect is mainly caused by investment flows into 
and out of small mutual funds. Zheng suggests that great cautiousness by investors, when investing 
in small funds rather than in large funds, is one of the potential reasons for the observed disparity. 
However, fund-size sensitivity can differ for investors of retail and institutional funds. Retail fund 
investors  might  care  more  for  investing  in  small  funds,  due  to relatively  high  search  costs  and 
limited diversification options. In order to detect potential differences, we reexamine the discussed 
size effect separately for investors of retail and institutional funds. For this purpose, we estimate 
performance of the new money portfolios, for each fund type separately, for funds representing the 
smallest 25 percentile and the largest 25 percentile, based on fund TNA of the corresponding month.  83  
 
The results are reported in Table 3.9. Consistent with Zheng’s (1999) findings, our results 
show that, for investors of both types of funds, small funds demonstrate a much stronger smart 
money effect, while large funds do not display any significant smart money effect at all. Only in 
small funds do positive portfolios significantly outperform negative portfolios. For both types of 
funds, the  greatest difference between positive  and negative portfolios  is detected in  cash  flow-
weighted  portfolios.  Interestingly,  for  retail  funds,  a  statistically  significant  difference  between 
alphas of positive and negative portfolios attributes only cash flow-weighted portfolios. In contrast, 
for  institutional  funds,  a  significant  difference  is  found  only  in  equally-weighted  portfolios. 
Moreover, the cash flow-weighted portfolio based strategy, of going short in the negative portfolio 
and long in the positive one, generates roughly 16 basis points per month higher four-factor and 
three-factor alphas for retail funds than for institutional funds. Simultaneously, a similar strategy, 
based on equally-weighted portfolios, generates approximately 6 basis points more for institutional 
funds than for retail. More specifically, a strategy of going short in the negative cash flow-weighted 
portfolio and long in the positive cash flow-weighted portfolio of retail funds, generates a significant 
four-factor  alpha  of 30.6 basis  points  per  month,  while  for  institutional  funds  it  would  gain  an 
insignificant four-factor alpha of 14.4 basis points. At the same time, the corresponding strategy, 
based on equally-weighted portfolios, yields an insignificant four-factor alpha of 2 basis points per 
month for retail funds, while yielding a significant alpha of 8.2 basis points for institutional funds. 
The observed asymmetries in strategy effectiveness, indicate differences between investors of the 
two types of funds in the smart money size effect. Cash flow-weighted based results indicate that a 
higher proportion of retail fund investors’ money flows exhibit the smart money effect. Moreover, 
the  effect  is  economically,  though  insignificantly,  higher  than  demonstrated  by  investors  of 
institutional funds. Alternatively, significant equally-weighted portfolio based results demonstrated 
by institutional flows imply that investors of institutional funds would rather use their diversification 
advantage, investing equally in several funds which will outperform as a group. This asymmetry is 
in  line  with  the  hypothesis  that,  when  investing  in  small  funds,  individual  investors  are  more 
cautious than institutional investors.  
 [Please insert Table 3.9 about here] 
To summarize, in line with the results of Zheng (1999), we find that the smart money effect 
is mainly a result of small funds’ investment flows. Moreover, our results indicate that the observed 
size effect differs for retail and institutional funds. As said: it appears that individual investors are 84  
 
more cautious when investing in small funds than institutional investors are. Possibly, higher search 
costs together with relatively limited diversification options, cause individual investors to be more 
careful when investing in small funds.  
3.4.4  Expansion versus Recession Periods 
A number of studies document that mutual fund performance varies over business cycles 
(Moskowitz  (2000),  Kosowski  (2006)).  Moskowitz  (2000)  finds  that  mutual  funds  significantly 
outperform the market during recession periods. In a more recent study, Kosowski (2006) reports a 
similar pattern. The author shows that over recession periods mutual funds generate up to 5 percent 
more  alpha  per  year  than  over  expansion  periods. Thus,  return  variation  across  business  cycles 
makes the opportunity of investing in mutual funds qualitatively different for recessionary and non-
recessionary periods. Alternatively, superior fund manager skills are found to be more pronounced 
over recession periods (Avramov and Wermers (2006)). If investors realize the existence of this 
tendency, they should demonstrate a stronger fund selection ability over recession periods.  
To test this question, we re-estimate the smart money effect for recession and expansion 
periods. More  specifically,  for  investors  of  each  type  of  fund,  we  compare  the  performance  of 
positive and negative new money portfolios separately, for recession and expansion periods, using 
the NBER recession – expansion classification (see Appendix 3.1). There are two expansion and two 
recession periods in the sample period. In total, there are 26 recession and 98 expansion months.  
Table 3.10 reports the results of the analysis. Notably, both types of investor demonstrate 
the smart money effect in expansion periods, while they do not show a significant smart money 
effect over recession periods. In particular, over expansion periods, the three-factor alpha of positive 
cash  flow-weighted  portfolio  is  23.4  and  21.3 basis  points  per  month  higher  than  the  alpha  of 
negative cash flow-weighted portfolio for retail and institutional funds. In contrast, over recession 
periods, the equivalent positive portfolio, although insignificantly, underperforms the portfolio of 
negative cash flow at 10.4 and 9 basis points per month correspondingly for retail and institutional 
funds.  
[Please insert Table 3.10 about here] 
Thereby,  our  results  reveal  that,  neither  investors  of  retail  funds  nor  supposedly  more 
sophisticated investors of institutional funds, benefit from higher predictability of managerial skills 85  
 
and superior fund performance over recession periods. In contrast, investors of both types of fund 
demonstrate no significant selection ability over recessions. Potentially, difference  in investment 
patterns characterizing recession and expansion periods is one of the explanations for the observed 
result.  
Interestingly, for investors of both fund types, the expansion smart money effect weakens 
after controlling for momentum, while the recession smart money effect appears to be stronger after 
controlling for momentum. This result might indicate that flows-momentum relationship differs over 
business cycles.   
3.4.5   Robustness Issues 
All the previously reported analyses are based on the sample in which we do not distinguish 
between retail funds composing the same portfolio with institutional “peers”, and those that do not 
have such peers, and vice versa: institutional funds having retail peers versus institutional funds 
without retail peers. While one could argue that investors of retail funds compared with investors of 
institutional  funds  initially  have  different  investment  opportunities,  since  the  set  of  available 
portfolios is not the same for investors of retail and institutional funds. If the opportunity sets are not 
equal in terms of return characteristics, comparison of fund selection abilities for investors of the two 
types  of  fund,  without  controlling  for  the  differences  in  opportunity  sets,  could  yield  distorted 
results.  To  address  this  issue,  we  repeat the  analysis  including  only  funds  with  peers,  targeting 
opposite investor types. All the results and main conclusions remain the same.      
For  additional  robustness  tests,  we  redo  the  analysis  using  normalized  cash  flows,  and 
controlling for different style classifications. Furthermore, we repeat the analysis using appraisal 
ratio of the new cash flow portfolios to measure the “smart money” effect.
29 We confirm that the 
results of all of the mentioned above robustness tests stay qualitatively the same.
30   
3.5   Determinants of Cash Flows:  
        Retail versus Institutional Mutual Funds 
                                                              
29 In particular, instead of the explained and implemented earlier in this chapter comparison of risk-adjust and unadjusted 
return measures of new cash flow portfolios, we estimate and compare appraisal ratios of the corresponding new cash 
flow  portfolios.  Similarly  to  the  methodology  using  fund  risk-adjusted  and  unadjusted  performance  measures,  the 
approach employing appraisal ratio implies existence of the “smart money” effect if the appraisal ratio of the positive net 
cash flow portfolio is significantly higher than this ratio of the negative net cash flow portfolio. 
30 Results of the robustness tests will be provided by authors upon request. 86  
 
So far, consistent with previous studies investigating the smart money effect, our results 
indicate that investors in our sample exhibit an ability to select funds, and these results hold, even 
controlling  for  momentum  exposure.  Furthermore,  we  find  that  investors  of  both  retail  and 
institutional funds demonstrate a fund selection ability, and this ability is not stronger for investors 
of institutional funds. In addition, the results detect a few signs of possible differences in the way 
investors of the two types of funds make their investment or divestment decisions. So, fund size and 
momentum exposure appear to have a different effect on flows of retail versus institutional funds.  
Thus, next, we examine the influence of fund size and stock return momentum on cash 
flows of each type of funds. In addition, we control for several other factors documented by the 
literature as affecting investment flows such as past performance, fund risk, flows into investment 
objective category (IOC) to which the fund belongs, portfolio turnover, expense ratio, and fund age 
(see, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac 
(2002)). We run a pooled OLS regression with the fund’s monthly net cash flows as dependent 
variable. The main explanatory variables are the fund total net assets estimated at the end of the 
previous  month,  and  the  fund’s  momentum  (UMD)  factor  loading  obtained  from  a  four-factor 
model-based rolling regression over the previous 36 months of fund performance. As mentioned 
above, we also control for fund lagged performance, risk, age, expense and turnover ratios, and the 
flows into fund’s IOC.  
Following Del Guercio and Tkac’s (2002) methodology, we also include a set of time-style 
interaction variables, one for each combination of month and style. For instance, G200202 variable 
takes value one if this observation relates to growth style fund in February 2002, and zero otherwise. 
The time component of the interaction dummy variable captures any cross-sectional correlations in 
the  observations  which  could  emerge  due  to differences  in  average  flows  across  months  of  the 
sample. The style component accounts to the fact that in any given month, funds with different IOCs 
may experience average flows that are significantly different from these of other styles. Thereby, 
adding a time-style interaction dummy reduces the above explained sources of residual dependence, 
increasing  precision  of  the  estimates.  Furthermore,  to  correct  for  heteroskedasticity,  we  cluster 
standard errors by funds. To estimate the corresponding coefficients for investors of institutional and 
retail  funds  separately,  we  interact  each  of  the  performance  and  non-performance  explanatory 
variables with fund type dummy variables. In particular, we include both sets of interactions: the 
interaction of each of the explanatory variables with the retail fund dummy, which gets value one if 87  
 
an  observation  relates  to  flows  of  retail  funds  and  zero otherwise,  and  the  interaction  with  the 
institutional fund dummy, getting value one if an observation is related to an institutional fund.   
To estimate the difference in effect of each of those variables on flows between retail and 
institutional funds, we specify separate regression including set of explanatory variables with and 
without interaction with the institutional fund dummy. Thus, the coefficients of the variables with 
the interaction represent the difference in effect of corresponding variable on flows of institutional 
versus  retail  funds,  and  t-statistics  of  those  coefficients  reflect  statistical  significance  of  the 
differences. 
Table 3.11 reports the results. Specification (1) in Panel A of Table 3.11 reports results for 
all  funds  in  our  sample.  Specification  (2)  in  Panel  B  summarizes  estimates  of  regression 
specification including fund type interactions terms. The last column in the table reports differences 
between coefficients of the corresponding variable of institutional versus retail funds.   
We see that, while flows of both retail and institutional  funds exhibit a significant and 
positive relationship with momentum loading, the relationship is stronger for institutional funds. 
Thus,  the  results  of  Panel  B  indicate  that,  increase  of  factor  loading  in  one  unit,  predicts,  for 
institutional funds, two-thirds higher additional inflows than for a retail fund. This result suggests 
that  institutional  funds’  investors  exhibit  much  stronger  momentum  following  behavior  than 
investors of retail funds. This finding is in line with the earlier results indicating differences between 
investors of retail and institutional funds in the influence of momentum on the smart money effect. 
Furthermore,  it  supports  evidence  of  momentum  following  behavior  of  institutional  investors 
documented by prior studies (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, (1993), Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Froot and Teo (2004), Sias (2004), Gallo, Phengpis and 
Swanson (2008)). In addition, the results reveal that fund size does not have the same effect on flows 
of retail and institutional funds. Large institutional funds attract significantly higher cash flows than 
their smaller competitors. In contrast, we do not find any significant effect of size on flows of retail 
funds.  This  result  confirms  the  difference  in  fund  size-flow  relationship  between  retail  and 
institutional funds detected by the previous analyses. The reason for this difference is worthy of 
further investigation. 
[Please insert Table 3.11 about here] 88  
 
Therefore, the results show that investors of both types of fund exhibit momentum following 
behavior, while this behavior is much more pronounced among investors of institutional funds. In 
addition, we find that fund size has an effect only on flows of institutional funds. While it appears to 
be positively correlated with flows of institutional funds, fund size-flow relationship for retail funds 
is found to be economically and statistically insignificant. 
3.6   Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter we reexamine the smart money effect, comparing the fund selection ability of 
investors of retail funds, representing mostly unsophisticated individual investors, against this ability 
of  investors  of  institutional  funds,  among  whom  –  though  a  higher  proportion  represents 
sophisticated investors – are also disadvantaged investors due to account restriction or tax issues.   
We explore this question by examining the smart money effect separately for investors of 
retail and institutional funds. We use the complete universe of diversified U.S. equity mutual funds 
for  the  period  January  1999  to  May  2009  in  the  CRSP  Survivor-Bias  Free  U.S.  Mutual  Fund 
Database. We use CRSP’s classification of institutional and retail funds to identify fund type.  
Note that this classification may not be a precise identifier of investor type. For instance, the 
final investment decision of 401k plans’ participants is taken by an individual investor, while their 
capital flows may combine flows of either an institutional or a retail fund. Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the classification of funds into retail and institutional implies differences 
in investor composition of the two types of fund. In particular, the overwhelming majority of retail 
fund  investors  apparently  are  regular  individuals.  At  the  same  time,  institutional  investors,  if 
participating  in  mutual  funds,  can  be  expected  to  invest  in  institutional  funds.  Furthermore, 
presumably more sophisticated institutional investors influence flows of institutional funds, while 
flows  of  retail  funds  are  determined  by  investment  decisions  of  unsophisticated  –  individual 
investors. 
Following the methodology employed by previous smart money studies, at the beginning of 
each month and for each type of fund, we construct two portfolios of new-money. The first portfolio 
consists of all funds with a positive net cash flow realized during the previous month. The second 
portfolio comprises all funds with a negative net cash flow realized over the same month. Next, we 89  
 
estimate the performance of each of the portfolios in the subsequent month using both the Fama-
French’s (1993) model and the Carhart’s (1997) model including a momentum factor. 
To test for fund selection ability on the part of investors of each fund type, we examine the 
difference between the alphas of the positive and negative cash flow portfolios of the corresponding 
fund sample. Thus, to compare money smartness of investors of retail and institutional funds, we 
compare the estimated differences.  
In line with the studies of Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999), and Keswani and Stolin (2008), we 
find a smart money effect for investors of both retail and institutional mutual funds. The effect is 
robust to different measures of performance and flows, and controlling for stock return momentum 
and investment style. Consistent with the findings of Zheng (1999), we find that the smart money 
effect  comes  mainly  from  small  funds.  We  also  observe  that  investors  of  both  types  of  funds 
demonstrate better fund selection ability over expansion periods than during recession periods.  
Surprisingly,  our  results  suggest  that  investors  of  institutional  funds,  with  a  higher 
representation of more sophisticated investors, do not demonstrate a better fund selection ability. 
Probably, performance persistence, widely documented by existing mutual fund literature, represents 
one of the main observable attributes of superior ability of the fund manager, while past return 
information is accessible and widely used by investors of both types of funds. If so, a higher level of 
financial  sophistication  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  better  fund  selection  ability.  Alternatively, 
performance persistence, providing some extent of return predictability, together with accessibility 
of  past  return  records  and  financial  advisers’  services,  allow  unsophisticated  investors  to 
demonstrate fund selection ability as well.   
Concurrently, our results indicate dissimilarities in the cash flow development for retail and 
institutional funds. The observed dissimilarities can be a result of difference in investment decision 
patterns characterizing investors of each fund type, and deserve further investigation. 90  
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Table 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Mutual Fund Sample  
The  table  presents  summary  statistics  on  the  mutual  fund  sample  obtained  from  the  CRSP  Survivor-Bias  Free  US  Mutual  Fund 
Database. The sample includes all U.S. equity mutual funds that existed at any time during January 1999 to May 2009 for which 
monthly total net assets (TNA) values are available. We exclude sector funds, international funds, specialized funds, and balanced 
funds. Panel A reports corresponding statistics for the entire sample. Panel B reports corresponding statistics for the sample of retail 
fund investors’ mutual funds. Panel C reports corresponding statistics for the sample of institutional fund investors’ mutual funds. The 
final sample of all funds consists of 11,710 fund-entities comprising 818,530 fund-months, the sample of retail funds consists of 7,779 
fund-entities  comprising  577,648  fund-months,  the  sample  of  institutional  funds  consists  of  3,931  fund-entities  comprising 
240,881fund-months. The dollar monthly net cash flow (NCFj,t) for fund j during month t is measured as      ,  =     ,  −     ,    ×
(1 +   , ).  In  this  equation,  the  terms  TNAj,t-1 and  TNAj,t represent  the  total  net  assets  for  the  fund  at  the  end  of  month  t-1  and t 
respectively, Rj,t represents the fund’s return in month t. The normalized quarterly cash flow for a fund during a month is computed as 
the dollar monthly cash flow for the fund divided by the TNA at the beginning of the month. Turnover is defined as the minimum of 
aggregate purchases or sales of securities during the year, divided by the average TNA, maximum front-end load is the maximum 
percent charges applied at the time of purchase, and expense ratio is the percentage of total investment that shareholders pay for the 
fund’s operating expenses. For each item, we first compute the cross-sectional averages in each year from 1999 to 2009. The reported 
statistics are computed from the time series of the 11 annual cross-sectional average figures for each item. 





percentile  St. Dev 
Panel A: All Funds           
Monthly Return (%)  0.14  0.09  -1.37  1.64  2.48 
Monthly Normalized Cash Flow  1.96  -0.06  -1.79  2.67  12.01 
Monthly Net Cash Flow (mill $)  0.88  0.01  -0.62  0.63  23.96 
Monthly TNA (mill $)  431.84  28.39  4.16  154.95  2571.39 
Turnover Ratio (% year)  76.47  65.68  34.66  107.98  52.84 
Maximum Front-End Load Fee (%)  3.30  4.56  0.51  5.30  2.29 
Expense Ratio (% year)  1.45  1.40  1.04  1.91  0.56 
Panel B: Retail Investors’ funds           
Monthly Return (%)  0.13  0.08  -1.40  1.64  2.52 
Monthly Normalized Cash Flow  1.82  -0.21  -1.87  2.46  11.52 
Monthly Net Cash Flow (mill $)  0.44  -0.02  -0.81  0.58  24.09 
Monthly TNA (mill $)  505.05  29.15  4.84  160.72  2952.69 
Turnover Ratio (% year)  76.37  65.32  34.50  107.65  53.13 
Maximum Front-End Load Fee (%)  3.40  4.64  0.75  5.36  2.24 
Expense Ratio (% year)  1.62  1.61  1.23  2.04  0.53 
Panel C: Institutional Investors’ Funds           
Monthly Return (%)  0.18  0.13  -1.29  1.65  2.36 
Monthly Normalized Cash Flow  2.13  0.25  -1.59  3.06  12.82 
Monthly Net Cash Flow (mill $)  1.73  0.01  -0.30  0.85  22.94 
Monthly TNA (mill $)  247.02  27.24  2.97  144.12  1134.27 
Turnover Ratio (% year)  76.91  66.81  35.01  109.22  52.28 
Maximum Front-End Load Fee (%)  1.50  0.32  0.00  3.53  1.76 
Expense Ratio (% year)  1.02  1.00  0.78  1.24  0.39 92  
 
Table 3.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Mutual Fund Portfolio Excess Returns  
This table presents summary statistics for monthly returns in excess of the risk-free rate on portfolios of mutual funds for 
the period January 1999 to May 2009. Panel A reports corresponding statistics for the entire sample. Panel B reports 
corresponding statistics for the sample of retail investors’ mutual funds. Panel C reports corresponding statistics for the 
sample of institutional investors’ mutual funds. The first row of each panel gives statistics for a TNA-weighted portfolio 
of all funds in the sample. The second row describes an equally-weighted portfolio of all funds in the sample. Also 
shown are the summary statistics for portfolios formed on the basis of monthly net new cash flows. Each month funds 
are grouped into either the positive cash flow portfolio or the negative cash flow portfolio based on the sign of the net 
cash flow experienced by each fund during the previous month. These portfolios are either equally-weighted across 
funds  or cash  flow-weighted, and are rebalanced  monthly. Summary  statistics are  also  given  for the  market  factor, 
labeled MKTRF. MKTRF and RF represents the excess return on the market portfolio and risk-free rate as reported by 
CRSP. Returns are expressed in percent per month. 
 





percentile  St. Dev 
Panel A: All Funds           
TNA-weighted average fund portfolio  -0.190  0.612  -2.530  3.135  4.793 
Equally-weighted average fund portfolio  -0.134  0.656  -2.925  3.183  4.899 
Equally-weighted negative cash flow portfolio  -0.184  0.612  -2.760  3.172  4.870 
Equally-weighted positive cash flow portfolio  -0.092  0.689  -2.765  3.262  4.947 
Cash Flow-weighted negative cash flow portfolio  -0.252  0.446  -2.875  3.056  4.855 
Cash Flow-weighted positive cash flow portfolio  -0.087  0.725  -2.583  3.131  4.940 
Panel B: Retail Investors’ funds 
         
TNA-weighted average fund portfolio  -0.187  0.590  -2.499  3.141  4.790 
Equally-weighted average fund portfolio  -0.148  0.634  -2.936  3.161  4.882 
Equally-weighted negative cash flow portfolio  -0.199  0.586  -2.749  3.134  4.868 
Equally-weighted positive cash flow portfolio  -0.103  0.705  -2.742  3.247  4.907 
Cash Flow-weighted negative cash flow portfolio  -0.259  0.409  -2.845  3.087  4.868 
Cash Flow-weighted positive cash flow portfolio  -0.075  0.686  -2.660  3.141  4.901 
Panel C: Institutional Investors’ Funds 
         
TNA-weighted average fund portfolio  -0.188  0.656  -2.654  2.976  4.793 
Equally-weighted average fund portfolio  -0.094  0.672  -2.859  3.258  4.931 
Equally-weighted negative cash flow portfolio  -0.137  0.665  -2.761  3.249  4.869 
Equally-weighted positive cash flow portfolio  -0.057  0.659  -2.813  3.347  5.006 
Cash Flow-weighted negative cash flow portfolio  -0.211  0.499  -2.790  2.865  4.797 
Cash Flow-weighted positive cash flow portfolio  -0.103  0.672  -2.712  3.271  4.933 
Market factor (MKTRF)  -0.102  0.770  -2.500  3.360  4.887 
Monthly risk-free rate (RF)  0.254  0.240  0.120  0.400  0.151 
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Table 3.3 
Performance of New Money Estimated by Risk-Adjusted Returns Using the Portfolio Regression Approach Equally-weighted portfolios 
For each sample, each month from January 1999 to May 2009, mutual funds are grouped into either the positive cash flow portfolio or the negative cash flow portfolio based on 
the sign of the net cash flow experienced by each fund during the previous month. Portfolio performance is evaluated based on the estimated portfolio alpha. The four-factor 
portfolio alpha is calculated as the intercept from the monthly time series regression of portfolio excess returns on the market excess return (MKTRF) and mimicking portfolios 
for  size  (SMB),  book-to-market  (HML),  and  momentum (UMD)  factors  (MKTRF,  SMB,  HML,  UMD  are  obtained  from  CRSP):    ,  =    +   ,        +   ,      +
  ,      +   ,      +    . The three-factor alpha is based on a model that excludes the momentum factor. The table reports estimates of portfolio alphas and factor loadings 
for the new money portfolios formed using equally-weighted fund returns (Panel A), and cash flow-weighted fund returns (Panel B). Estimates are also presented for an average 
fund portfolio that is equally-weighted in all available funds (Panel A), and the TNA-weighted portfolio of all available funds (Panel B). The table also reports the difference in 
alphas between (a) the positive cash flow portfolio and the negative cash flow portfolio, and (b) the positive cash flow and the average portfolio. Alphas are reported as percent 
per month. The t-statistics based on the Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted only for alphas. * Significant at 10% level. 
** Significant at 5% level.    
 
      Panel A: Equally-weighted portfolios       
    Positive Cash Flow Portfolio  Negative Cash Flow Portfolio  Average Portfolio     
   







Four factor model  
All 
funds 
-0.062  0.996  0.134  0.047  0.034  -0.122  0.967  0.061  0.099  -0.030  -0.091  0.983  0.103  0.070  0.004  0.060**  0.029** 
   
(-1.00)  (85.59)  (5.85)  (1.74)  (4.82)  (-1.59)  (55.84)  (1.84)  (2.39)  (-1.76)  (-1.35)  (72.87)  (4.08)  (2.19)  (0.58)  (2.13)  (2.29) 
Retail 
funds 
-0.071  0.999  0.131  0.049  0.049  -0.131  0.964  0.057  0.093  -0.033  -0.101  0.979  0.101  0.063  0.004  0.060*  0.030** 
   
(-1.20)  (83.97)  (5.75)  (1.42)  (5.57)  (-1.64)  (53.08)  (1.71)  (2.13)  (-1.82)  (-1.49)  (69.88)  (4.09)  (1.91)  (0.58)  (1.89)  2.09) 
Instit. 
funds 
-0.028  1.006  0.133  0.060  0.026  -0.092  0.976  0.071  0.121  -0.020  -0.058  0.992  0.104  0.090  0.005  0.064**  0.030** 
   
(-0.38)  (72.41)  (5.24)  (2.04)  (3.95)  (-1.36)  (64.16)  (2.22)  (3.22)  (-1.44)  (-0.86)  (73.57)  (3.78)  (2.73)  (0.61)  (2.26)  (2.13) 
Three factor model 
All 
funds 
-0.053  0.973  0.144  0.036    -0.130*  0.987  0.052  0.109    -0.089  0.980  0.104  0.069    0.077*  0.036* 
   
(-0.80)  (97.8)  (6.26)  (1.13)    (-1.74)  (50.72)  (1.47)  (2.39)    (-1.34)  (74.74)  (4.027)  (2.093)    (1.71)  1.73) 
Retail 
funds 
-0.061  0.963  0.142  0.027    -0.139*  0.986  0.047  0.103    -0.100  0.976  0.103*  0.061*    0.078*  0.038* 
   
(-0.94)  (92.49)  (6.09)  (0.79)    (-1.79)  (46.9)  (1.33)  (2.15)    (-1.49)  (71.77)  (4.05)  (1.82)    (1.66)  1.70) 
Instit. 
funds 
-0.021  0.989  0.140  0.052    -0.097  0.989  0.065  0.127    -0.057  0.989  0.106  0.088    0.075*  0.036 
   




      Panel B: Cash flow-weighted portfolios       
    Positive Cash Flow Portfolio  Negative Cash Flow Portfolio  Average Portfolio     
   







Four factor model  
All funds 
-0.052  0.992  0.146  -0.012  0.075  -0.133*  0.964  -0.023  0.085  -0.053  -0.087**  0.979  0.026  0.022  0.009  0.081  0.035 
   
(-1.52)  (108.6)  (6.90  (-0.47)  (5.65)  (-1.81)  (52.02)  (-0.67)  (2.20)  (-2.86)  (-2.22)  (102.8)  (2.17)  (1.29)  (1.59)  (1.36)  (1.32) 
Retail funds 
-0.038  0.981  0.147  -0.029  0.088  -0.125  0.963  -0.036  0.067  -0.057  -0.080*  0.978  0.024  0.012  0.012  0.087  0.042 
   
(-0.95)  (101.4)  (5.85)  (-1.00)  (5.81)  (-1.58)  (49.63)  (-1.05)  (1.69)  (-2.95)  (-1.92)  (101.4)  (2.26)  (0.61)  (1.76)  (1.34)  (1.59) 
Instit. funds 
-0.0531  0.995  0.115  0.0227  0.037  -0.146**  0.963  0.026  0.140  -0.038  -0.103***  0.978  0.029  0.068  -0.005  0.093**  0.050* 
   
(-1.63)  (140.2)  (7.01)  (1.18)  (6.30)  (-2.54)  (58.8)  (0.81)  (4.11)  (-2.56)  (-3.85)  (87.55)  (1.47)  (3.56)  (-0.95)  (2.18)  (1.78) 
Three-factor model 
All funds 
-0.033  0.942  0.168  -0.036    -0.147**  1.000  -0.038  0.103    -0.085**  0.973  0.029  0.019    0.114  0.052 
   
(-0.55)  (75.34)  (6.85)  (-0.83)    (-2.01)  (45.52  (-1.01)  (2.31)    (-2.17)  (147.5)  (2.41)  (1.12)    (1.28)  (1.03) 
Retail funds 
-0.016  0.923  0.172  0.058    -0.139*  1.001  -0.053  0.088    -0.078*  0.970  0.028  0.008    0.123  0.061 
   
(-0.24)  (69.22)  (5.70)  (-1.12)    (-1.76)  (43.27)  (-1.37)  (1.86)    (-1.85)  (158.8)  (2.58)  (0.42)    (1.27)  (1.16) 
Instit. funds 
-0.044  0.971  0.125  0.011    -0.156***  0.988  0.015  0.153    -0.104***  0.982  0.027  0.070    0.112*  0.060 
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Table 3.4 
Portfolio Regression Approach: Mean Difference in Alphas between portfolios of different fund types 
The table reports the statistical estimates for the differences between alphas of positive, negative, and average portfolios for different types of funds. Portfolio alphas are estimated 
using portfolio regression approach. Panel A reports the differences for alphas measured based on equally-weighted cash flow portfolio method. For instance, the first column from 
the left shows from the top to the bottom the difference in alphas of positive portfolios for retail versus all, institutional versus all, institutional versus retail funds respectively. Panel 
B reports corresponding differences for alphas measured based on cash flow-weighted portfolio method. The t-statistics in parentheses test whether the alpha difference between the 
portfolios is significantly different from zero. The t-statistics is based on the Newey-West covariance matrix. Differences are reported in percentage per month. * Significant at 10% 
level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
  Panel A: Equally-weighted portfolios          Panel B: Cash flow-weighted portfolios       
  Four factor model    Three-factor model    Four factor model    Three-factor model 



































Difference  in  Alphas 
Retail vs. All 
-0.009*  -0.009***  -0.01***    -0.008  -0.010***  -0.010***    0.014  0.008  0.007*    0.017  0.007  0.007** 
  (-1.77)  (-2.63)  (-6.17)    (-1.62)  (-2.91)  (-6.24)    (1.03)  (1.18)  (1.89)    (1.22)  (0.92)  (2.14) 
Difference  in  Alphas 
Institutional vs. All 
0.034*  0.031***  0.032***    0.032*  0.033***  0.032***    -0.001  -0.013  -0.016    -0.011  -0.009  -0.02 
  (1.93)  (2.9)  (5.17)    (1.95)  (3.21)  (5.17)    (-0.05)  (-0.58)  (-0.95)    (-0.37)  (-0.41)  (-1.02) 
Difference  in  Alphas 
Institutional vs. Retail  
0.043*  0.039***  0.042***    0.040*  0.043***  0.043***    -0.015  -0.022  -0.023    -0.028  -0.017  -0.027 
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Table 3.5 
Portfolio Regression Approach: Mean Difference in (Alpha of Positive Portfolio - Alpha of Negative Portfolio), and in (Alpha of Positive Portfolio 
- Alpha of Average Portfolio) for different fund types 
The table reports the statistical estimates for the differences between each two types of funds in alpha difference of positive versus negative, and positive versus average 
portfolios. Portfolio alphas are estimated using portfolio regression approach. Panel A reports the differences for alphas measured based on equally-weighted cash flow 
portfolio method. For instance, the first column from the left shows from the top to the bottom respectively the difference between retail versus all, institutional versus all, 
and institutional versus retail funds in alpha difference of positive versus negative portfolios. Panel B reports corresponding differences for alphas measured based on cash 
flow-weighted portfolio method. The t-statistics in parentheses test whether the difference is significantly different from zero. The t-statistics is based on the Newey-West 
covariance matrix. Differences are reported in percentage per month. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
  Panel A: Equally-weighted portfolios          Panel B: Cash flow-weighted portfolios       
  Four factor model    Three-factor model    Four factor model    Three-factor model 




















Difference in “VS” Alphas 
Retail vs. All 
-0.001  0.001      0.001  0.002      0.006  0.007      0.010  0.010   
  (-0.02)  (0.32)      (0.22)  (0.47)      (0.37)  (0.55)      (0.51)  (0.64)   
Difference in “VS” Alphas 
Institutional vs. All 
0.003  0.002      -0.001  -0.001      0.012  0.015      -0.001  0.009   
  (0.16)  (0.17)      (-0.05)  (-0.05)      (0.30)  (0.61)      (-0.03)  (0.29)   
Difference in “VS” Alphas 
Institutional vs. Retail  
0.003  0.001      -0.003  -0.003      0.007  0.008      -0. 011  -0.001   
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Table 3.6 
Performance of New Money Estimated by Risk-Adjusted Returns Using the Fund Regression Approach 
Each month from January 1999 to May 2009, mutual funds are grouped into either the positive cash flow portfolio or the negative cash flow portfolio based on the sign of 
the net cash flow experienced by each fund during the previous month. The four-factor portfolio alpha is calculated as the weighted average of the realized alphas of the 
individual funds obtained from the time-series regression of fund excess returns on the market excess return (MKTRF) and mimicking portfolios for size (SMB), book-to-
market (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors (MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD are obtained from CRSP):    ,  =    +   ,            +   ,        +   ,        +
  ,        +   , . The three-factor alpha is based on a model that excludes the momentum factor. Panel A of the table reports estimates of portfolio alphas and factor 
loadings for the new money portfolios formed using equally-weighted fund alphas. Estimates are also presented for an average fund portfolio that is equally-weighted in 
all available funds. Panel B reports estimates for the new money portfolios formed using cash flow-weighted fund alphas. Estimates are also presented for an average fund 
portfolio representing the TNA-weighted portfolio of all available funds. The table also reports the difference in alphas between (a) the positive cash flow portfolio and 
the negative cash flow portfolio, and (b) the positive cash flow and the average portfolio. Alphas are reported as percent per month. The t-statistics based on the Newey-
West covariance matrix are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted only  for alphas. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** 
Significant at 1% level.   
 
Panel A: Equally-weighted portfolios 
                                     Four factor model            Three-factor model     
      Alpha        Difference in Alphas      Alpha        Difference in Alphas 
































-0.281***  -0.426***  -0.366***      0.146***  0.085***    -0.279***  -0.429***  -0.367***      0.150***  0.088*** 
   
(-14.73)  (-21.43)  (-20.13)      (6.65)  (8.57)    (-18.74)  (-23.44)  (-23.79)      (8.94)  (12.94) 
Retail funds 
-0.279***  -0.438***  -0.377***      0.159***  0.098***    -0.275***  -0.440***  -0.378***      0.165***  0.103*** 
   
(-14.60)  (-22.26)  (-21.17)      (6.48)  (9.07)    (-19.17)  (-24.23)  (-25.38)      (9.05)  (15.14) 
Institutional funds 
-0.286***  -0.385***  -0.335***      0.110***  0.049***    -0.286***  -0.389***  -0.337***      0.103***  0.051*** 
   











Panel B: Cash flow-weighted portfolios 
                                     Four factor model            Three-factor model     
      Alpha        Difference in Alphas      Alpha        Difference in Alphas 
































-0.148***  -0.391***  -0.263***      0.242***  0.115***    -0.144***  -0.395***  -0.263***      0.251***  0.119*** 
   
(-6.18)  (-19.52)  (-16.95)      (6.51)  (5.21)    (-7.95)  (-19.88)  (-20.11)      (9.40)  (7.07) 
Retail funds 
-0.118***  -0.396***  -0.259***      0.277***  0.141***    -0.110***  -0.400***  -0.258***      0.289***  0.148*** 
   
(-4.636)  (-18.81)  (-17.06)      (6.5)  (5.24)    (-5.764)  (-19.15)  (-20.71)      (9.597)  (7.22) 
Institutional funds 
-0.217***  -0.372***  -0.282***      0.156***  0.065***    -0.217***  -0.380***  -0.286***      0.163***  0.069*** 
   























Fund Regression Approach: Mean Difference in Alphas between portfolios of different fund types 
The table reports the statistical estimates for the differences between alphas of positive, negative, and average portfolios for different types of funds. Portfolio alphas are estimated 
using fund regression approach. Panel A reports the differences for alphas measured based on equally-weighted cash flow portfolio method. For instance, the first column from the 
left shows from the top to the bottom the difference in alphas of positive portfolios for retail versus all, institutional versus all, institutional versus retail funds respectively. Panel B 
reports corresponding differences for alphas measured based on cash flow-weighted portfolio method. The t-statistics in parentheses test whether the alpha difference between the 
portfolios is significantly different from zero. The t-statistics is based on the Newey-West covariance matrix. Differences are reported in percentage per month. * Significant at 10% 
level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
  Panel A: Equally-weighted portfolios          Panel B: Cash flow-weighted portfolios       
  Four factor model    Three-factor model    Four factor model    Three-factor model 



































Difference  in  Alphas 
Retail vs. All 
0.002  -0.011***  -0.011***    0.003  -0.012***  -0.012***    0.030***  -0.005*  0.004***    0.034***  -0.004  0.005*** 
  (0.62)  (-13.14)  (-7.39)    (1.47)  (-10.15)  (-7.57)    (5.63)  (-1.76)  (7.06)    (5.92)  (-1.23)  (4.20) 
Difference  in  Alphas 
Institutional vs. All 
-0.005  0.041***  0.031***    -0.007  0.040***  0.030***    -0.068***  0.018*  -0.019***    -0.073***  0.015  -0.023*** 
  (-0.83)  (8.69)  (10.04)    (-1.44)  (7.46)  (9.04)    (-3.48)  (1.69)  (-10.21)    (-4.52)  (1.23)  (-6.96) 
Difference  in  Alphas 
Institutional vs. Retail  
-0.006  0.052***  0.043***    -0.010  0.051***  0.041***    -0.098***  0.023*  -0.023***    -0.107***  0.019  -0.028*** 















Fund Regression Approach: Mean Difference in (Alpha of Positive Portfolio - Alpha of Negative Portfolio), and in (Alpha of Positive Portfolio - 
Alpha of Average Portfolio) for different fund types 
The table reports the statistical estimates for the differences between each two types of funds in alpha difference of positive versus negative, and positive versus average 
portfolios. Portfolio alphas are estimated using fund regression approach. Panel A reports the differences for alphas measured based on equally-weighted cash flow portfolio 
method. For instance, the first column from the left shows from the top to the bottom respectively the difference between retail versus all, institutional versus all, and 
institutional versus retail funds in alpha difference of positive versus negative portfolios. Panel B reports corresponding differences for alphas measured based on cash flow-
weighted portfolio method. The t-statistics in parentheses test whether the difference is significantly different from zero. The t-statistics is based on the Newey-West 
covariance matrix. Differences are reported in percentage per month. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
  Panel A: Equally-weighted portfolios          Panel B: Cash flow-weighted portfolios       
  Four factor model    Three-factor model    Four factor model    Three-factor model 




















Difference in “VS” Alphas 
Retail vs. All 
0.013***  0.013***      0. 014***  0.014***      0.035***  0.026***      0.038***  0.029***   
  (7.64)  (13.01)      (8.08)  (9.87)      (8.92)  (7.02)      (8.26)  (6.81)   
Difference in “VS” Alphas 
Institutional vs. All 
-0.046***  -0.036***      -0.047***  -0.037***      -0.086***  -0.049***      -0.088***  -0.050***   
  (-8.79)  (-13.07)      (-9.87)  (-14.86)      (-5.96)  (-4.45)      (-6.37)  (-5.43)   
Difference in “VS” Alphas 
Institutional vs. Retail  
-0.059***  -0.049***      -0.061***  -0.052***      -0.121***  -0.075***      -0.126***  -0.079***   
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Table 3.9 
Smart money effect: Small versus Large Funds  
For each sample, each month from January 1999 to May 2009, mutual funds are grouped into either the positive cash flow portfolio 
or the negative cash flow portfolio based on the sign of the net cash flow experienced by each fund during the previous month. 
Portfolio performance is evaluated based on the estimated portfolio alpha. The four-factor portfolio alpha is calculated as the 
intercept from the monthly time series regression of portfolio excess returns on the market excess return (MKTRF) and mimicking 
portfolios for size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors (MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD are obtained from 
CRSP):   ,  =    +   ,        +   ,      +   ,      +   ,      +    .  The  three-factor  alpha  is  based  on  a  model  that 
excludes the momentum factor. The table reports the difference in alphas between (a) the positive cash flow portfolio and the 
negative cash flow portfolio, and (b) the positive cash flow and the average portfolio. EW means that reported value calculated for 
equally-weighted cash flow portfolios, CW means that a value relates to cash flow-weighted portfolios. Panel A reports results for 
the smallest funds defined as funds with TNA of the lowest 25 percentile. Panel B reports results for the largest funds defined as 
funds with TNA of the highest 25 percentile. Differences in alphas are reported as percent per month. The t-statistics based on the 
Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted only for alphas. * Significant at 10% 
level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 
    
Panel A        Panel B   
 
   
Smallest 25   percentile      Largest 25   percentile 
 











                 
Four-Factor Model                 
                 
Positive vs. Negative (EW)    0.030  0.020  0.082*    0.066  0.073  0.061 
    (0.74)  (0.50)  (1.76)    (1.14)  (1.13)  (1.56) 
                 
Positive vs. Negative (CW)    0.243***  0.306***  0.144    0.081  0.090  0.077 
    (2.83)  (3.17)  (1.50)    (0.91)  (0.94)  (1.12) 
                 
                 
Three-Factor Model                 
                 
Positive vs. Negative (EW)    0.039  0.031  0.088*    0.086  0.095  0.074 
    (0.97)  (0.72)  (1.86)    (1.13)  (1.14)  (1.38) 
                 
Positive vs. Negative (CW)    0.261***  0.328***  0.154    0.114  0.127  0.095 
    (2.87)  (3.30)  (1.53)    (0.94)  (0.94)  (1.17) 
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Table 3.10 
Smart money effect: Expansion versus Recession Periods  
For each sample, each month from January 1999 to May 2009, mutual funds are grouped into either the positive cash flow portfolio 
or the negative cash flow portfolio based on the sign of the net cash flow experienced by each fund during the previous month. 
Portfolio performance is evaluated based on the estimated portfolio alpha. The four-factor portfolio alpha is calculated as the 
intercept from the monthly time series regression of portfolio excess returns on the market excess return (MKTRF) and mimicking 
portfolios for size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors (MKTRF, SMB, HML, UMD are obtained from 
CRSP):   ,  =    +   ,        +   ,      +   ,      +   ,      +    .  The  three-factor  alpha  is  based  on  a  model  that 
excludes the momentum factor. The table reports the difference in alphas between (a) the positive cash flow portfolio and the 
negative cash flow portfolio, and (b) the positive cash flow and the average portfolio. EW means that reported value calculated for 
equally-weighted cash flow portfolios, CW means that a value relates to cash flow-weighted portfolios. Panel A reports results for 
expansion months. Panel B reports results for recession months. Differences in alphas are reported as percent per month. The t-
statistics based on the Newey-West covariance  matrix  are reported in parenthesis. Statistical significance is denoted only  for 
alphas. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. Level of statistical significance for 
difference between corresponding coefficients for expansion and recession months is reported only for the coefficients for which 
the difference is significant on at most 10% level. In those cases, statistical significance on at least 10% level is denoted by (a).  
 
   
Panel A        Panel B   
 
   
Expansion        Recession   
 











                 
Four-Factor Model                 
                 
Positive vs. Negative (EW)    0.074*  0.073*  0.076*    0.091  0.098  0.044 
    (1.71)  (1.69)  (1.75)    (1.23)  (1.14)  (0.86) 
                 
Positive vs. Negative (CW)    0.134  0.132  0.160**    0.118  0.115  0.039 
    (1.22)  (1.09)  (2.19)    (1.24)  (1.46)  (0.55) 
                 
                 
Three-Factor Model                 
                 
Positive vs. Negative (EW)    0.125*  0.128*  0.114**(a)    0.022  0.015  0. 004(C) 
    (1.89)  (1.81)  (2.16)    (0.39)  (0.23)  (0.07) 
                 
Positive vs. Negative (CW)    0.225*  0.234*  0.213***(a)    -0.081  -0.104  -0.090(C) 
    (1.98)  (1.85)  (2.89)    (-0.68)  (-0.65)  (-0.83) 
                 
                 
Number of Fund-Months    600,253  434,205  166,048    178,536 
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Table 3.11 
Determinants of Net Cash Flows: Retail versus Institutional Funds 
The table reports the coefficients from pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of funds’ monthly net cash flow on the 
momentum (UMD) loading calculated over the previous 36 month of fund return, fund total net assets estimated to the end of the 
previous month, the 1
st lag of fund’s annual return, fund risk estimated as the standard deviation of fund return over the previous 12 
months, the monthly normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, turnover ratios defined as a minimum of aggregate purchases or sales of 
securities during the year, divided by average fund total net assets, fund expense ratio is the percentage of total investment that 
shareholders pay for the fund’s operating expenses. We also include time-style interaction dummies for each combination of month 
and style. Panel A (Specification (1)) reports the results for all funds in the sample. Panel B (Specification (2)) reports the results of 
the regression in which we interact each of the explanatory variables once with a dummy identifying retail funds and once more 
time with the dummy identifying institutional funds. We also include the dummy identifying institutional funds as a separate 
variable. The columns titled “Difference Institutional vs. Retail” reports differences between the coefficients of institutional and 
retail funds from the regression analysis summarized in Specification (2), exhibiting the difference in effect of respective variable 
on fund money flows of the two types of funds. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors are clustered by 
funds. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
 


















  Difference 
Institutional vs. 
Retail 
               
               
Intercept/ Institutional Dummy    5.111***    3.090**  3.044*    3.044* 
    (4.28)    (2.24)  (1.99)    (1.99) 
UMD Loading    4.238***    3.962***  6.601***    2.639* 
    (4.49)    (3.59)  (5.22)    (1.72) 
Fund’s Total Net Assets    0.0002    0.0001  0.0074***   0.0074*** 
    (0.56)    (-0.24)  (5.78)    (5.59) 
Lagged Annual Return    0.315***    0.329***  0.257***    -0.072*** 
    (18.25)    (17.83)  (15.17)    (-5.90) 
Fund Risk    0.083***    0.118***  -0.054    -0.172*** 
    (2.30)    (2.96)  (-1.35)    (-4.07) 
IOC Net Cash Flow    0.001***    0.002***  0.001***    -0.001*** 
    (8.59)    (8.83)  (4.68)    (-4.76) 
Turnover Ratio    -0.012***    -0.008***  -0.009***    -0.001 
    (-4.95)    (-2.83)  (-2.76)    (-0.15) 
Expense Ratio    -1.756***    -1.250***  -0.200    1.050 
    (-6.33)    (-3.09)  (-0.33)    (1.44) 
Fund Age    -0.025***    -0.021***  -0.053***    -0.032*** 
    (-6.57)    (-5.26)  (-5.69)    (-3.20) 
               
R sq. adjusted    0.030    0.049     
No. Fund-Months/Entities    7,995    7,995     
No. Fund- Entities    393,360    393,360     
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Figure 3.1 






Cumulative  Monthly  Total  Net  Asset  Value  (in  millions  of  U.S.  dollar)  of 
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Figure 3.3 
Alphas’ Differences: for Positive vs. Negative, and Positive vs. Average Portfolios 
The  figure  summarizes  the  differences  in  alphas  between  the  positive  cash  flow  portfolio  and  the  negative  cash  flow 
portfolio, and the positive cash flow portfolio and the average portfolio estimated based on the portfolio regression approach 
and  reported  in  Table  3.3.  Graph  A  shows  the  differences  measured  based  on  four-factor  model  for  equally-weighted 
portfolios. Graph B shows the differences measured based on three-factor model for equally-weighted portfolios.  Graph C 
shows  the  differences  measured  based  on  four-factor  model  for  cash  flow-weighted  portfolios,  and  graph  D  shows  the 
differences measured based on three-factor model for cash flow-weighted portfolios. 
 
 A.  For the four-factor model (equally-weighted portfolios)          B. For the three-factor model (equally-weighted portfolios) 
 
        
 
C. For the four-factor model (cash flow-weighted portfolios)     D. For the three-factor model (cash flow-weighted portfolios) 











































































































































Recession*– Expansion periods over the sample period February 1999 – May 1999 
(based on NBER business cycle classification**) 
 
 
Business Cycle Reference Dates    Duration in Months 




Recession    Expansion 
           
February 1999  February 2001        25 
March 2001  October 2001    8     
November 2001  November 2007        73 
December 2007  May 2009    18     
           
Total      26    98 
 
 
*”A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting 
more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial 
production, and wholesale-retail sales.” (NBER) 
**Source: an official website of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html; visited on 07.02.2010. 
 107  
 
CHAPTER 4 108  
 
The Determinants of the Investment Flows: 
Retail versus Institutional Mutual Funds 
In  this  chapter  we  compare  fund  selection  criteria  for  retail  and  institutional  mutual  funds’ 
investors. We find that clients of institutional mutual funds use more quantitatively sophisticated 
criteria, such as risk-adjusted return measures and tracking error, than investors of retail mutual 
funds  do.  In  line  with  momentum  trading  literature,  we  show  that  institutional  investors 
demonstrate stronger momentum driven behavior. Additionally, our results indicate that relative 
performance of a fund with respect to a benchmark is an important criterion in fund selection 
process for investors of both types of funds. We also provide evidence that the convex form of 
flow-performance  relationship,  documented  by  existing  literature,  is  driven  mostly  by  retail 
funds. Finally, we find that flow patterns of both fund types vary across the business cycle. 
Moreover, the differences between the two patterns also change across the business cycle. 
4.1   Introduction 
Over the past decades, the mutual fund industry has grown considerably. Moreover, since 
the early 1990s, a new class of so-called institutional funds has emerged. In contrast to retail 
funds that focus on regular individuals, institutional funds primarily target institutional investors 
such as corporations, non-profit organizations, endowments, foundations, municipalities, pension 
funds, and other large investors, including wealthy individuals. As a result, the typical retail fund 
investor differs noticeably from the typical institutional fund investor in his level of financial 
sophistication, investment objectives, and search costs.
31 Consequently, criteria that these two 
types of investors base their investment decision on are likely to vary, making investment flow 
patterns of retail and institutional funds differ too.  
There is a lot of mutual fund research that addresses investment flows. Edelen (1999) 
shows that investment flows to a large extent determine fund manager trading activity causing 
fund managers to engage in liquidity motivated trading that they otherwise would have avoided. 
In  addition,  mutual  fund  research  documents  that  investment  flows  affect  fund  manager 
incentives with respect to risk. Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997)  argue  that  fund  manager  compensation  tied  to  amount  of  assets  under  management 
together with the convex form of the fund flow-performance relationship, creates incentives for 
                                                              
31 See, for example, Alexander, Jones and Nigro (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Palmiter and Taha 
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managers to shift fund risk. Johnson (2005) emphasizes the importance of flow examination due 
to the potential influence of flows on fund performance. 
Researchers  investigating  the  determinants  of  mutual  fund  flows  established  the 
importance of past performance.
32 Some of the  literature shows the effect of  flows on fund 
managers’ behavior.
33 Other studies shed light on the relationship between search costs and fund 
flows, and the influence of fund marketing and advertisement on flows.
34  
However,  those  studies  do  not  usually  distinguish  between  flows  of  funds  targeting 
different types of investors. Meanwhile, the growing proportion of institutional funds – both in 
term  of  the  number  of  funds  and  assets  under  management  –  makes  the  recognition  and 
understanding of those differences especially important.  
In this chapter, we study determinants of mutual funds’ investment flows separately for 
retail and institutional funds, examining how fund selection criteria vary across investors of these 
two types of funds. Examination of flows at the monthly frequency allows us to get a more 
precise picture of fund flows’ dynamic as compared to analysis based on quarterly or annually 
estimated flows.
35 
We conduct our investigation using complete universe of diversified U.S. equity mutual 
funds for the period January 1999 to May 2009 in the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual 
Fund Database. We categorize  funds into retail  and institutional based on the corresponding 
designation provided by CRSP. Note that this classification may not be a precise identifier of 
investor type. For instance, the final investment decision of 401k plans’ participants is taken by 
an individual investor, while their capital flows may combine flows of either an institutional or a 
retail fund. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the classification of funds into retail 
and  institutional  implies  differences  in  investor  composition  of  the  two  types  of  fund.  In 
particular, the overwhelming majority of retail fund investors apparently are regular individuals. 
At the same time, institutional investors, if participating in mutual funds, can be expected to 
                                                              
32 See, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Gruber (1996), Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1994), Ippolito 
(1992), Sirri and  Tufano (1998),  Ivkovich  and Weisbenner (2009), and Ferreira,  Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos 
(2009). 
33 See, for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), and Chevalier and Ellison (1995). 
34 See, for example, Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005). 
35 Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) investigate mutual fund flows estimated at quarterly frequency; Berk and Tonks 
(2009), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) study mutual fund flows measured at annual 
frequency. 110  
 
invest in institutional funds. Furthermore, presumably more sophisticated institutional investors 
influence flows of institutional funds, while flows of retail funds are determined by investment 
decisions of unsophisticated – individual investors. 
In a related study, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) compare flow patterns across investor 
types. Our study differs from and complements their study in a number of ways. Firstly, their 
conclusions are based on the comparison of investment flows of pension fund sponsors and retail 
mutual fund investors. However, investor composition of institutional mutual funds comprises a 
broad variety of investors, among which pension fund sponsors represent only one particular 
type.
36  Therefore,  while  investment  pattern  of  pension  fund  sponsors  may  be  expected  to 
resemble that of institutional  fund investors, Del Guercio and Tkac’s (2002) result does not 
provide an empirical answer on whether or not this is the case. Implementation of a mutual fund 
type identifier allows us to conduct more general and precise comparison of differences in fund 
selection criteria of retail versus institutional mutual fund investors. Secondly, Del Guercio and 
Tkac (2002) base their analysis of retail mutual funds on a relatively small sample comprising 
less than 500 equity retail mutual funds and covering the period between 1987 and 1994, while 
we use the complete universe of U.S. domestic equity mutual funds  currently actual during the 
most recent period – between years 1999 and 2009. Our final sample includes almost 7,800 retail 
funds and more than 3,900 institutional funds. Thirdly, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) investigate 
investment flows estimated at the annual horizon, thereby ignoring shorter-term flow dynamics. 
We examine mutual fund flows calculated at the monthly frequency, which allows us to get a 
more precise picture of fund flow character as compared to an analysis based on quarterly or 
annual flows.
37 Furthermore, we expand on the set of factors determining flows of each type of 
fund,  investigating  effects  of  factors  such  as  fund  expense  ratio  and  momentum  exposure. 
Finally, to account for possible variation in investment flow pattern across the business cycle, we 
examine the pattern separately for NBER expansion and recession periods.
38 This examination is 
                                                              
36 According to Cohen (2003), factors determining asset allocation decisions of institutions might vary for different 
types of institutions   
37 Barber, Odean and Zheng (2005) investigate mutual fund flows estimated at the quarterly frequency; Berk and 
Tonks (2009), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Sirri and Tufano (1998) study mutual fund flows measured at 
annual frequency. 
38  We  adopt  NBER  dates  of  expansion  and  recession  months  to  define  the  business  cycle  following  existing 
literature  investigating  flows  and  performance  of  mutual  funds  across  the  business  cycle  (see  for  examples 
Moskowitz (2000), Kosowski (2006), and Cederburg (2008)).  111  
 
especially valuable in the light of findings of prior literature documenting that mutual fund flows 
are not time invariant and tend to change with market conditions.
39   
Consistent with the investor profile, we find a number of differences in investment flow 
patterns  between  retail  and  institutional  funds.  First,  we  find  that  customers  of  institutional 
mutual  funds  react more  to  criteria  considered sophisticated.  For  example,  while  investment 
flows of both types of funds are significantly and positively related to a variety of risk-adjusted 
performance measures, flows of institutional  funds are significantly  stronger related to those 
measures. We also find that the observed difference in flow-performance relationship increases 
during  recession  periods.
40  On  the  other  hand,  flows  of  retail  funds  are  more  sensitive  to 
unadjusted performance measures.  
In  line  with  the  empirical  findings  of  previous  literature,  the  flow-performance 
relationship appears to have a non-linear form.
41 However, the form of this relationship is not the 
same for flows of retail and institutional funds. For retail funds, the relationship appears to have 
a convex form, implying that investors of those funds tend to allocate disproportionally more 
into good performers, while they do not punish bad performers by withdrawing money. For 
institutional funds, however, the form of the flow-performance relationship appears to be merely 
linear  in  the  part  reflecting  the  flow-performance  relationship  for  well  performing  funds. 
Conversely,  for  some  of  performance  measures,  the  form  is  concave  in  the  part  reflecting 
punishment of bad performers. This result implies that investors of institutional funds withdraw 
assets from poor performing funds punishing the worst performers the hardest, while allocating 
assets into well performing funds.  
Our  findings  on  differences  in  the  form  of  the  flow-performance  for  retail  and 
institutional  funds  relationship  contribute  to  the  extensive  literature on  incentives  and driver 
factors  of  fund  manager  behavior.  The  convex  shape  of  the  flow-performance  relationship, 
                                                              
39 Edelen and Warner (2001) and Boyer and Zheng (2008) show that market conditions affect mutual fund flows, 
documenting a positive relationship between flows into U.S. equity mutual funds and market returns. Birnbaum, 
Kallberg, Koutsoftas and Schwartz (2004) document reluctance of both retail and institutional investors to withdraw 
their funds in bearish market conditions. Cederburg (2008) finds that investors demonstrate strong return chasing 
behavior during expansions, while they do not chase returns during recessions. 
40 Findings of prior literature reveal that, at risk-adjusted basis, mutual funds perform better during recession periods 
than during expansions (see for examples Moskowitz (2000), Kosowski (2006), Avramov and Wermers (2006), and 
Cederburg (2008)). Those results may explain why, in our nalysis, risk-adjusted performance measures appear to 
have a stronger influence on fund flows during recession months, and why this tendency is found to be especially 
pronounced among –  presumably more sophisticated – institutional investors.  
41 See, for example, Ippolito (1992), and Sirri and Tufano (1998). 112  
 
observed for the funds of retail fund sample, implies that “winners take all”. As a result, fund 
managers, who are typically compensated as a percentage of assets under management, have an 
implicit incentive to raise the risk of their portfolios in order to increase the chances to be among 
the winners, without taking a risk of being punished in case of failure.
42 At the same time, our 
results show that concave-convex form of the flow-performance relationship for institutional 
funds weakens fund manager incentive to follow the mentioned risk-shifting behavior. 
In  addition,  our  results  indicate  that  relative  performance  of  funds  with  respect  to 
benchmarks is an important criterion in the fund selection process. Both institutional and retail 
funds outperforming their  investment objective  category (IOC) experience  higher flows than 
underperforming funds.
43 Similarly, funds outperforming the market are rewarded with higher 
inflows. Benchmarks appear to have a stronger influence among investors of retail funds. In line 
with Guercio and Tkac’s (2002) findings, the influence of the magnitude of the excess returns on 
fund flows is found to be especially pronounced at the top of the performance distribution.  
We find a significant negative relationship between investment flows and tracking error – 
a measure of diversifiable risk – for both institutional and retail mutual funds. This is in contrast 
to the results of Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), documenting no evidence for influence of fund 
tracking error on mutual fund flows. Our results indicate that both institutional and retail fund 
investors tend to punish funds with a higher tracking error through withdrawing assets from 
those funds. At the same time, in line with the logic of the reference paper, this relationship 
appears to be much more pronounced for flows of institutional funds, whose clients presumably 
represent more sophisticated investors. Furthermore, for institutional funds, the influence of the 
tracking error on investment flows is stronger during expansion periods. Flows of retail funds 
are, though weaker than institutional flows, negatively related to tracking error during bullish 
periods and positively related to tracking error during bearish periods.  
Based  on  research  that  documents  evidence  for  momentum  following  behavior,  we 
examine how momentum exposure of each type of fund affects fund flows, and whether this 
effect differs across fund types.
44 We find evidence suggesting that flows of both types of funds 
are significantly positively related to fund momentum exposure. However, the results suggest 
                                                              
42 See, for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), and Chevalier and Ellison (1997). 
43 From here and further in this paper we use IOC abbreviation to denote “investment objective category” term. 
44 See, for example, Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Froot 
and Teo (2004), Sias (2004), and Gallo, Phengpis, and Swanson (2008). 113  
 
that attractiveness of momentum following funds diminishes during recession months. Moreover, 
the effect of business cycle on flow-momentum relationship is not the same for institutional and 
retail  funds.  While  momentum-trading  institutional  funds  attract  considerably  higher  inflows 
than their retail counterparts during expansions, those funds experience relatively lower flows 
over recessions. This finding is consistent with the literature documenting variation of investor 
behavior across different market conditions.
45 
In addition, consistent with the previous studies, we find that both institutional and retail 
funds with higher inflows in the past continue to experience higher inflows in the subsequent 
periods.
46 Moreover, this effect appears to be stronger for institutional funds. This result suggests 
that  institutional  fund  investors  exhibit  stronger  herding  behavior,  which  is  in  line  with  the 
results reported by prior literature.
47  
Finally, fund expense ratio also appears to have a significant influence on flows of both 
types of funds. In particular, mutual funds with lower expense ratio experience higher inflows. 
Retail fund investors demonstrate stronger sensitivity to fund expense ratio, and the difference is 
even  larger  during  recession  periods.  Experiencing  wealth  depreciation,  individual  investors, 
presumably, are even more sensitive to costs associated with their participation in mutual funds 
during recession periods than during expansions. At the same time, investors of institutional 
funds – probably due to the fact that they do not invest their own money – are less sensitive to 
the price of services and ready to pay for higher quality or more convenient service.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview 
for institutional and retail mutual funds. Section 4.3 discusses characteristics of individual and 
institutional  investors  and  potential  reflection  of  those  characteristics  in  flow  determinants. 
Section 4.4 describes the mutual fund data sample. Section 4.5 explains the methodology and 
reports results of the analysis.  Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2   Industry Overview: Retail versus Institutional Funds 
                                                              
45 See, for example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Cederburg (2008), Shrider (2009), Birnbaum, Kallberg and 
Schwartz (2004), and Glode, Hollified, Kacperczyk, and Kogan (2009). 
46 See, for example, Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). 
47 See, for example, Nofsinger and Sias (1999), and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992b). 114  
 
Funds focused on institutional investors represent a relatively recent trend starting in the 
early  1990s  (James  and  Karceski  (2006)). The  formation  of  institutional  funds  resulted  in  a 
division of mutual funds into individual and institutional oriented. Thus, funds serving individual 
clienteles  are  known  as  “retail”  funds,  while  funds  targeting  institutional  investors  – 
“institutional”. There is no formal definition of retail or institutional fund. The main criteria that 
are usually considered to classify  funds into retail and institutional are minimum investment 
requirement  declared  by  fund  and  the  distribution  channel  of  fund  shares.  Morningstar,  for 
example, classifies as institutional funds with minimum initial investment requirements of at 
least $100,000 (James and Karceski (2006)). In this study, we use fund classification provided by 
CRSP, which adopts Lipper fund type categorization. To be classified as institutional by Lipper, 
a fund has to have a minimum investment requirement of at least $100,000 and fund’s shares 
have to be distributed to or through an institution.
48 In addition, funds that designate themselves 
as institutional are usually recognized as those.
49 
The size of the institutional segment of the mutual fund market has grown dramatically in 
recent years, both in terms of the number of funds and assets under management. For example, 
James and Karceski (2006) report that at the beginning of their sample period – 1986 – the 
number of open-end bond and equity institutional funds was 22, while at the end of the sample 
period – the end of year 1998 – there were 873 funds. Thus, the number of institutional funds 
grew at 40-folds during the sample period. In contrast, the number of retail funds increased from 
786 to 5,076 (increase of around 650%) during the same period. At the same time, the amount of 
assets managed by institutional funds grew from 3.2 billion at the beginning of the sample period 
– year 1986 – to over $302 billion by the end of the sample period – year 1998
50.  
Our sample also depicts considerable growth of proportion of institutional funds. Thus, at 
the beginning of our sample period – January 1999 - institutional funds represented around 20% 
of all funds managing merely 12% of assets, while at the end of the period – May 2009 – almost 
40% of all funds were institutional funds accounting for 22% of assets under management.
51 
                                                              
48 We received this information during phone conversation with one of the Lipper officers responsible for this field. 
49 Both Morningstar and Lipper consider a fund as institutional if it designate it as such (for Morningstar we get this 
information based on the study of James and Karceski (2006), and for Lipper based on our e-mail dialog with one of  
the Lipper officers responsible for this field.   
50 In their study, James and Karceski (2006) categorize fund as an institutional if the fund is designated as such by 
Morningstar.  
51 In our sample over the period between January 1999 and May 2009, the number of institutional funds grew at 
faster pace than the number of retail funds, with the number of institutional funds increasing 322 percent (from 884 115  
 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the evolution of both groups of funds in our sample over the period 
between January 1999 and May 2009.  
 [Please insert Figures 4.1 and 4.2 about here] 
Numbers reported by Investment Company Institute confirm the observed tendency. ICI 
estimates that institutions held more than 1.7 trillion dollars in equity, bond, money market and 
hybrid open-end mutual funds at year-end 2008 (out of a total of $9.6 trillion in these funds). 
That is compared with 0.7 trillion dollar held by institutional investors in mutual funds at year-
end 2000, which represented merely 10% of total assets of the mutual fund industry in year 2000 
(7 trillion dollar).
52  
Although the same companies that have a part in running retail mutual funds (banks, 
insurance companies, brokers, and fund advisory companies) operate institutional mutual funds, 
these funds have several distinguishing characteristics. Besides considerably higher minimum 
initial investments, institutional funds usually offer lower costs to investors compared to retail 
funds.  So,  only  a  insignificant  minority  of  institutional  funds  have  front  or  deferred  loads, 
redemption fees or 12b-1 marketing expenses. 
Some  of  the  institutional  funds  in  our  sample  have  retail  counterparts.  Since  the 
Investment Company Act requires different classes of shares of the same fund to have the same 
return  before  distribution  expenses,  the  institutional  and  retail  shares  of  such  funds,  while 
holding the same portfolio, are claims on separate asset pools or trusts. This structure is imposed 
by the differences  in services that each type of fund requires from the fund manager.
53 For 
instance, management fees may be lower for the institutional investor shares than for the retail, 
since  an  institutional  sponsor  may  provide  bookkeeping  services  and  transact  with  the  fund 
through an omnibus account. The institutional and the retail peers file separate prospectuses.  
Only a small number of academic studies investigate retail  versus institutional  funds, 
mainly  concentrating  on  performance  characteristics.  James  and  Karceski  (2006)  find  that, 
despite significantly lower management expenses, the average return on institutional funds is no 
better than the average return on retail funds. Even on a risk-adjusted basis, institutional funds 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
to 2844 funds), and the number of retail funds increasing 53 percent (from 3042 to 4656 funds). Assets under 
management hold by institutional funds increased almost three-fold (from 247 billion to 671 billion), while assets 
under management of retail funds remained nearly the same (1883 billion to 1840 billion). 
52 See, ICI “Fact Book 2009”. ICI defines a mutual fund shareholder as institutional if the shareholder represents an 
institution such as a business, financial, or non-profit organization.  
53 See James and Karceski (2006). 116  
 
performance is similar to retail funds. In addition, the authors report that institutional funds with 
low  initial  investment  requirements  and  funds  with  retail  peers  perform  worse  than  other 
institutional funds both before and after adjusting for risk and expenses. Finally, examining the 
relationship between fund cash flows and performance, the authors find that cash flows into 
institutional funds with high minimum investment requirements are significantly more sensitive 
to risk-adjusted measures of performance than are flows into small institutional funds or retail 
funds. 
Investigating the relationship between the performance and characteristics of domestic, 
actively managed institutional equity mutual funds, Baker, Haslem and Smith (2009) show that 
large funds tend to perform better, which suggests the presence of significant economies of scale. 
The authors also document evidence on the positive relationship between cash  holdings and 
performance.   
Our  study  contributes  to  existing  literature  revealing  determinants  of  mutual  funds’ 
investment  flows  separately  for  retail  and  institutional  funds,  examining  how  fund  selection 
criteria vary across investors of these two types of funds.  
So far, we discussed specific characteristics of retail and institutional funds. As noted 
above, target clientele is one of the main differences between those two types of funds. Thus, the 
individual investor is a typical client of retail funds, while institutional investors are usually 
clients of institutional funds. In the next section, we discuss characteristics of individual and 
institutional investors and their potential reflection on fund selection process.  
4.3   Investor Characteristics and Flow Determinants 
Academic  research  on  investor  behavior  often  distinguishes  between  individual  and 
institutional investors, referring to regular households as individual investors and organizations 
or  groups  of  individuals,  investing  through  intermediaries,  as  institutional  investors.  Such  a 
division reflects fundamental differences between those two types of investors in characteristics 
determining investor behavior. First, individual investors are considered to be unsophisticated in 
financial issues.  
As  documented  by  Capon,  Fitzsimons  and  Prince  (1996),  who  conduct  a  survey  on 
mutual fund purchases by U.S. households, most individual mutual fund investors are naïve, 117  
 
affected by many non-performing factors when taking their investment decisions, and have little 
knowledge  in  financial  issues  in  general  and  in  their  mutual  fund  investments  in  particular. 
Based on the results of a survey of U.S. mutual fund individual investors, Alexander, Jones and 
Nigro (1998) come to a similar conclusion reporting insufficiently low level of financial literacy 
of individual investors. Summarizing the findings of academic literature that studies mutual fund 
individual investor’s profile, Palmiter and Taha (2008) conclude that individual investors are 
mostly  ignorant  and  financially  unsophisticated:  the  majority  are  unaware  of  the  basic 
characteristics  of  the  funds  they  invest  in,  do  not  take  into  account  the  risk  and  the  costs 
associated with their investments in the funds, and chase past returns.  
In  contrast,  institutional  investors  are  commonly  considered  more  sophisticated.  Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002) characterize pension fund sponsors – the typical institutional investor – 
as more sophisticated in financial issues than retail mutual funds’ investors. The authors note that 
pension fund sponsors are often professionals specializing in investment management. Moreover, 
Del  Guercio  and  Tkac  (2002)  find  that  pension  fund  sponsors  rely  more  on  quantitatively 
sophisticated fund performance evaluation methods, such as fund Jensen’s alpha, fund relative 
performance with respect to a benchmark, and fund tracking error.
54  
However, institutional investor has no need to be a financial expert in order to take an 
advantage on individual investor in the quality of their investment decision. The economies of 
scale  provide  institutional  investors  with  better  access  to  services  of  professional  experts. 
Moreover,  the  economies  of  scale  make  search  costs  for  institutional  investors  considerably 
lower  compared  to  those  for  individuals.
55  Furthermore,  a  large  amount  of  assets  held  by 
institutional  investors  provides  them  with  much  wider  diversification  opportunities. 
Simultaneously,  there  is  another  essential  difference  between  individual  and  institutional 
investors. In contrast to institutional investors, individuals invest on their own behalf.
56 
Given that the typical institutional investor is more sophisticated in financial issues than 
the typical individual investor, institutional investors can be expected to base their investment 
                                                              
54  Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) note that pension fund sponsors usually rely on consultant recommendations when 
selecting and evaluating money managers. At the same time, consultants’ screening includes extensive quantitative 
analysis based on such risk-adjusted measures as Jensen’s alpha and tracking error. Moreover, according to the 
authors, those measures are commonly included in pension fund databases and evaluation software packages. In 
addition, pointing out an importance of a benchmark, the authors mention that pension fund sponsors usually select 
and evaluate fund managers with respect to investment style. 
55 See, for example, Sirri and Tufano (1998). 
56 See, for example, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). 118  
 
decisions on more sophisticated selection criteria than individual investors do. In fact, comparing 
selection  criteria  of  retail  mutual  fund  investors  with  pension  funds,  Del  Guercio  and  Tkac 
(2002) document that pension funds - representing more sophisticated investors - use more such 
quantitatively  sophisticated  measures  as  tracking  error  and  Jensen’s  alpha.  In  contrast,  the 
authors find that retail mutual fund investors pay greater attention to raw returns. Yet, they note 
that flows of retail mutual funds are also positively correlated with some of more sophisticated 
performance measures such as Jensen’s alpha. The authors explain this result by high correlation 
between Jensen alpha and broadly accessible fund evaluation measures such as the Morningstar 
ranking.  In  their  more  recent  study,  Del  Guercio  and  Tkac  (2008)  reveal  that  Morningstar 
rankings indeed positively affect investment flows into retail mutual funds. Summarizing the 
academic literature that examines the profiles of mutual fund investors, Palmiter and Taha (2008) 
come to a similar conclusion, reporting that individual mutual fund investors tend to chase past 
returns.  
Nevertheless,  institutional  investors  may  exhibit  return  chasing  behavior  as  well.  For 
instance, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) conjecture that investment decisions by some 
institutional investors are affected by agency conflicts. Thus, an institution may entrust with 
money management outside managers  in attempt to avoid responsibility  in the case of poor 
performance, making thereby the fund selection process mainly based on past returns.  
Extensive research investigates whether information on historical return can be helpful in 
prediction future returns.
57 Though the answer to this question is still the subject of controversy, 
this literature suggests that return persistence is mostly observable among the best and worst 
performing funds.
 58 Accordingly, the worst performing funds continue to perform poorly, while 
the best performers continue generating high returns. Sharp (1966) finds persistence for both low 
and high-ranked mutual funds. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) introduce the concept of 
“hot hands” meaning the tendency of the best performing funds to continue to outperform in the 
subsequent  periods.  Grinblatt  and  Titman  (1992),  and  Goetzmann  and  Ibbotson  (1994)  also 
provide  evidence  of  return  persistence  among  the  best  performing  funds.  Simultaneously, 
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58 See, for example, Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Carhart (1997), Grinblatt and Titman (1992), and 
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Ibbotson and Goetzmann (1994) document return persistence among the worst performing funds. 
In their recent study, Berk and Tonks (2007) come to the similar conclusion. Fama and French 
(2008) find, though temporary, persistence in fund three-factor alpha among both winners and 
losers.  Thus,  the  authors  report  that  funds  that  underperformed  in  the  previous  year  also 
continued  to  perform  poorly  in  succeeding  years.  According  to  the  authors,  the  observed 
persistence is a result of investors’ reluctance to withdraw assets from poorly performing funds.   
Comparing  the  flow-performance  relationship  of  pension  fund  managers  and  retail 
mutual funds, Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find that pension investors punish poorly performing 
funds by withdrawing assets from those funds. In contrast, mutual fund investors do not react to 
bad performance of losers by withdrawing assets, while allocate disproportionally more in the 
recent winners. In fact, earlier study by Sirri and Tufano (1998) reports that individual mutual 
fund  investors  allocate  asymmetrically  more  assets  in  funds  with  high  performance  in  the 
previous  period.  Ivkovich  and  Weisbenner  (2009)  document  that  individual  mutual  fund 
investors tend to sell recently losing funds, while reluctant to sell the recent winners. At the same 
time,  Chevalier  and  Ellison  (1997)  argue  that  the  flow-performance  relationship  creates 
incentives for mutual fund managers to increase or decrease the riskiness of the fund that are 
dependent on the fund’s year-to-date return, reporting that mutual fund managers tend to change 
portfolio risk at the year end. Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel and Ramos (2009) study variation in the 
flow-performance relationship across countries. They find that the relationship tends to be less 
convex in countries with a higher level of economy and a more developed mutual fund industry, 
explaining their findings by the higher level of financial sophistication of investors, and lower 
costs of participation in mutual funds attributing developed countries.
59 In addition, the authors 
show that the level of portfolio risk is higher in countries with more convex form of the flow-
performance relationship.
60  
Therefore, if investors would consider those findings when selecting funds, they could be 
expected to allocate more assets into the recent winners, expecting them to repeat high return, 
while withdrawing assets from the worst-performing funds, realizing high probability that those 
funds will continue to underperform. If that was the case, the flow-performance relationship 
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would  have  a  concave-convex  form, being  concave  in  its  leftmost  portion  referring  to  poor 
performing funds, while convex in its rightmost part representing better performing funds. In the 
context of our study, we expect the form of flow-performance relationship for more sophisticated 
institutional investors to be closer to the one implied by academic findings. While, in line with 
previous studies investigating flow-performance relationship for individual investors, we expect 
the relationship to have a convex form.
61  
Studies of fund selection posit that individual investors face substantial search costs and 
are less informed than institutional investors. Sirri and Tufano (1998) suggest that search costs 
have  an  important  impact  on  investment  decisions  of  individual  mutual  fund  investors.  The 
authors document that high performance seems to be most salient for funds which exert higher 
marketing efforts as measured by high fees. Media attention, reducing investor search costs, is 
positively associated with fund flows. Barber, Odean and Zheng (2003) find that mutual fund 
investors are influenced by salient, attention-grabbing information. They note that investors are 
more sensitive to salient in-your-face fees, like front-end loads and commissions than operating 
expenses;  they  are  likely  to  buy  funds  that  attract  their  attention  through  exceptional 
performance,  marketing,  or  advertising.  Moreover,  they  do  not  observe  any  significant 
relationship between annual flows and fund operational expenses. They explain this result by a 
positive  relationship  between  fund  advertisement  efforts  and  flows,  which  cancels  out  the 
negative effect of the fund expense ratio, embedding advertisement costs. In line with this result, 
Babalos, Kostakis and Philippas (2009), examining Greek mutual funds, find no relationship 
between  fund  expenses  and  flows.  In  contrast,  Ivkovich  and  Weisbenner  (2009)  find  that 
individual investor divestment decisions are sensitive to the fund expense ratio. Presumably, 
individual investors can be expected to care more for expenses associated with their participation 
in mutual funds for the simple reason that, in contrast to institutional investors, they pay all the 
expenses out of their own pocket. For the same reason institutional investors can be expected to 
be  less  sensitive  to  the  price  of  service,  but  ready  to  pay  more  for  higher  quality  or  more 
convenient service. 
Simultaneously,  individual  fund  investors  may  attempt  to  reduce  search  cost  using 
publically available information such as historical performance of a benchmark. For instance, 
individual investors may be expected to evaluate relative fund performance with respect to such 
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benchmarks as market indexes or IOC.
62 Another reason to expect individual investors to use 
benchmarks  is  the  simplicity  of  the  way  one  can  establish  whether  a  fund  outperforms  its 
category or not. Such performance evaluation does not require advanced knowledge in finance. 
Findings of Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009) support this idea revealing that flows of individual 
investors into mutual funds are positively related to fund relative performance with respect to its 
IOC.  
While the relevance of performance measure in prediction of fund return is questionable, 
institutional  investors,  who  can  use  more  complex  performance  measures  due  to  higher 
sophistication level, can be expected to use such straightforward estimates less. Benchmarks, 
however, can have an important influence on fund evaluation process of institutional investors as 
well. According to the argument of Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), 
institutional investors, in an attempt to reduce their job risk, evaluate fund managers with respect 
to benchmarks. Their argument can be constituted as follows. The job and the reputation of the 
corporate  insider  responsible  for  allocation  of  corporate  money,  are  directly  affected  by  the 
performance of the entrusted money. Thus, he may prefer strategies where blame can be easily 
readdressed to others and his decisions can be defended ex-post. For instance, the corporate 
treasurer’s office may delegate the money management to external managers and hire consulting 
firms to select managers, in an attempt to reduce responsibility in the case of poor performance 
(Lakonishok at al. (1992)). In addition, although good performance of a money manager, with 
respect  to  a  market  benchmark,  may  serve  as  a  convincing  explanation  for  the  choice  of 
manager,  corporate  insiders  may  evaluate  fund  managers  with  respect  to  benchmarks  (Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002). Furthermore, institutional investors, who seek to reduce the cost of 
manager’s bets deviating from the benchmark, pay high attention to tracking error reflecting 
volatility of managed portfolio from the benchmark. Thus, client attention to tracking error can 
be interpreted as the result of agency problems because it focuses on the cost of manager bets 
that  deviate  from  the  benchmark,  while  ignoring  the  potential  benefit  in  terms  of  increased 
return.  Empirical  findings  of  O’Connell  and  Teo  (2004)  support  this  argument,  providing 
evidence  of  highly  asymmetric  response  of  institutional  investors  to  gains  and  losses. 
Investigating currency contract trade of institutional investors, the authors show that dramatically 
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reducing risk in anticipation of losses, institutions only slightly increase risk in anticipation of 
gains. Thus, we expect institutional investors to punish fund managers with high tracking error 
by withdrawing assets from their funds. 
Based on prior literature, we also expect to find differences in attitude of individual and 
institutional investors to momentum exposure of fund. The momentum phenomenon implies that 
well performing stocks tend to continue performing well (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)).
63 Sapp 
and Tiwari (2004), investigating the “smart money” effect for a broad sample of U.S. domestic 
equity funds, speculate that investors tend to allocate their money into ex-post best-performing 
funds.  Furthermore,  past  best-performers  inevitably  disproportionally  hold  ex-post  best-
performing  stocks.  Thus,  relocating  their  money  into  past  winners,  investors  inadvertently 
benefit  from  momentum  returns  on  winning  stocks.  However,  investigating  the  hypothesis 
empirically, the authors conclude that higher exposure to the momentum factor does not make a 
fund more popular, reporting a positive while insignificant relationship between fund momentum 
exposure and subsequent quarter flows. Since individual investors represent the majority in the 
sample  investigated  by  Sapp  and  Tiwari  (2004),  this  finding  rather  reflects  the  attitude  of 
individual investors to fund momentum exposure. In contrast, Goetzmann and Massa (2002) 
document  momentum  behavior  for  index  fund  investors.  Contributing  to  this  discussion, 
Wermers (1997) shows that use of momentum investment strategy by mutual fund managers is 
one of the main reasons for fund performance  persistence, claiming that momentum trading 
funds  succeed  consistently  to  outperform  their  peers.  In  his  later  study,  Wermers  (2003) 
investigates holdings of fund portfolios and shows that fund managers who have recently done 
well tend to invest a considerable portion of new money in the recently winning stocks in attempt 
to continue to perform well. On the contrary, managers of poorly-performing funds are reluctant 
to sell underperforming stocks. According to this logic, it is reasonable that investors seek out 
funds  that  consistently  implement  momentum  strategy.  Moreover,  investor  preference  for 
momentum trading funds could explain observed momentum trading behavior of mutual fund 
managers.
64 Furthermore, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) document that institutional investors are 
momentum traders, arguing that stock return momentum is a main reason for herding behavior, 
observed  among  institutional  investors.  Thus,  we  expect  that  institutional  fund  investors, 
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compared to investors of retail funds, demonstrate stronger preference for funds with  higher 
momentum exposure.  
The  mutual  fund  literature  documents  persistence  in  fund  flows.  Investigating  Israeli 
equity  mutual  funds,  Ben-Raphael,  Kandel  and  Wohl  (2009)  document  that  fund  flows  are 
positively auto-correlated. Examining flows of U.S. equity funds, Cashman, Deli, Nardari and 
Villupuram (2007) document evidence of high persistence in monthly mutual fund flows. While 
flow persistence attributes herding behavior, prior literature finds this tendency to be stronger for 
institutional  investors.  For  example,  Nofsinger  and  Sias  (1999)  show  that  trading  stocks 
institutional investors tend to follow each other’s trades and their own lag trade of securities. Sias 
(2002)  provides  evidence  for  herding  behavior  of  institutional  investors,  reporting  positive 
relationship between  institutional  investors’ demands  for securities over  succeeding quarters. 
Thus, we expect to find stronger persistence in flows of institutional funds. 
Finally, to account for possible differences in investor behavior across the business cycle, 
we examine flow patterns of each fund type separately for expansion and recession periods.
65 
This examination is especially valuable in the light of findings of prior literature documenting 
that mutual fund flows are not time invariant and tend to change with market conditions. Edelen 
and Warner (2001) and Boyer and Zheng (2008) show that market conditions affect mutual fund 
flows, documenting a positive relationship between flows into U.S. equity mutual funds and 
market returns. Studies of Birnbaum, Kallberg, Koutsoftas and Schwartz (2004) and Cederburg 
(2008) reveal that mutual fund investor behavior changes across the business cycle. Birnbaum, 
Kallberg, Koutsoftas and Schwartz (2004) document reluctance of both retail and institutional 
investors  to  withdraw  their  funds  in  bearish  market  conditions.  Cederburg  (2008)  finds  that 
investors demonstrate strong return chasing behavior during expansions, while they do not chase 
returns during recessions.
66 Moreover, adverse market conditions may erase attractiveness of 
funds following momentum strategies. Thus, documenting positive relationship between fund net 
cash flow and fund momentum exposure, Cederburg (2008) finds that this relationship is weaker 
during recessions. The author explains this result by higher investors’ concern of exposure to 
aggregate risks during recession than during expansion periods. 
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Simultaneously, a number of papers report variation of mutual fund performance over the 
business cycle. Moskowitz (2000) notes that mutual funds perform better during recessions than 
during expansions. Expanding on this subject, Kosowski (2006) reveals that evidence on mutual 
fund underperformance stems  from expansion periods, while during recessions mutual funds 
show significantly positive alpha.
67 Accordingly,  mutual funds seem to perform better when 
investors need it the most. Moreover, recession periods appear to be the best time to profit from 
predictability of mutual fund managers’ skills. This being the case, we would expect investors to 
seek  more  for  alpha  during  recession  periods  than  during  expansions.  Moreover,  more 
sophisticated investors would be expected to exhibit a stronger priority for fund risk-adjusted 
performance. 
In addition, for investors of retail funds, the effect of fund expense ratio on flows may be 
expected  to  differ  over  the  business  cycle.  Experiencing  wealth  depreciation,  individual 
investors, presumably, are more sensitive to costs associated with their participation in mutual 
funds during recession periods than during expansions.    
4.4   Data Descriptions 
4.4.1  Sample Descriptions 
We  collect  data  from  the  CRSP  Survivor-Bias  Free  US  Mutual  Fund  Database.  Our 
sample comprises of all open-end domestic equity mutual funds existed at any time during the 
period January 1999 to May 2009 and for which values of monthly total net asset are reported by 
CRSP. Further, we exclude specialized funds, sector funds, balanced funds and international 
funds, since risk factors of these funds may differ from risk factors driving the performance of 
other equity mutual funds. We use the Lipper objective codes provided by the CRSP to assign 
investment style classification. Thus, we distinguish three investment styles: growth, value, and 
core.  Each  of  the  styles  is  subsequently  broken  down  by  market  capitalization  into  small, 
medium, large or multiple types. Thereby, we construct investment objective categories (denoted 
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as IOC). For each fund, we determine investment style as of the date of the last fund observation 
in our sample.
68  
We treat fund-entity  as  is denoted by CRSP. More specifically, each  fund represents 
either a share class, thereby representing only a part of the fund assets, or a fund representing an 
entire portfolio. Our final sample contains 11,710 fund-entities comprising 818,530 fund-months.  
It  includes  4,004  fund-entities  as  of  January  1999  and  7,421  fund-entities  as  of  May  2009 
aggregating to $2.13 trillion and $2.51 trillion correspondingly.
69  
4.4.2  Classification funds into retail and institutional 
We categorize funds as institutional if CRSP designates them as such. Starting in 1999, 
the CRSP database includes a variable that identifies whether a fund represents institutional or 
retail type. We use this year as a starting point in our investigation. As mentioned in the previous 
section, explicit division of funds into institutional and retail, represents relatively recent trends, 
starting in early 1990s.  
CRSP derives institutional/retail identifier from Lipper, and assigns funds as institutional 
if they fall in Lipper’s “Institutional” or “Bank Institutional” categories. More specifically, Bank 
Institutional  funds  are  considered  funds  that  are  primarily  offered  to  clients,  agencies  and 
fiduciaries  of  bank  trust  departments,  commercial  banks,  thrifts,  trust  companies,  or  similar 
institutions. The bank, bank affiliate or subsidiary acting as advisor or, in  some cases, sub-
advisor for the funds, and the funds are typically marketed as a bank product. Institutional funds 
are primarily targeted at organizations and institutions, including pension  funds, 401k plans, 
profit  sharing  plans,  endowments,  or  accounts  held  by  institutions  in  a  fiduciary,  agency  or 
custodial capacity. 
Note that this classification may not be a precise identifier of investor type. For instance, 
the final investment decision of 401k plans’ participants is taken by an individual investor, while 
their capital flows may combine flows of either an institutional or a retail fund. Nevertheless, it 
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69 According to ICI Mutual Funds’ Fact Book 2009, of the U.S. mutual funds’ total of $9.6 trillion assets under 
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seems reasonable to assume that the classification of funds into retail and institutional implies 
differences in investor composition of the two types of fund. In particular, the overwhelming 
majority  of  retail  fund  investors  apparently  are  regular  individuals.  At  the  same  time, 
institutional investors, if participating in mutual funds, can be expected to invest in institutional 
funds.  Furthermore, presumably  more  sophisticated  institutional  investors  influence  flows  of 
institutional  funds,  while  flows  of  retail  funds  are  determined  by  investment  decisions  of 
unsophisticated – individual investors.  
4.4.3  Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 contains descriptive statistics for the mutual funds of both samples. Therefore, 
Panels B and C provide corresponding statistics for the retail fund and the institutional fund 
samples respectively. For purposes of comparison, we also report corresponding statistics for the 
sample of all funds (Panel A).  
The average monthly  net cash flows (described in this  section below) into funds are 
positive  for  retail  and  institutional  funds.  However,  the  average  monthly  net  cash  flow  of 
institutional funds is nearly four times higher than that of retail funds ($1.73 million and $0.44 
million correspondingly). If we normalize net cash flow by fund TNA of the prior month, the 
average normalized monthly cash flows are much more similar for both types of funds.
 70  
As reported in Table 4.1, retail funds are on average bigger than institutional funds. Thus, 
the average retail fund in our sample has $505 million under management compared to $247 
million  managed  by  the  average  institutional  fund.  Presumably,  the  observed  difference  in 
average size is the result of the size difference between the largest retail and institutional funds. 
More specifically, the largest institutional fund in our sample is roughly half the size compared 
to the largest retail fund, managing $48 billion and $97 billion respectively. At the same time, 
the median fund size is almost the same: $29 million for retail funds compared to $27 million for 
institutional funds. 
In addition, Table 4.1 shows that the average expense ratio is considerably lower for 
institutional funds than for retail funds. In particular, the average expense ratio for institutional 
fund (1.02% per year) is 60 percentage points lower than the average expense ratio for the retail 
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fund (1.62% per year). While expense ratios and maximum front-end load fees are considerably 
higher for retail funds, the turnover ratio is similar for both samples.
71  
Furthermore,  institutional  funds  in  our  sample  seem  to  perform  slightly  better  at 
unadjusted and risk-adjusted basis. Lower brokerage commissions and expenses, characterizing 
institutional funds, is one of possible sources of return difference.   
In addition, tracking error – a measure of diversifiable risk – appears to be lower for 
institutional funds, indicating that the institutional fund manager, on average, tends to deviate 
less from the market.  
[Please insert Table 4.1 about here] 
To start working with our flow data at the fund-month level, we eliminate fund-months 
without records for fund total net asset value. This leaves us with 817,423 fund-months, out of 
which 576,975 are retail fund-months and are 240,448 institutional fund-months. In addition, we 
exclude fund-observations with 1
st and 99
th flow percentile, so that highly unusual flows do not 
drive our results. More specifically, exceptionally noisy flow data can attribute very young funds 
or funds about to be closed down.  
4.4.4  Measurement of Flows and Performance 
We  define  normalized  cash  flows  as  the  percentage  growth  in  fund  assets,  net  of 
appreciation. We calculate them as: 
     ,  =
    ,      ,        ,  
    ,   
.                                                    (1)  
Here       ,   denotes  the  monthly  normalized  cash  flows  for  fund  j  during  month  t. 
    ,  refers to the total net assets at the end of month t,   ,  is the fund’s return for month t. The 
estimate of normalized cash flows expressed in equation (1) implies that existing fund investors 
fully  reinvest  their  dividends.  In  addition,  the  estimate  assumes  that  all  the  new  money  is 
invested  at  the  end  of  month.  As  noted  in  previous  studies,  normalized  cash  flows  may  be 
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preferable when dollar flows are positively related to fund size, whereby larger funds attract 
higher flows regardless of performance (Gruber (1996)).  
The performance of mutual funds can be measured in different ways. Since our goal is to 
reveal which measures are important to investors of each type of funds, we select measures 
which are available to investors of both types of funds, and can be considered when making their 
investment decisions.  In particular, we use historical raw returns estimated at different lengths 
and horizons. This assumption is built on evidence of chasing raw return documented by the 
previous literature. Based on the same logic, we employ relative return to other funds with the 
same  IOC.  In  addition,  we  include  performance  measures  considered  sophisticated,  such  as 
tracking error and a number of risk-adjusted measures including Jensen’s, Fama-French, and 
Carhart alphas. Those measures are expected to be especially important to more sophisticated 
investors  of  institutional  funds.  Furthermore,  we  include  a  fund  momentum  loading  factor. 
Considering well-documented momentum-following behavior, attributing institutional investors, 
we expect investors of institutional funds to exhibit this tendency as well. All of those measures 
are lagged, so as to be observable by investors when an investment decision has to be made.  
4.5   Analysis and Results 
4.5.1  The determinants of fund flows: institutional versus retail funds 
As mentioned earlier, differences in clientele profile imply differences in fund selection 
criteria considered by investors of retail versus institutional funds. In this section, we examine 
those differences using  linear regression  framework, as suggested by  Del Guercio and Tkac 
(2002).
72  In  particular,  we  pool  all  observations  with  monthly  normalized  cash  flows  as  a 
dependent  variable  and  a  number  of  lagged  performance  and  non-performance  measures  as 
explanatory  variables.  More  specifically,  performance  measures  include:  fund  raw  return, 
relative performance of the fund with respect to the average performance of the style to which 
this fund is related, the momentum factor loading of the fund, fund risk-adjusted returns, and 
tracking error. The set of non-performance variables includes the natural logarithm of fund total 
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net assets, the net cash flows of the fund estimated as a dollar change in fund total assets, net of 
appreciation, the normalized cash flows of  the IOC to which the fund belongs, fund turnover and 
expense  ratios,  and  fund  age  scaled  in  months.  Following  Del  Guercio  and  Tkac’s  (2002) 
methodology, we also include a set of time-style interaction variables, one for each combination 
of month and style. For instance, G200202 variable takes value one if this observation relates to 
growth style fund in February 2002, and zero otherwise. The time component of the interaction 
dummy  variable  captures  any  cross-sectional  correlations  in  the  observations  which  could 
emerge due to differences in average flows across months of the sample. The style component 
accounts to the fact that in any given month, funds with different IOCs may experience average 
flows that are significantly different from these of other styles. Thereby, adding a time-style 
interaction  dummy  reduces  the  above  explained  sources  of  residual  dependence,  increasing 
precision of the estimates. Furthermore, to correct for heteroskedasticity, we cluster standard 
errors by funds. To estimate the corresponding coefficients for investors of institutional and retail 
funds  separately,  we  interact  each  of  the  performance  and  non-performance  explanatory 
variables with fund type dummy variables. In particular, we include both sets of interactions: the 
interaction of each of the explanatory variables with the retail fund dummy, which gets value one 
if an observation relates to flows of retail funds and zero otherwise, and the interaction with the 
institutional fund dummy, getting value one if an observation is related to an institutional fund.   
To estimate the difference in effect of each of those variables on flows between retail 
and institutional funds, we specify a separate regression including a set of explanatory variables 
with and without interaction with the institutional fund dummy. Thus, the coefficients of the 
variables with the  interaction represent the difference  in effect of corresponding  variable on 
flows of institutional versus retail funds, and t-statistics of those coefficients reflect statistical 
significance of the differences. 
Formally, the regression equation, which estimates effect of the variables on flows of 
each type of fund, has the following form: 
     ,  =    +   
    ,  ×    +   
     ,  ×    +      +   
    ,  ×     +   
     ,  ×    +   
    ,  +    , , (2)                                                                                            
where     ,   and      ,   are  vectors  of  the  described  above  performance  and  non-performance 
measures respectively . More specifically, performance measures include the 1
st lag of a dummy 
variable for within style best performing fund getting value 1 if fund monthly return is higher 130  
 
than return of its style in corresponding month and zero otherwise, the 1
st lag of fund’s monthly 
raw return, the momentum (UMD) loading of fund calculated over the previous 36 month of 
fund return, fund’s Jensen’s alpha calculated over the previous 36 months of fund return, fund 
tracking error which is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of fund excess 
return over previous 36 month and market portfolio excess return. Non-performance measures 
comprise the logarithm of fund total net assets estimated to the end of the previous month, the 1
st 
lag of fund’s monthly net cash flow, monthly normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, expense ratio 
as  at  the  end  of  the  previous  month  estimated  as  the  percentage  of  total  investment  that 
shareholders  pay  for  the  fund’s  operating  expenses  and  turnover  ratios  as  at  the  end  of  the 
previous month defined as a minimum of aggregate purchases or sales of securities during the 
year, divided by average fund total net assets, and time-style interaction dummies.      and    are 
dummy variables to retail and institutional fund respectively, and    ,  is a vector of time-style 
dummy interactions constructed for each combination of month and style.  
Table 4.2 reports results of the regression specified by equation (2). Specification (1) in 
Panel A of Table 4.2 contains results for all funds in our sample. Specification (2) in Panel B 
summarizes estimates of regression specification including fund type interactions terms. The last 
column in the table reports differences between coefficients of the corresponding variable of 
institutional versus retail funds. As mentioned above, our set of performance measures includes 
fund-monthly absolute return as at the end of the previous month, a dummy variable indicating 
monthly relative performance of fund, with respect to its IOC, getting value one if fund return 
exceeded average return of all funds in our sample, belonging to the same investment category as 
the fund, and zero otherwise, the momentum (UMD) loading calculated over the previous 36 
months of fund return, fund’s Jensen’s alpha calculated over the previous 36 months of fund 
return, and fund tracking error, measured as the standard deviation of the residuals from the 
regression  of  fund  excess  return  over  the  previous  36  months  on  excess  return  of  market 
portfolio.  
[Please insert Table 4.2 about here] 
Overall,  the  results  are  consistent  with  our  expectations.  Coefficients  of  the  lagged 
absolute returns are positive and significant for both types of funds, indicating that both retail 
and  institutional  fund  investors  chase  past  return  (Panel  B  of  Table 4.2). More  specifically, 131  
 
controlling  for  the  rest,  an  additional  1%  of  monthly  raw  return  implies  an  increase  of  7 
percentage points in the next month normalized cash flows of retail fund, and an increase of 
almost 5 percentage points in succeeding month normalized cash flows of institutional fund. This 
result  is  in  line  with  earlier  literature,  documenting  return  chasing  behavior  of  individual 
investors.
73  Moreover,  more  sophisticated  investors  of  institutional  funds  also  demonstrate 
significant return chasing. Consistent with the Lakonishok et al. (1992) argument, this finding 
indicates that investment decisions of institutional investors may be affected by agency conflict. 
In particular, an institution may entrust money management to outside managers in an attempt to 
avoid responsibility in the case of poor performance. Thus, the fund selection process would be 
mainly based on past returns. For instance, the corporate insider responsible for money allocation 
can easily switch between money managers, relocating the money from a poorly performing 
manager to a manager who has done well in the past. This way the money manager selection 
process is based mainly on past performance (Lakonishok et al. (1992)). 
Yet, as expected, return chasing tendency appears to be significantly weaker for more 
sophisticated investors of institutional funds compared to this demonstrated by less sophisticated 
investors  of  retail  funds.  To  distinguish  whether  the  observed  difference  depends  on  the 
frequency of the return estimate, we repeat the analysis for returns measured at a quarterly, semi-
annually, and annually basis. The results of those specifications confirm that, return chasing 
behavior  is  found to be  significantly  stronger  for  retail  fund  investors,  independently  of  the 
frequency at which the returns are measured. 
Fund Jensen’s alpha is found to be positively and significantly related to normalized cash 
flows  of  both  retail  and  institutional  funds.  Thus,  both  more  sophisticated  investors  of 
institutional  funds  and  unsophisticated  investors  of  retail  funds,  consider  risk-adjusted 
performance selecting funds. Consistent with the differences in investor characteristics, the result 
shows that investment decisions of institutional fund investors are influenced much stronger by 
Jensen’s alpha. While institutional fund investors, considered to be more sophisticated investors, 
are  expected  to  use  more  complex  quantitative  measures,  it  is  less  obvious  to  expect 
unsophisticated retail investors to employ those measures. According to Del Guercio and Tkac 
(2002), high correlation of Jensen’s alpha with widely available fund valuation measures such as 
                                                              
73 See, for example, Palmiter and Taha (2008), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Capon, Fitzsimons and Prince (1996), 
and Sirri and Tufano (1992). 132  
 
Morningstar ranking can explain this result. Nevertheless, when we repeat the analysis replacing 
Jensen’s  alpha  with  Fama-French  alpha  and  subsequently  with  Carhart  alpha,  the  results, 
qualitatively,  stay  the  same.
74  Therefore,  our  results  indicate  that  while  institutional  funds 
investors  rely  more on  quantitatively  sophisticated performance  measures,  investors  of  retail 
funds when making their investment decisions, consider those measures as well. Possibly, the 
fact that a considerable part of individual investors use the help of financial advisers (ICI fact 
book  2009),  who place  great  emphasize  on  various  advanced  performance  measures  (Jones, 
Lesseig and Smythe (2005)) is one of the reasons for this findings.  
Furthermore, we find a significant positive relationship between fund momentum (UMD) 
loading and normalized cash flows. This is in contrast to findings of Sapp and Tiwari (2004), 
reporting  positive  while  insignificant  relationship  between  fund  momentum  exposure  and 
subsequent quarter normalized cash flows. Given the findings of Wermers (1997, 2003), who 
suggests that momentum trading is one of the main reasons for performance persistence of top 
performing funds, it is reasonable to investors to seek out funds that consistently implement 
momentum strategy. If so, more sophisticated investors can be expected to pay higher attention 
to  fund  momentum  exposure.  Our  results  support  this  statement.  In  particular,  while  the 
momentum exposure is found to be significant for retail as well as for institutional funds, the 
effect  appears  to  have  a  stronger  impact  on  flows  of  institutional  funds.  This  result  is  also 
consistent  with  prior  literature,  documenting  momentum  following  behavior,  primarily  for 
institutional investors.
75 
The coefficient of fund prior month normalized cash flows is positive and significant for 
both types of funds. Thereby, in line with existing literature, our results show persistence in fund 
                                                              
74  In  addition,  we  repeat  the  analysis  replacing  Jensen’s  alpha  with  fund  appraisal  ratio  –  a  measure  of  fund 
manager’s stock picking ability estimated as a ratio of fund Jensen’s alpha to the fund unsystematic risk or standard 
deviation of residuals from the market model. Accordingly, appraisal ratio can be classified as a quite complex 
quantitative  measure  of  fund  manager  performance.  Thus,  more  sophisticated  investors  –  whom  in  our  sample 
represent investors of institutional funds – can be expected to pay higher attention to this manager performance 
measure. In line with this prediction, the results of the analysis show that flows of institutional funds are stronger 
related to the ratio than flows of retail funds. Nevertheless, the results indicate that less sophisticated investors of 
retail funds consider fund  appraisal ratio when  making their investment decisions  as well.  This result is rather 
expectable given high correlation between appraisal ratio and Jensen’s alpha (the correlation between fund appraisal 
ratio and Jensen’s alpha in our sample is equal to 0.76).    
75 See, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman, (1993), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), 
Froot and Teo (2004), Sias (2004), and Gallo, Phengpis and Swanson (2008). 133  
 
flows.
76 The influence of past fund flows appears to be more pronounced for institutional funds. 
This result supports the findings of Nofsinger and Sias (1999), who document stronger herding 
behavior for institutional investors trading stocks. 
The results show a significant negative relationship between fund normalized cash flows 
and its expense ratio. This finding is in line with the results of Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009), 
revealing sensitivity of fund outflows to expense ratio. Notably, retail fund investors exhibit 
much  stronger  sensitivity  to  fund  expenses  than  institutional  investors.  The  coefficient  of 
expense ratio variable for retail investors is more than twice higher than this for institutional fund 
investors. Thus, controlling for the rest of characteristics, a retail fund with expense ratio higher 
in 1%, on average experiences almost 1.10% lower inflows than its competitors with the lower 
expense ratio. While, an institutional fund with corresponding high expense ratio has inflows that 
are  only  0.48%  lower  compared  to  the  flows  of  its  institutional  peers  with  the  lower  ratio. 
Considering  that  institutional  investors  are  supposed  to  be  better  informed  and  such  fund 
characteristics as expense ratio are more accessible to institutional investors, this result is rather 
surprising. Moreover, according to Barber, Odean and Zheng (2003), since retail investors face 
substantially higher search costs and are less informed than institutional investors, they are more 
likely  to  buy  funds  attracting  their  attention  through  advertising,  even  although  advertising 
efforts increase fund expense ratio.  Probably, the fact that, in contrast to institutional investors, 
individuals invest on their own behalf, makes them pay greater attention to costs associated with 
the investment. While, for institutional investors costs related to investment, do not play such an 
important role. Another possible reason for the observed disparity in the effect of fund expenses, 
may be difference in level and quality of services required by each type of investors from funds. 
Apparently, being less sensitive to price of service (due to the fact that they do not invest their 
own money), institutional investors are ready to pay for a higher quality or more convenient 
service.   
 In  addition,  our  results  reveal  that  fund  normalized  cash  flows  have  significant 
relationship with relative performance of fund with respect to benchmarks. More specifically, 
keeping the rest of variables the same, retail funds outperforming their IOC in a given month, on 
average  experience  0.18%  higher  inflows  in  the  subsequent  month.  Correspondingly, 
                                                              
76 See, for example, Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Cashman, Deli, 
Nardari and Villupuram (2007). 
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institutional funds with performance higher than the performance of their IOC, attract 0.13% 
more flows than their underperforming peers. This result suggests that the benchmark plays an 
important role in fund selection process of both types of investors. To test whether the effect of 
relative  fund  performance  exists  for  relative  performance  of  lower  frequency,  we  repeat  the 
analysis for quarterly, semi-annually, and annually measured relative fund performance. We find 
that the effect is present for relative fund performance estimated on lower frequency as well, 
gradually increasing for performance with the decline of frequency. We suppose that the simple 
way  one  can  establish  whether  a  fund  outperforms  its  category  or  not,  together  with  wide 
availability of performance data for IOC, may explain why investors use IOC outperformance 
criterion when evaluating funds. While the relevance of this performance measure in prediction 
of fund return is questionable, institutional investors, who can use more complex performance 
measures due to a higher sophistication level, use such straightforward estimates less. 
The important influence of the benchmark is also reflected in a significant relationship 
between normalized cash flows and fund tracking error, indicating to which extent funds deviate 
from market benchmarks. The results show, that investors punish fund managers deviating from 
the  market  benchmark  by  withdrawing  money,  while  institutional  investors  respond  to  high 
tracking error much more aggressively. In particular, the coefficient representing the effect of 
tracking  error  for  institutional  funds  (-0.59)  is  three  times  higher  than  the  corresponding 
coefficient for retail funds (-0.21%). This result is consistent with agency conflict interpretation 
suggested by Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). Their argument can be 
constituted  as  follows.  The  job  and  the  reputation  of  the  corporate  insider,  responsible  for 
allocation of corporate money, are directly affected by the performance of the entrusted money. 
Thus, he may prefer strategies where blame can be easily readdressed to others and his decisions 
can be defended ex-post. For instance, the corporate treasurer’s office may delegate the money 
management to external managers and hire consulting firms to select managers in attempt to 
reduce responsibility in the case of poor performance (Lakonishok at al. (1992)). In addition, 
since good performance of money managers, with respect to a market benchmark, may serve as a 
convincing  explanation  for  the  choice  of  manager,  corporate  insiders  may  evaluate  fund 
managers with respect to benchmarks (Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). Following this  line of 
reasoning, institutional investors, who seek to reduce the cost of manager’s bets deviating from 
the benchmark, pay high attention to tracking error, reflecting volatility of managed portfolio 135  
 
from the benchmark. Empirical findings of O’Connell and Teo (2004) support this argument, 
providing evidence of highly asymmetric response of institutional investors to gains and losses. 
The authors show that, institutional investors dramatically reducing risk in anticipation of losses 
but only slightly increase risk in anticipation of gains. 
4.5.2  Benchmark 
 However, not only the extent to which fund return deviates from market return, and 
whether or not fund manager bets benchmark affect fund flows, but also the magnitude of the 
excess return of funds on benchmark return may influence flows (see, for example, Del Guercio 
and Tkac (2002)). Thus, we continue with closer investigation of the effect of the benchmark on 
fund flows, using IOC and S&P 500 index as benchmarks.
77 Following Del Guercio and Tkac 
(2002)  methodology,  besides  testing  influence  of  direct  event  of  beating  benchmarks,  we 
examine the effect of fund absolute excess return on benchmark returns. In addition, we account 
for the asymmetry in the effect for well and badly performing funds, estimating the effect of the 
performance variables separately for funds performing better and worse than the benchmark. For 
this purpose, we include the following dummy variables in the analysis:     ,    getting value 
one if in the previous month fund raw return is higher than raw return of benchmark, and zero 
otherwise, and        ,    equals to one if in the corresponding month raw return of fund is 
lower than raw return of the benchmark;  
Thus, considering investment objective category (IOC) as a benchmark, we specify the 
following regression equation: 
     ,  =    +   
     ,  +   
    ,  ×     ,    +   
    ,  ×        ,  +   
   ,  +   
    , +   , ,        (3) 
where     ,  is a dummy variable equal to one, if fund raw return in the previous month is higher 
than raw return of funds’ IOC in the corresponding month, and zero otherwise;        ,  is a 
                                                              
77 Investment objective category is commonly considered as a benchmark in evaluation of mutual funds. Information 
regarding  performance  of  investment  objective  category  and  relative  performance  of  fund  with  respect  to  its 
category is upgraded at high frequency and publically available. Simultaneously, S&P 500 index can be considered 
as a proper benchmark, given the fact that our sample consists solely of U.S. domestic equity funds. In addition, 
previous studies examining the effect of benchmark on flows of mutual funds document that mutual fund investors 
use S&P 500 index as benchmark (Del Guercio and Tkac (2002)). We do not report results of the analysis using 
S&P  Index  as  a  benchmark.  Nevertheless,  we  confirm  that  those  results  are  qualitatively  similar,  and  will  be 
provided by the authors upon request.  136  
 
dummy variable, which is equal to one, if in the corresponding month raw return of fund is lower 
than raw return of fund’s IOC; is a vector of the lagged in one month performance measures 
including fund excess returns defined as a difference between contemporaneous raw returns of 
fund and return of its IOC, Jensen’s alpha, and tracking error;   ,  is a vector of control variables 
comprising the natural logarithm of fund total net assets estimated to the end of the previous 
month, the lagged monthly net cash flows of the fund estimated as a dollar change in fund total 
assets, net of appreciation, the normalized cash flows of  the IOC to which the fund belongs, 
fund turnover and expense ratios as of the end of previous month, and fund age scaled in months. 
Similarly to the previous analysis expressed by equation (2), we interact each of the explanatory 
variables  with  fund  type  dummies.  Thus,        and      are  dummy  variables  to  retail  and 
institutional  fund  respectively,  and     ,   is  a  vector  of  time-style  dummy  interactions.  The 
statistical significances of differences in corresponding coefficients for institutional and retail 
funds  are  estimated  based  on  an  approach  similar  to  the  one  implemented  in  the  previous 
analysis.  
Table 4.3 presents the results of the regression analysis. Specification (1) in Panel A of 
Table 4.3 reports the results for the sample of retail funds, Specification (2) in Panel B – the 
results for the sample of institutional funds. Consistent with the results documented in Table 4.2, 
the coefficient on the outperformance IOC dummy is positive for both types of funds, while, the 
effect is found to be economically and statistically significant only for the retail fund sample. 
This result confirms that, the fact whether fund manager beats IOC, positively affects future 
period flows.   
[Please insert Table 4.3 about here] 
The positive and significant coefficients of fund positive excess return on the return of 
IOC, found for both types of funds, show a significant relationship between normalized cash 
flows and the magnitude of fund’s excess return on the return of its category. More specifically, 
outperforming its category by 1 additional percent, the retail fund can expect the next month 
flows to be 23 percentage points  higher. In the case of  institutional funds, an  increase of 1 
percent in outperformance of investment category predicts subsequent month normalized flow to 
be 18 percentage points higher. Thus, economic significance of the effect of positive excess 
return is merely similar among retail and institutional funds. Notably, our results do not detect 137  
 
any significant effect of negative excess return on flows of institutional funds: coefficient for 
interaction of fund excess return on return of its category, with dummy for underperforming 
funds, is insignificant for institutional  funds. The coefficient for retail  funds is  negative and 
significant, indicating that a higher gap between fund performance and the performance of the 
fund’s ICO is associated with higher outflows from the fund in the succeeding month.  
In  addition,  the  coefficient  of  tracking  error  for  outperforming  institutional  funds  is 
significantly smaller than this coefficient for underperforming institutional funds, meaning that 
institutional fund investors’ punishment for deviation from the market is considerably weaker for 
managers outperforming their investment categories. This is in contrast to retail funds, for which 
negative effect of tracking error for both outperforming and underperforming funds is merely the 
same.  Moreover,  the  influence  of  tracking  error  on  flows  of  outperforming  and  of 
underperforming retail funds  is considerably smaller than that  for corresponding  institutional 
funds. This result supports the findings of our previous analysis, indicating that institutional fund 
investors, compared to investors of individual funds, pay much higher attention to tracking error 
reflecting volatility of managed portfolio from benchmarks. At the same time, the result indicates 
that investors of both retail and institutional funds punish for deviation from the market even 
managers outperforming their investment category. 
Further, the results reveal that for retail funds outperformance of investment category 
significantly strengthens the effect of Jensen’s alpha: the coefficient of Jensen’s alpha  is 55 
percentage points higher for funds outperforming their IOC, and that difference is statistically 
significant. In contrast, the difference in the effect of Jensen’s alpha on fund flows between the 
outperforming  and  the  underperforming  institutional  funds  comprises  only  20  insignificant 
percentage  points.  This  result  implies  that  flow-performance  relationship  for  retail  and 
institutional funds may have a different form. Further in this chapter, we proceed with closer 
investigation of the form of flow-performance relationship for each type of funds. 
4.5.3  The form of flow-performance relationship 
Differences in investor profile between institutional and retail funds may be reflected in 
difference  of  the  flow-performance  relationship  form  characterizing  each  of  the  fund  types. 
Since, investors of institutional funds are supposed to be more sophisticated, we expect the form 
of the flow-performance relationship characterizing institutional funds to be more effective.  138  
 
The extensive literature studying mutual fund performance persistence, documents that 
persistence in fund return is mostly found among the worst and the best performing funds (see 
Hendrix, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Ibbotson and Goetzmann (1994), and Berk and Tonks 
(2007)). According to those academic findings, we would expect more sophisticated investors to 
punish the worst performing funds through withdrawal of assets from those funds, realizing the 
likelihood that these funds will continue to perform poorly, while to reward the best-performing 
funds with higher inflows anticipating that those funds would maintain high returns in the future. 
In this case, the form of flow-performance relationship would be concave in the part reflecting 
punishment  of  worse  performers,  and  convex  in  its  part  representing  flow-performance 
relationship among better performing funds.  
Researchers studying the flow-performance relationship for mutual funds, however, find 
the relationship  is  non-linear  and has a  convex  form, concluding that mutual fund investors 
indeed allocate more assets in recently best-performing funds, while they do not punish poor 
performing funds. We suppose that given a higher level of financial sophistication of institutional 
fund investors, the flow-performance relationship form, for institutional funds, may be closer to 
the effective one as is implied by the literature.  
To test this hypothesis, we apply methodology suggested by Sirri and Tufano (1998). In 
particular, we examine the relationship between fund normalized cash flows and the rank of 
various fund-performance measures estimated to the end of the previous month.  
A relative performance of each fund is estimated with respect to the relevant performance 
measure of fund’s IOC. A fractional rank of fund (     , ) ranges from 0 to 1 and represents its 
percentile performance relative to other funds with the same IOC  in month t. Since we are 
interested in identifying the potential asymmetric response to good and bad performance, we 
conduct  the  analysis  using  a  piecewise  linear  regression.  More  specifically,  we  include  five 
quintile  variables  indicating  fund  relative  performance  ranking.  The  quintiles  (   , )  are 
constructed as following: 
 1 ,  =          , ,0.2 , 
 2 ,  =          ,  −  1 , ,0.2 , 
 3 ,  =          ,  −  1 ,  −  2 , ,0.2 , 139  
 
 4 ,  =          ,  −  1 ,  −  2 ,  −  3 , ,0.2 , 
 5 ,  =          ,  −  1 ,  −  2 ,  −  3 ,  −  4 , ,0.2 .                                                             (4)                                                    
Thus, if fund performance at corresponding month represented 75 performance percentile 
within its IOC, each of the variables  1,  2 and  3 will get value 0.2; the value of the variable 
 4 will be equal to 0.15, and  5 will  be 0. 
To  test  the  flow-performance  relationship,  we  specify  the  following  regression 
equation
78: 
     ,  =    +    1 ,    ×    +    2 ,    ×    +    3 ,    ×   +    4 ,    ×    +
+   5 ,    ×    +     ,    ×   +   ×    +    1 ,    ×    +    2 ,    ×    +
+    3 ,    ×    +     4 ,    ×    +     5 ,    ×    +   
   ,    ×    +   
    ,  +
+   , ,                                                                                                                            (5)          
where  1 ,   ,  2 ,   ,  3 ,   ,  4 ,    and   5 ,     are quintile variables indicating fund 
relative  performance  ranking;    ,     is  a  control  variables  vector  comprising  the  natural 
logarithm of fund total net assets estimated to the end of the previous month, the lagged monthly 
net cash flows of the fund estimated as a dollar change in fund total assets, net of appreciation, 
the normalized cash flows of  the IOC to which the fund belongs, fund turnover and expense 
ratios, and fund age scaled in months. Similarly to the previous analyses, we interact each of the 
explanatory variables with fund type dummies. Thus,     and    are dummy variables to retail and 
institutional fund respectively.    ,  is a vector of time-style dummy interactions. 
Table 4.4 summarizes regression coefficients for different performance measures. Panel 
A of Table 4.4 reports results for raw return estimated at monthly and annual frequency; Panel B 
–  for  risk-adjusted  return  measured  as  Jensen  and  Fama-French  alphas.  In  each  panel, 
specification  (1)  reports  the  regression  coefficients  for  all  funds  in  our  sample,  while 
specification (2) shows estimates of regression including fund type interaction terms. In line with 
previous studies, our results confirm a positive relationship between fund normalized cash flows 
                                                              
78  To  test  robustness  of  our  results  to  alternative  methodologies,  we  redo  the  analysis  following  the  Sirri  and 
Tufano’s  (1998)  approach.  In  particular  we  first  estimate  cross-sectional  regression  for  each  month,  and  then 
estimate coefficients and t-statistics as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). We confirm that the results obtained based on 
the above described cross-sectional regression estimated for each month approach are qualitatively similar to the 
results obtained using pooled time series cross-sectional regression reported in the paper. 140  
 
and a fund’s historical performance, and the form of this relationship is not linear. The results for 
annual return (reported in Panel A of Table 4.4) show that the coefficients of all performance 
quintiles are positive and significant. While the flow-performance relationship is positive for all 
quintiles of monthly return as well, not all of those relationships are found to be statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, the relationships for the top quintile of monthly return of both types of 
funds are statistically significant. The results in Panel B indicate similar pattern for risk-adjusted 
measures:  flow-performance  relationship  is  significant  and  positive  for  all  quintiles  as  for 
Jensen’s alpha as well as for Fama-French alpha. 
[Please insert Table 4.4 about here] 
 To get a better sense about form of flow-performance relationship for each performance 
measure, we plot the result of the regression analysis graphically (see Figure 4.3). In particular, 
in Figure 4.3 for each quintile of corresponding return measure we depict expected change in the 
monthly normalized cash flows as a function of having performance in a certain performance 
quintile. For example, the effect of the lowest quintile is expressed by its regression coefficient. 
While, to estimate the effect of second performance quintile, we sum up coefficients of the first 
and the second quintiles. As one can note, the flow-performance relationship has a convex form 
for  all  performance  measures  of  retail  funds,  confirming  findings  of  previous  papers  that, 
individual investors tend to allocate disproportionally more assets in the better performing funds, 
but do not punish bad performers by withdrawing assets from those funds. The slope is largest in 
the  rightmost  portion  of  the  flow-performance  graphs  for  retail  funds,  and  smallest  in  the 
leftmost portion of the graphs.
79 This form implies that investors of those funds tend to allocate 
disproportionally more into good performers, but do not punish bad performers by withdrawing 
money. As a result, fund managers, who are typically compensated as a percentage of assets 
under management, have an implicit incentive to raise the risk of their portfolios in order to 
increase the chances to be among the winners, without taking a risk of being punished in the case 
of failure.
80 
                                                              
79 We examine statistical significance of the observed convexity/concavity testing significance of difference between 
coefficients of each two fractional performance quintiles. To test each of the differences, we re-parameterize the 
original model in such a way that the tested linear restriction H0 (   (   ) −   ( ) = 0) corresponds to a linear 
restriction of  ∗ = 0 form (Verbeek (2000), “A Guide to Modern Econometrics”).  
80 See, for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), and Chevalier and Ellison (1997). 141  
 
However, that is  not the case for institutional funds. Being merely  linear with  slight 
convexity in their rightmost part, the graphs of flow-performance relationship for institutional 
funds are either linear (for annual raw return and Fama-French alpha) or concave (for monthly 
raw return and Jensen’s alpha; for Jensen’s alpha the observed concavity is also statistically 
significant,  at  5%  level).
81  These  results  reveal  that  in  contrast  to  retail  fund  investors, 
institutional fund investors withdraw assets  from poor performing funds punishing the worst 
performers harder, while allocating assets into good performing funds with a preference to the 
best  performers.  Thus,  our  results  show  that  concave-convex  form  of  the  flow-performance 
relationship for institutional funds weakens fund manager incentive to follow the discussed risk-
shifting behavior.  
 [Please insert Figure 4.3 about here] 
4.5.4  Investment flows across the business cycle 
So far, we have documented determinants of mutual funds’ investment flows for retail 
and institutional funds and how these determinants vary across investors of these two types of 
funds. However, existing literature suggests that investment flow pattern may change across the 
business cycle.
82 To account for possible differences in investor behavior across the business 
cycle, we further compare flow patterns of two types of funds separately for expansion and 
recession periods using the NBER recession-expansion classification (see Appendix 4.1). We use 
a regression specification similar to the one expressed by equation (2).   
[Please insert Table 4.5 about here] 
Table 4.5 reports the results of the analysis. The coefficients of lagged raw returns for 
both retail and institutional funds are higher for expansion months. In particular, controlling for 
the rest, additional percent  in monthly return predicts a statistically significant increase of 9 
percentage points in flows of retail funds and 7 percentage points in flows of institutional funds 
during expansion. At the same time, similar return growth predicts only an increase of less than 3 
percentage points in flows of both types of funds during recession period. These results reveal 
                                                              
81 The differences indicating in the graphs convexity of flow-performance relationship for retail funds are strongly 
significant (at 1% level). In contrast, we do not find any significant differences between the coefficients of fractional 
performance for institutional funds except the concave form observed in the leftmost of the Jensen’s alpha graph.   
82 See, for example, Cederburg (2008), and Shrider (2009). 142  
 
that  expansion  investors  of  both  types  of  funds  demonstrate  much  stronger  return  chasing 
behavior than recession investors. This finding is in line with the results of Cederburg (2008), 
who documents that return chasing behavior attributes expansion mutual fund investors rather 
than recession mutual fund investors.  
For retail funds, the coefficient of outperformance IOC is noticeably higher for expansion 
months. Thus, during expansion flows of the retail fund outperforming its investment category is 
expected to be 22 percentage points  higher than these of the underperforming  fund, and the 
difference is statistically significant. During recession, however, a retail fund outperforming its 
IOC in the prior month has approximately the same level of flows as its underperforming peer. 
This indicates that normalized cash flows of retail funds are sensitive to relative performance of 
fund, with respect to its IOC, only during expansion months. Flows of institutional funds are also 
found to be significantly related to relative fund performance only during expansion period. In 
line with the results that we report earlier in this chapter, sensitivity of institutional fund flows to 
relative fund performance is significantly weaker compared to that of retail funds’ flows.  
The  coefficients  of  Jensen’s  alpha  estimated  for  recession  are  twice  higher  than  the 
corresponding coefficients for expansion for both types of funds. This result reveals that the 
effect of risk-adjusted return on fund normalized cash flows is much stronger during recessions. 
Thus,  recession  investors  pay  higher  attention  to  fund  alpha.  Considering  findings  of  prior 
literature,  suggesting  that  mutual  funds  perform  –  at  risk-adjusted  basis  –  at  best  during 
recessions,
 83 this behavior seems to be rational, and may explain why this tendency is especially 
pronounced among presumably more sophisticated institutional investors.   
In addition, our results indicate that both institutional and retail fund investors tend to 
punish funds with a higher tracking error through withdrawing assets from those funds during 
expansions, while institutional  fund investors react more aggressively to a deviation of fund 
manager from the market. In contrast, recession investors of both types of funds do not punish 
fund managers for higher tracking error. Moreover, normalized cash flows of retail funds appear 
to be positively related to tracking error during bearish periods.  
Further, consistent with the results of Cederburg (2008), we find that exposure of fund to 
stock momentum has a different influence on fund normalized cash flows during expansion and 
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recession months. We find that for both types of funds, momentum exposure has much stronger 
influence  during  expansion  periods.  Moreover,  the  results  show  that  momentum-trading 
institutional  funds  attract  considerably  higher  inflows  than  their  retail  counterparts  during 
expansions,  while  those  funds  experience  relatively  lower  flows  over  recessions.  Thus, 
attractiveness  of  momentum  strategies  depreciates  during  recession  periods  when  the  stock 
market is going down.  
Finally, in line with our prediction, the results show that the difference between investors 
of retail and institutional funds in their sensitivity to fund expense ratio is more pronounced 
during recessions. This finding is consistent with our argument that individual investors care 
more  for  expenses  associated  with  their  participation  in  mutual  funds  since,  in  contrast  to 
institutional  investors,  they  pay  all  expenses  out  of  their  own  pocket.  At  the  same  time, 
institutional investors, being less sensitive to the price of service, are ready to pay more for 
higher quality or more convenient service. 
4.6   Conclusion 
The  typical  retail  fund  investor  differs  noticeably  from  the  typical  institutional  fund 
investor  in  his  level  of  financial  sophistication,  investment  objectives,  and  search  costs.
84 
Consequently, criteria that these two types of investors base their investment decision are likely 
to vary, making investment flow patterns of retail and institutional funds differ too. 
In this chapter, we study determinants of mutual funds’ investment flows separately for 
retail and institutional funds, examining how fund selection criteria vary across investors of these 
two types of funds. Examination of flows at the monthly frequency allows us to get more precise 
picture of fund flows’ dynamic as compared to analysis based on quarterly or annually estimated 
flows. 
We conduct our investigation using complete universe of diversified U.S. equity mutual 
funds for the period January 1999 to May 2009 in the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free U.S. Mutual 
Fund Database. We categorize  funds into retail  and institutional based on the corresponding 
designation provided by CRSP. Note that this classification may not be a precise identifier of 
                                                              
84 See, for example, Alexander, Jones and Nigro (1998), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and Palmiter and Taha 
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investor type. For instance, the final investment decision of 401k plans’ participants is taken by 
an individual investor, while their capital flows may combine flows of either an institutional or a 
retail fund. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume that the classification of funds into retail 
and  institutional  implies  differences  in  investor  composition  of  the  two  types  of  fund.  In 
particular, the overwhelming majority of retail fund investors apparently are regular individuals. 
At the same time, institutional investors, if participating in mutual funds, can be expected to 
invest in institutional funds. Furthermore, presumably more sophisticated institutional investors 
influence flows of institutional funds, while flows of retail funds are determined by investment 
decisions of unsophisticated – individual investors. 
We document a number of differences in the investment flow patterns consistent with 
client attributes. First, we find that customers of institutional mutual funds react more to criteria 
considered  sophisticated.  We  also  find  that  the  observed  difference  in  flow-performance 
relationship increases during recession periods. On the other hand, flows of retail funds have a 
stronger relationship with unadjusted performance measures.  
Consistently  with  the  empirical  findings  of  previous  literature,  the  flow-performance 
relationship appears to have a non-linear form.
85 However, the form of this relationship is not the 
same for flows of retail and institutional funds. While for retail funds, the relationship appears to 
have a convex form, implying that investors of those funds tend to allocate disproportionally 
more  into  good  performers,  but  do  not  punish  bad  performers  by  withdrawing  money.  For 
institutional funds, however, the form of flow-performance relationship appears to be convex 
only in the part reflecting disproportional priority of good performers to the rest of the funds. 
Conversely, the form is concave in the part reflecting punishment of bad performers. This result 
implies  that  investors  of  institutional  funds  withdraw  assets  from  poor  performing  funds 
punishing the worst performers the hardest, while allocating assets into good performing funds, 
investing more in the best performers.  
Our  findings  on  differences  in  the  form  of  the  flow-performance  for  retail  and 
institutional  funds  relationship  contribute  to  the  extensive  literature on  incentives  and driver 
factors  of  fund  manager  behavior.  The  convex  shape  of  the  flow-performance  relationship, 
observed for the funds of retail fund sample, implies that “winners take all”. As a result, fund 
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managers, who are typically compensated as a percentage of assets under management, have an 
implicit incentive to raise the risk of their portfolios in order to increase their chances to be 
among the winners, without taking a risk of being punished in case of failure.
86 At the same time, 
the observed concave-convex form of the flow-performance relationship for institutional funds 
may weaken fund manager incentive to follow the discussed risk-shifting behavior. 
Further,  our  results  indicate  that  relative  performance  of  funds,  with  respect  to 
benchmarks, is  an  important criterion  in  fund selection process. Both  institutional and retail 
funds,  outperforming  their  IOC,  experience  higher  flows  than  underperforming  funds.  The 
benchmark appears to have a stronger influence among investors of retail funds. In line with the 
Guercio and Tkac (2002) findings. The influence of the magnitude of the excess returns on find 
flows is found to be especially pronounced at the top of the performance distribution.  
In addition, we find a significant negative relationship between investment flows and 
tracking error – a measure of diversifiable risk – for both institutional and retail mutual funds. 
Thus, both types of  investor punish funds with  a higher tracking error through withdrawing 
assets from those funds, and the tendency appears to be much more pronounced for flows of 
institutional  funds.  Furthermore,  for  institutional  funds,  the  influence  of  tracking  error  on 
investment flows is stronger during expansion periods. In contrary, flows of retail funds are, 
though weaker than institutional flows, negatively related to tracking error during bullish periods 
and positively related to tracking error during bearish periods.  
We also provide evidence suggesting that flows of both types of funds are significantly 
positively  related  to  fund  momentum  exposure.  Consistent  with  the  literature  documenting 
variation  of  investor  behavior  across  different  market  conditions,  our  results  show  that 
momentum-trading  institutional  funds  attract  considerably  higher  inflows  than  their  retail 
counterparts  during  expansions,  while  those  funds  experience  relatively  lower  flows  over 
recessions.
87 
We  document  that  both  institutional  and  retail  funds  with  higher  inflows  in  the  past 
continue to experience higher inflows in the subsequent periods.
88 Moreover, this effect appears 
                                                              
86 See for example Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997). 
87 See, for example, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), and Glode Hollified, Kacperczyk, and Kogan (2009). 
88 See, for example, Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002). 146  
 
to be stronger for institutional funds. This result suggests that institutional fund investors exhibit 
stronger herding behavior, which is in line with the results reported by previous literature.
89  
Finally, fund expense ratio also appears to have a significant influence on flows of both 
types of funds. In particular, mutual funds with lower expense ratio experience higher inflows. 
Retail fund investors demonstrate stronger sensitivity to fund expense ratio, and the difference is 
even  larger  during  recession  periods.  Probably,  investors  of  institutional  funds  –  being  less 
sensitive to the price of services – due to the fact that they do not invest their own money – are 
ready to pay for higher quality or more convenient service. 
                                                              
89 See for example Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992b). 147  
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistics for Mutual Fund Sample  
The table presents summary statistics on the mutual fund sample obtained from the CRSP Survivor-Bias Free US Mutual Fund Database. The sample includes all U.S. equity mutual funds that 
existed at any time during January 1999 to May 2009 for which monthly total net assets (TNA) values are available. We exclude sector funds, international funds, specialized funds, and balanced 
funds. Panel A reports corresponding statistics for all funds. Panel B reports the statistics for the sample of retail funds, Panel C – for the sample of institutional funds. The final sample of all funds 
consists of 11,710 fund-entities comprising 818,530 fund-months, the sample of retail funds consists of 7,779 fund-entities comprising 577,648 fund-months, the sample of institutional funds 
consists of 3,931 fund-entities comprising 240,881fund-months. We report statistics for the total net assets for the fund at the end of month, the dollar monthly normalized cash flow (Flowj,t) for 
fund j during month t is measured as      ,  = (    ,  −     ,    × (1+     , ))/(    ,   ) (In this equation, the terms TNAj,t-1 and TNAj,t represent the total net assets for the fund at the 
end of month t-1 and t respectively, Rerj,t represents the fund’s return in month t), the dollar monthly net cash flow (NCFj,t) for fund j during month t  measured as      ,  =     ,  −     ,    ×
(1 +     , ), monthly fund return,  fund tracking error which is the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of fund excess return over previous 36 month and market portfolio 
excess return, turnover defined as the minimum of aggregate purchases or sales of securities during the year, divided by the average TNA, maximum front-end load, which is the maximum percent 
charges applied at the time of purchase, and expense ratio defined as the percentage of total investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s operating expenses. 
 
           
  Panel A: All Funds    Panel B: Retail Funds    Panel C: Institutional Funds 
  Mean  Median  25
th  75
th  St.D.    Mean  Median  25
th  75
th  St.D.    Mean  Median  25
th  75
th  St.D. 
                                   
Monthly TNA (mill.$)  431.84  28.39  4.16  154.95  2571.39    505.05  29.15  4.84  160.72  2952.69    247.02  27.24  2.97  144.12  1134.27 
Monthly Normalized Flows (%)  1.96  -0.06  -1.79  2.67  12.01    1.82  -0.21  -1.87  2.46  11.52    2.13  0.25  -1.59  3.06  12.82 
Monthly Net Cash Flows (mill.$)  0.88  0.01  -0.62  0.63  23.96    0.44  -0.02  -0.81  0.58  24.09    1.73  0.01  -0.30  0.85  22.94 
Monthly Return (%)  0.14  0.09  -1.37  1.64  2.48    0.13  0.08  -1.40  1.64  2.52    0.18  0.13  -1.29  1.65  2.36 
Tracking Error  0.017  0.015  0.010  0.022  0.010    0.018  0.016  0.010  0.023  0.010    0.016  0.015  0.010  0.021  0.009 
Turnover Ratio (%)  76.47  65.68  34.66  107.98  52.84    76.37  65.32  34.50  107.65  53.13    76.91  66.81  35.01  109.22  52.28 
Maximum Front-End Load Fee (%)  3.30  4.56  0.51  5.30  2.29    3.40  4.64  0.75  5.36  2.24    1.50  0.32  0.00  3.53  1.76 
Expense Ratio (%)  1.45  1.40  1.04  1.91  0.56    1.62  1.61  1.23  2.04  0.53    1.02  1.00  0.78  1.24  0.39 
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Table 4.2 
Determinants of Normalized Cash Flows: Retail versus Institutional Funds 
The table reports the coefficients from pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of funds’ monthly normalized cash flow 
on the 1
st lag of best performer dummy getting value 1 if fund monthly return is higher than return of its style in corresponding 
month and zero otherwise, the 1
st lag of fund’s monthly return, the momentum (UMD) loading calculated over the previous 36 
month of fund return, fund’s Jensen’s alpha calculated over the previous 36 months of fund return, fund tracking error which is the 
standard deviation of the residuals from the regression of fund excess return over previous 36 month and market portfolio excess 
return, the logarithm of fund total net assets estimated to the end of the previous month, the 1
st lag of fund’s monthly net cash flow, 
and expense ratio as at the end of the previous month and defined as the percentage of total investment that shareholders pay for the 
fund’s operating expenses. We also control but do not report coefficients of the monthly normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, 
turnover ratios as at the end of the previous month and defined as a minimum of aggregate purchases or sales of securities during 
the  year,  divided by  average  fund  total  net assets,  fund age  scaled  in  months,  and  time-style  interaction  dummies  for  each 
combination of month and style. Panel A (Specification (1)) reports the results for all funds in the sample. Panel B (Specification 
(2)) reports the results of the regression in which we interact each of the explanatory variables once with a dummy identifying retail 
funds and once more time with the dummy identifying institutional funds. We also include the dummy identifying institutional 
funds as a separate variable. The columns titled “Difference Institutional vs. Retail” reports differences between the coefficients of 
institutional and retail funds from the regression analysis summarized in Panel B, exhibiting the difference in effect of respective 
variable on fund money flows of the two types of funds. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard errors are 
clustered by funds. 
 


















  Difference 
Institutional vs. 
Retail 
               
               
Intercept/ Institutional Dummy Coef.    3.633    3.558  1.021    1.021 
    (23.59)    (20.80)  (3.14)    (3.14) 
Lagged Monthly Best Performers    0.166    (0.181  0.125    -0.056 
    (5.85)    (6.13)  (2.03)    (-0.84) 
Lagged Monthly Return    0.063    0.070  0.046    -0.024 
    (7.92)    (8.73)  (4.74)    (-3.46) 
UMD Loading    1.571    1.442  2.092    0.650 
    (8.82)    (7.48)  (5.95)    (1.70) 
Jensen’s Alpha    2.597    2.465  2.905    0.439 
    (38.27)    (33.39)  (22.35)    (3.09) 
Tracking Error    -0.297    -0.212  -0.586    -0.374 
    (-9.43)    (-6.56)  (-9.45)    (-5.82) 
Lagged Monthly Net Cash Flow    0.019    0.017  0.022    0.005 
    (17.43)    (14.44)  (9.81)    (1.92) 
Expense Ratio    -0.994    -1.098  -0.475    0.623 
    (-20.11)    (-19.11)  (-2.86)    (3.56) 
               
R sq. adjusted    0.048    0.050     
No. Fund-Months/Entities    394,361     394,361     
No. Fund- Entities    7,994    7,994     
               
Control variables included in each regression:    Lagged fund size and turnover ratio, fund age, normalized cash flow of 
fund’s IOC, month and style (growth, value, core) interaction dummies 
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Table 4.3 
The Effect of Relative Fund Performance with respect to its IOC 
The table reports the coefficients from pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of funds’ monthly normalized cash flow on 
“Fund Outperforming IOC” dummy variable taking value 1 if a prior month fund return was higher than the average return of all funds 
of fund’s IOC, interaction of prior month fund excess return (defined as a difference between fund return and market return) with 
“Fund Outperforming IOC” dummy, interaction of prior month fund excess return with [1-“Fund Outperforming IOC”], interaction of 
fund’s Jensen’s alpha (calculated over the previous 36 months of fund return) “Fund Outperforming IOC” dummy, interaction of 
fund’s Jensen’s alpha with [1-“Fund Outperforming IOC”], interaction of fund tracking error (which is the standard deviation of the 
residuals  from  the  regression  of  fund  excess  return  over  previous  36  month  and  market  portfolio  excess  return)  with  “Fund 
Outperforming IOC” dummy, interaction of fund tracking error with [1-“Fund Outperforming IOC”]. We also include as control 
variables but do not report the logarithm of fund total net assets estimated to the end of the previous month, the 1
st lag of fund’s 
monthly net cash flow, the monthly normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, turnover and expense ratios as at the end of the previous 
month, where turnover ratio is a minimum of aggregate purchases or sales of securities during the year, divided by average fund total 
net assets, and expense ratio is the percentage of total investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s operating expenses. In addition, 
we include time-style interaction dummies for each combination of month and style. Panel A (Specification (1)) reports the results of 
the regression analysis conducted for the sample of retail funds. Panel B (Specification (2)) reports the results of the regression 




  Panel A: Retail Funds 
 
Panel B: Institutional Funds 
 




  Above IOC  Below IOC 
 
Above IOC  Below IOC 
             
Intercept     1.442  ____    3.829  ____ 
    (9.15)      (11.25)   
Fund Outperforming its IOC     0.351  ____    0.003  ____ 
    (4.49)      (0.02)   
Monthly Excess Return  (on IOC)    0.225  -0.047    0.179  0.011 
    (8.60)  (-1.77)    (3.58)  (0.25) 
Jensen’s Alpha    2.690  2.134    3.193  2.982 
    (27.15)  (20.10)    (18.96)  (20.64) 
Tracking Error    -0.329  -0.326    -0.472  -0.524 
    (-8.00)  (-7.66)    (-6.05)  (-7.06) 
R sq. adjusted    0.049    0.031 
No. Fund-Months    308,797    114,432 
No. Fund- Entities    5,879    2,524 
             
Control variables included in each regression: 
 
Lagged fund size, net cash flow, turnover ratio, and expense ratios, fund age, 
normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, month and style (growth, value, core) 
interaction dummies 
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Table 4.4 
The Form of Flow-performance Relationship: Retail versus Institutional Funds 
The  table  reports  the  coefficients  from  piecewise  pooled  time-series  cross-sectional  OLS  regressions  of  funds’  monthly 
normalized cash flow on fund fractional performance measured with respect to fund IOC (first quintile reflects the lowest 20
th 
performance percentile, fifth quintile – the highest). We also include as control variables but do not report the logarithm of fund 
total net assets estimated to the end of the previous month, the 1
st lag of fund’s monthly net cash flow, the monthly normalized 
cash flow of fund’s IOC, in addition, regressions with monthly and annual return includes standard deviation of fund return over 
the previous 12 months. Panel A reports the results for the performance measures based on fund raw returns estimated at monthly 
and annual frequency; Panel B reports the results for the performance measures based on fund risk-adjusted returns: Jensen’s 
alpha and fund Fama-French alpha, where fund’s Jensen’s alpha and fund Fama-French alpha are calculated over the previous 36 
months of fund return. In addition, we include time-style interaction dummies for each combination of month and style. The first 
column of Panel A and Panel B reports the results for all funds in the sample. The last two columns of Panel A and Panel B 
report the results of the regression in which we interact each of the explanatory variables once with a dummy identifying retail 
funds and once more time with the dummy identifying institutional funds. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
standard errors are clustered by funds. 
  
Panel A           




    All 
Funds 




Based on Monthly Return           
           
Bottom Performance Quintile (Monthly)    0.023    0.028  0.006 
    (5.34)    (5.73)  (0.63) 
2
nd  Performance  Quartile (Monthly)    0.004    0.001  0.010 
    (1.49)    (0.52)  (1.63) 
3
rd  Performance Quartile (Monthly)    0.011    0.014  0.003 
    (4.45)    (5.51)  (0.60) 
4
th  Performance Quartile (Monthly)    0.011    0.009  0.016 
    (3.00)    (2.36)  (1.96) 
Top Performance Quintile (Monthly)    0.023    0.026  0.014 
    (6.89)    (7.47)  (1.87) 
R sq. adjusted             0.035    0.037 
No. Fund-Months            632,036       632,036 
No. Fund- Entities             10,687    10,687 
           
Based on Annual Return           
           
Bottom Performance Quintile (Annual)    0.059    0.066  0.035 
    (12.39)    (12.95)  (3.26) 
2
nd  Performance  Quartile (Annual)    0.028    0.024  0.038 
    (10.26)    (8.46)  (5.73) 
3
rd  Performance Quartile (Annual)    0.033    0.034  0.031 
    (13.12)    (12.70)  (5.41) 
4
th  Performance Quartile (Annual)    0.026    0.024  0.028 
    (6.79)    (6.13)  (3.44) 
Top Performance Quintile (Annual)    0.062    0.069  0.047 
    (17.03)    (17.30)  (6.11) 
R sq. adjusted             0.051    0.052 
No. Fund-Months           632,036    632,036 
No. Fund- Entities             10,687    10,687 
           
Control variables included in each 
regression: 
 
  Lagged fund size, net cash flow, turnover ratio, and expense ratios, 
fund age, normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, month and style 
(growth, value, core) interaction dummies 






Panel B           




    All 
Funds 




Based on Jensen’s Alpha           
           
Bottom Jensen’s Alpha Quintile     0.051    0.054  0.049 
    (9.68)    (9.85)  (3.90) 
2
nd  Performance  Quartile (Annual)    0.029    0.019  0.057 
    (9.33)    (6.01)  (7.43) 
3
rd  Performance Quartile (Annual)    0.029    0.029  0.025 
    (10.24)    (10.30)  (3.65) 
4
th  Performance Quartile (Annual)    0.031    0.028  0.039 
    (7.39)    (6.51)  (4.05) 
Top Jensen’s Alpha Quintile    0.049    0.052  0.040 
    (12.34)    (12.30)  (4.54) 
R sq. adjusted             0.051    0.052 
No. Fund-Months/Entities           413,130    413,130 
No. Fund- Entities             8,208    8,208 
           
Based on Fama-French Alpha           
           
Bottom Fama-French Alpha Quintile     0.056    0.054  0.065 
    (10.35)    (9.65)  (4.92) 
2
nd  Performance  Quartile (Annual)    0.022    0.020  0.032 
    (7.12)    (6.39)  (3.92) 
3
rd  Performance Quartile (Annual)    0.027    0.023  0.034 
    (9.09)    (7.79)  (4.81) 
4
th  Performance Quartile (Annual)    0.028    0.026  0.032 
    (6.92)    (6.39)  (3.36) 
Top Fama-French Alpha Quintile    0.044    0.044  0.044 
    (11.24)    (10.68)  (4.97) 
R sq. adjusted             0.047    0.048 
No. Fund-Months/Entities           413,130    413,130 
No. Fund- Entities             8,208    8,208 
           
Control variables included in each 
regression: 
 
  Lagged fund size, net cash flow, turnover ratio, and expense ratios, 
fund age, normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, month and style 
(growth, value, core) interaction dummies 
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Table 4.5 
Determinants of Normalized Cash Flows: Expansions versus Recessions 
The table reports the coefficients from pooled time-series cross-sectional OLS regressions of funds’ monthly normalized cash flow on the 1
st 
lag of best performer dummy getting value 1 if fund monthly return is higher than return of its style in corresponding month and zero 
otherwise, the 1
st lag of fund’s monthly return, the momentum (UMD) loading calculated over the previous 36 month of fund return, fund’s 
Jensen’s alpha calculated over the previous 36 months of fund return, fund tracking error which is the standard deviation of the residuals from 
the regression of fund excess return over previous 36 month and market portfolio excess return, the 1
st lag of fund’s monthly net cash flow, 
and expense ratio as at the end of the previous month defined as  the percentage of total investment that shareholders pay for the fund’s 
operating expenses. We also control but do not report coefficients of the logarithm of fund total net assets estimated to the end of the previous 
month, the monthly normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, turnover ratios as of the end of the previous month defined as a minimum of 
aggregate purchases or sales of securities during the year, divided by average fund total net assets, and time-style interaction dummies for 
each combination of month and style. Panel A reports the results for expansion months. Panel B reports the results for recession months. 
Panel B reports the results of the regression in which we interact each of the explanatory variables once with a dummy identifying retail funds 
and once more time with the dummy identifying institutional funds. Specifications (1) and (2) of Panel A and Panel B correspondingly report 
the results of the regression in which we interact each of the explanatory variables once with a dummy identifying retail funds and once more 
time with the dummy identifying institutional funds. The columns titled “Difference Institutional vs. Retail” reports differences between the 
coefficients of institutional and retail funds from the regression analysis summarized in the first two columns of each of the panels, exhibiting 
the difference in effect of respective variable on fund money flows of the two types of funds. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
standard errors are clustered by funds. Level of statistical significance for difference between corresponding coefficients of each type of fund 
esrimated for expansion and recession months is reported only for the coefficients for which the difference is significant on at most 10% 
level. A letter a denotes 1% significance level, b – 5% level, and c – 10% level.  
% 
   
Panel A: Expansion Period 
 
Panel B: Recession Period 
    (1) 
 
    (2) 
 
 
    Retail  Institutional 
  Difference 
Institutional vs. 
Retail 
  Retail  Institutional 
  Difference 
Institutional vs. 
Retail 
Intercept/ Institutional Dummy 
Coef.
  3.469 b  0.959 c    0.959    4.291  0.922    0.922 
    (18.14)  (2.51)    (2.51)    (15.24)  (1.93)    (1.93) 
Lagged Monthly Best Performers    0.211 b  0.128 c    -0.083    0.005  -0.124    -0.129 
    (6.37)  (1.77)    (-1.08)    (0.08)  (-1.01)    (-0.99) 
Lagged Monthly Return    0.090 a  0.074    -0.016    0.029  0.024    -0.005 
    (8.59)  (5.25)    (-1.68)    (2.36)  (1.66)    (-0.61) 
UMD Loading    1.099  2.173 c     1.074    0.833  0.313    -0.520 
    (4.92)  (5.05)    (2.32)    (2.53)  (0.57)    (-0.86) 
Jensen’s Alpha    2.263 a  2.737 a    0.474    4.225  5.404    1.180 
    (29.19)  (19.00)    (3.03)    (21.52)  (15.64)    (3.03) 
Tracking Error    -0.242 a  -0.599 a    -0.357    0.185  0.008    -0.177 
    (-6.95)  (-8.76)    (-5.09)    (2.50)  (0.06)    (-1.17) 
Lagged Monthly Net Cash Flow    0.018 a  0.022    0.004    0.012  0.020    0.008 
    (14.08)  (8.70)    (1.34)    (8.22)  (8.12)    (2.91) 
Expense Ratio    -1.054 a  -0.542    0.512    -1.370  -0.344    1.026 
    (-16.25)  (-2.70)    (2.44)    (-15.00)  (-1.60)    (4.41) 
                     
R sq. adjusted    0.051        0.049     
No. Fund-Months    298,636        94,356     
No. Fund- Entities    6,991        6,149     
                     
Control variables included in each 
regression: 
  Lagged fund size and turnover ratio, fund age, normalized cash flow of fund’s IOC, month and 
style (growth, value, core) interaction dummies 
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Figure 4.1 
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Figure 4.3  
The Flow-performance Relationship 
The  figure  summarizes  the  results  reported  in  Table  4.6  and  depicts  the  relationship  between  fund  monthly 
normalized cash flows and lagged fractional performance for corresponding performance measures. Graph A shows 
the relationship for fractional performance measured based on monthly raw return. Graph B shows the relationship 
for fractional performance measured based on annual raw return. Graph C shows the relationship for fractional 
performance measured based on fund Jensen’s alpha calculated over the previous 36 months of fund return, and graph D 
shows  the  relationship  for  fractional  performance  measured  based  on  fund  Fama-French  alpha  calculated  over  the 
previous 36 months of fund return. 
 
      A.                                                                                             B. 
                
      
      C.                                                                                             D.  

































































































































































Recession*– Expansion periods over the sample period February 1999 – May 1999 
(based on NBER business cycle classification**) 
 
 
Business Cycle Reference Dates    Duration in Months 




Recession    Expansion 
           
February 1999  February 2001        25 
March 2001  October 2001    8     
November 2001  November 2007        73 
December 2007  May 2009    18     
           
Total      26    98 
 
 
*”A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting 
more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial 
production, and wholesale-retail sales.” (NBER) 
**Source: an official website of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html; visited on 07.02.2010. 
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